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“The story of the sciences in the twentieth century is one of a steady loss of certainty. Much of 
what was real and machine-like and objective and determinate at the start of the century, by 
mid-century was a phantom, unpredictable, subjective and indeterminate. What had defined 
science at the start of the century—its power to predict, its clear subject/object distinction—
no longer defined it at the end.” (Arthur, 1994) 
This certainly - and particularly - also applies to economic sciences. In the 19th century, the 
economic debate was still characterized by a remarkable degree of diversity. Alongside mar-
ginalism there was the historical school of economics, socialist economics or the romantic 
school of economics. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Wick-
sell and Walras had prevailed against Schmoller and Wagner, against Marx and Engels, and 
against Adam Müller. The mathematical, model-based penetration of economic life, so-called 
neo-classicism, assumed that it was fitting to describe individuals as rational utility maximisers 
(homo oeconomicus) and that the interactions between these individuals could be accurately 
reflected by the market model. However, the faith of neo-classicist economists in the market 
was severely shaken in 1929 by Black Friday and the subsequent Great Depression. A few years 
later, Keynes (1936) showed that it is by no means true that markets always act rationally 
under all circumstances. Nevertheless, this was not the end of neoclassical thinking, which 
later experienced a revival from the end of the 1960s onwards.  
However, there were always critics of neoclassical theory, who partly developed some very 
interesting alternative approaches. New institutional economics is certainly one of these, par-
ticularly the aspects of transaction cost theory and the theory of asymmetric information. 
From the mid-1970s, they were joined by behavioral economics as a new branch of economic 
research. This is closely related to two names: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, and began 
with their publications "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases" (1974) and “Pro-
spect Theory: A Study of Decision Making Under Risk” (1979). Prospect theory was the first 
comprehensive and theoretically sound outline of a descriptive decision theory, and finally 
ended the hegemony of normative rationality. The systematic description of framing effects 
and changing risk behavior dependent on the translation of a decision into profits and losses 
yielded important new recognitions (Thaler, 1980). Based on the findings of Kahneman and 
Tversky, the academic discourse over the past 25 years has increasingly focused on explana-
tory models founded upon behavioral science. In empirical studies, a large number of obvious 
anomalies and inconsistencies were revealed which challenged the market efficiency para-
digm, and in many cases clearly refuted it.  
The increasing frequency of severe disruptions in the capital markets (1987, 2000 and 2008) 
has further fueled existing doubts about neoclassical theory and increased the interest in al-
ternative research approaches. Today, economic research is characterized by a pleasing vari-
ety of both theories and methodology, and empirical research has emancipated itself from 
model theories of economic behavior. Experimental research has become an integral element 
of economics: alongside psychological aspects, cultural, sociological and political factors are 
also taken into account. In the field of neuroeconomics even medical procedures are involved 
in economic research. 
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This cumulative dissertation also reflects the new methodological diversity in economics. 
Three out of the five studies here consider the decision-making behavior of real subjects with 
the aid of laboratory experiments. The first study analyses real investment alternatives with 
the aid of simulated calculations. In the final study, large amounts of real data (capital market 
forecasts by experts) are evaluated econometrically.  
In terms of content, the dissertation deals with capital markets. In spite of a wide range of 
attempted interpretations, sophistic market theories and ambitious models, academic re-
search still has difficulty in explaining the fundamental characteristics of real capital markets. 
Capital markets are complex systems with a considerable degree of momentum, and they are 
driven by a large number of heterogeneous market participants who possess incomplete in-
formation and a limited capacity for rational decision-making (Rapp und Cortes, 2017).  
For investments in the capital markets, portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) plays a significant 
role and continues to form an important basis for decisions on the structuring of investment 
portfolios. For risk-averse investors, diversifying the contents of their portfolio is a meaningful 
strategy. This applies whenever the direction of future price trends is uncertain, because di-
versification is pointless when market movements are highly predictable. In that case the op-
timal strategy would be to invest solely in the security with the highest expected increase in 
value (Markowitz, 1991). In practice, however, investors continue to hold underdiversified 
portfolios which contradict the basic tenet of portfolio theory.  
The first three studies of this cumulative dissertation address different aspects of portfolio 
management. In the first study, a simulated calculation is used to examine the suitability of 
fine wine as a means of diversification. In the second study, possible causes for sub-optimal 
diversification decisions are analyzed. And in the third study, a method to improve the meas-
uring of the risk preference of subjects is presented. The fourth study deals with the influence 
of mood on the tendency towards herd behavior in the context of share price forecasts. Fi-
nally, the fifth study evaluates real interest rate forecasts for the Asia-Pacific region in order 
to be able to assess the forecasting skills of the financial analysts in question. In the following 
sections I present a more detailed look at the five studies: 
First contribution – Investing in Fine Wine from the Perspectives of Diversification and Costs 
For centuries now, investors have been practicing the concept of spreading their financial in-
vestments widely. By investing in securities of different geographical origins, from various is-
suers and in different currencies, the risk level of a portfolio is reduced. The theoretical basis 
of portfolio theory was laid down by Harry Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952). By diversifying the 
assets held, the risk of a portfolio can be reduced while maintaining the same expected return, 
or returns can be increased without also increasing the level of risk involved. This is dependent 
on acquiring a combination of investments which are not completely correlated with each 
other.  
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In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in the years 2008-2009, interest rates fell signifi-
cantly worldwide. This is one of the main reasons why investments in alternative asset classes 
have recorded such impressive growth rates. Alongside hedge funds, private equity and com-
modities, so-called exotics or collectables are also increasingly being considered as investment 
opportunities. Fine wine is also a commodity whose positive diversification features have been 
noted. The foundation for this is that the factors which influence wine prices differ significantly 
from those which influence the prices of classical asset classes. In this way, an important pre-
condition for meaningful diversification is already fulfilled. 
Previous studies which have taken a closer look at the suitability of fine wine for diversification 
purposes based their arguments on index data. However, making calculations on the basis of 
index data contains pitfalls: index data does not include any costs. And precisely this question 
is of particular relevance for investments in fine wine, as there have been no low-cost index 
funds until now.  
In order to create a direct link to previous studies, the first stage of the analysis was carried 
out on an index basis. And then, in a second stage based on real-life investment opportunities, 
the actual investment costs were taken into account. The reference currencies were the US 
dollar and the euro. For the analysis from an equity index perspective, the MSCI World Index 
was used, and for bonds the JPM Global Government Bond Index was deployed. Regarding 
the data for investment in fine wine, the main focus was on the Liv-ex-50 Index calculated by 
the London wine exchange Liv-ex, which was founded in 1999. The period of observation was 
January 2004 to May 2018. In the case of the real investments, index funds were used for the 
data analysis of equities and bonds. As there is no index fund for fine wine, the Liv-ex-50 index 
was used, including all of the costs of a real investment. The cost elements for the calculation 
were made available by the Liv-ex for the period from March 2010 onwards. The period of 
observation was thus March 2010 to May 2018. 
Various portfolio compositions were compared over the periods indicated. On the one hand, 
a portfolio of 50% shares and 50% bonds was compared to a portfolio of 45% shares, 45% 
bonds and 10% fine wine. On the other hand, a portfolio of 25% shares and 75% bonds was 
compared to a portfolio of 20% shares, 70% bonds and 10% fine wine. As benchmarks, the 
annualized return, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio of the respective portfolios 
were calculated. 
The findings are sobering and clearly contradict those of the previous studies. At an index 
level, the inclusion of fine wine merely leads to a slight improvement of the annualized return, 
but at the same time to an increase in risk. Only in the case of one portfolio in euros was the 
Sharpe ratio somewhat better after the inclusion of 10% fine wine. When considering the real 
investment opportunity, the considerable costs of an investment in fine wine have to be 
viewed against the low costs of an index fund for equities and bonds. In US dollars and euros, 
the annualized returns were lower in comparison to the portfolios without the inclusion of 
fine wine, and at the same time the risk levels are higher. The inclusion of wine always led to 
a decrease in the Sharpe ratio. 
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The conclusion on the diversification properties of fine wine in a portfolio which is already 
broadly diversified in traditional asset classes can be fittingly described as sobering. Fine wine 
does not lead to any improvement of the Sharpe ratio from the index perspective in US dollars, 
and when the base currency is euros only a slight increase was achieved in one out of two 
portfolios. When all costs are taken into account, there was not a single case where the risk-
return profile of a portfolio was improved by the inclusion of fine wine. However, on the pos-
itive side it can be noted that the costs of an actual investment in fine wine have been notice-
ably reduced. This is due to the establishment of the Liv-ex global fine wine market, which 
charges considerably lower transaction fees than classical auction houses.  
Second contribution – Portfolio Diversification: The Influence of Herding, Status-Quo Bias 
and Gambler's Fallacy 
Empirical and experimental research has provided a multitude of explanations for why sub-
jects obviously find it so difficult to make meaningful decisions when it comes to diversifying 
their portfolios. The explanations range from difficulties in dealing with correlations to 
wrongly-assessed probabilities of occurrence, the so-called illusion of knowledge or a simple 
home bias. 
Other possible causes for sub-optimal diversification decisions were established in interviews 
carried out with experts. Observing the investment decisions of others seems to make some 
investors lose sight of optimal diversification opportunities (herding behavior). The state-
ments and recommendations of well-known investors can play a significant role here (guru 
effect). In addition, clinging to existing portfolio compositions can also prevent an optimal 
level of diversification (status-quo bias). Finally, an orientation towards what are presumed to 
be patterns in share prices (gambler’s fallacy) can lead to wayward investment decisions.  
In this context, the question arises as to whether herding behavior, status-quo bias and/or 
gambler's fallacy are really suitable explanations for why many subjects fail to diversify their 
portfolios sufficiently. 
The significance of these phenomena in economic decision-making situations has been empir-
ically proven, but in the context of diversification decisions, they have not been analyzed by 
means of experiments until now. 
In this experiment, the subjects only have two investment alternatives to choose from (share 
A and share B). A total of four units can be invested. These two shares can only exhibit two 
price movements, and both events have a probability of occurrence of 50%. The return on 
share A and the return on share B are independent random events. With regard to their ex-
pected returns and risk exposure, share A and share B do not differ. In this situation the effi-
cient frontier is reduced to a single point (a 50-50 mix of shares A and B) so that the exact 
nature of the risk aversion of the subjects exerts no influence on the optimal decision with 
regard to the portfolio. 
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In Treatment 1, in each round the subjects receive all of the information available about their 
fellow players: they receive a performance table of the participants along with the decisions 
they have made about their portfolios. In Treatment 2 the subjects are not informed about 
the investment decisions of the other subjects and their investment success. The comparison 
between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 is intended to provide information about how strongly 
herding behavior (orientation towards the majority of their fellow players or towards the most 
successful player (guru)) keeps the subjects from optimally diversifying their portfolios.  
In Treatment 1, the subjects begin with different sub-optimal investment portfolios. In Treat-
ment 3, all of the subjects receive the optimal portfolio as an initial starting point. If the phe-
nomenon of status-quo bias occurs, the optimal portfolio should be chosen more frequently 
in Treatment 3, and the average risk exposure should be lower than in the basic treatment.  
Given that the rational strategy of choosing two units each of share A and share B only applies 
to risk-averse investors, non-risk averse subjects are identified using the method of Holt and 
Laury (2002) and not taken into consideration in the remainder of the evaluation. 
Overall, it had to be noted that in this experiment to the large majority of portfolio decisions 
(more than 62%) have to be considered sub-optimal. This is also shown by the fact that the 
average standard deviation of the chosen portfolios is higher than that of the standard devia-
tion of the portfolio which would have been chosen if the rational strategy had been pursued.  
The portfolio decisions of the subjects remained fragmented throughout the entire game. A 
tendency towards herding was not recognizable. Neither the most frequently chosen portfo-
lios from the previous round nor the portfolio of the leading player had a decisive effect on 
the subjects' decisions.  
Status-quo bias did not exert an important influence on the occurrence of sub-optimal diver-
sification decisions either. The differing starter portfolios in Treatments 1 and 3 did not have 
a lasting effect on the composition of the subjects’ portfolios. 
However, the observation of randomly-occurring presumed patterns in the returns of the two 
shares did indeed have a very significant influence on the portfolio decisions of the subjects. 
This was also confirmed by the statements of the subjects who were interviewed in rounds 5 
and 11 about the motives behind their decisions: over 40% stated that the identification of 
patterns of results had formed the basis for their decisions. It can thus be stated that gambler’s 
fallacy can play an important role in sub-optimal portfolio diversification. 
Third contribution – Measurement of Risk Preference 
Individual risk preference is a key element in economic theory on decision-making under un-
certainty. Experimental research on diversification behavior also requires a clear differentia-
tion between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects, because decisions which can be 
absolutely meaningful for a risk-loving subject are often completely inconceivable for a risk-
averse subject and vice versa. Robust findings in experimental research on diversification can 
only be obtained when one knows how to categorize the risk preferences of the subject.  
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Well-known procedures for the measurement of risk preference are put to the test here, and 
a new approach is presented which is superior to the previous ones with regard to the une-
quivocal identification of risk preference while taking a relevant risk of loss into account. 
A good procedure for determining risk preference should above all comply with three criteria: 
it must be a simple and clear procedure; it must be possible to unambiguously differentiate 
between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects; and the influence of loss aversion 
on risk preference must not be neglected. It should also be easy to understand so as not to 
confuse the subjects. They should be able to grasp and assess the decision-making situation 
without difficulty. Clearly identifying risk preference is necessary in order to correctly interpret 
the results of experimental research on diversification behavior. And finally, the possibility of 
not inconsiderable losses is important, as this is an essential characteristic of real capital mar-
kets, and loss aversion plays a significant role in the formation of risk preferences. 
Among the existing approaches, that used by Holt and Laury (2002) has undoubtedly received 
the most attention. The fact that not every subject - given the complexity of the task - makes 
decisions which lead to unambiguous results has already been established several times (Ja-
cobson und Petrie, 2009; Charness und Viceisza, 2011). The approach used by Eckel and Gross-
man (2008) is significantly simpler and clearer, and that deployed by Crosetto and Filippin 
(2013) even more so. However, all three procedures exhibit the weakness that in certain situ-
ations it is not possible to differentiate in an unambiguous and reliable way between risk-
averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects. In addition, in these three approaches the influ-
ence of loss aversion on risk preference is not taken into consideration, or not sufficiently. 
The procedure proposed here, however, fulfils all three of the criteria mentioned above. It 
deals with a decision to choose between two lotteries. The subjects take a card - they can 
choose between taking a card from pile A or one from pile B. Both piles consist of four playing 
cards each. The subjects are informed that the expected return is identical in both piles. In 
addition, the subjects are made aware of the fact that pile A leads to results which fluctuate 
slightly around the expected value (risk-averse subjects choose this option), while pile B leads 
to results which fluctuate considerably around the expected value (risk-loving participants 
choose this option). In addition, there is the option for subjects to be indifferent towards 
choosing pile A or pile B (risk-neutral participants choose this option).  
The game is played using three treatments which have the same expected value and only dif-
fer with regard to their level of risk. Treatment 1 does not contain any possibility of losses, 
while in Treatment 2 there is a possibility of a small loss and in Treatment 3 there is a possi-
bility of a significant loss. The reason behind the selection of the treatments is the expectation 
that only the possibility to suffer a relevant loss will lead to a correct identification of the risk 
preferences of the subjects.  
The results were clear and largely in line with our expectations. Comparing Treatment 1 (no 
possibility of loss) and Treatment 2 (possibility of a small loss), there was no significant differ-
ence between the number of participants who chose pile A or pile B. In treatment 3, however 
(possibility of a significant loss) a marked influence on risk preferences can be noted. In Treat-
ment 3 less than half of the subjects (in percentage terms) chose the risky variation (pile B) 
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than was the case in Treatments 1 and 2. Our presumption that a high risk of loss influences 
the risk preference of subjects considerably more than a low risk of loss was thus confirmed. 
Overall, it can be stated that taking a possibility of a significant loss into account leads to a 
more realistic recording of the three categories of risk preference (risk averse, risk neutral und 
risk loving). In the form of our treatment 3 we are thus proposing a new approach which dis-
criminates clearly between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects. In addition, the 
approach is clear and simple and contains a possibility to suffer a significant loss. 
Fourth contribution – Herd Behavior and Mood 
In economics, herding behavior is considered to be present when subjects imitate the behav-
ior of other subjects, or make economic decisions on the basis of the views, assessments or 
actions of others. By now it is considered proven that the mood of subjects has an influence 
on their economic decision-making. There have been a large number of studies on this topic. 
However, until now no-one has conducted experiments on whether different moods also have 
an affect on the likelihood of herding behavior.  
In our experiment, the subjects forecast share prices. They have the opportunity to determine 
future share price levels via four fundamental influencing factors which have a constant effect 
on the share price. An error-free forecast is made more difficult by a random influence which 
leads to a situation where even subjects who act rationally only manage to successfully fore-
cast an average of 40% of share prices. The greater the distance between the forecasts of the 
subjects and the expected value of the share (rational strategy), the lower the probability that 
their forecast will prove correct. In extreme cases, the probability that the forecast is correct 
can fall to 0%.  
After they have made their preliminary forecasts, the subjects are informed of the consensus 
forecast and thus offered the chance to orientate themselves towards other subjects and to 
possibly exhibit herding behavior. In a between-subjects design, three treatments are used 
(neutral, positive and negative mood). Mood is influenced by means of film excerpts which 
are shown to the subjects.  
As expected, the subjects did not act in accordance with homo oeconomicus, a figurative hu-
man characterized by the ability to make rational decisions: they did not always choose the 
rational strategy. Less than a third of all forecasting decisions followed the rational strategy, 
and less than a tenth of all subjects made rational decisions throughout all rounds of the game. 
After the consensus forecast had been announced, the subjects adjusted their forecasts in 
more than a third of all cases. These adjustments were almost exclusively in the direction of 
the consensus forecast. A clear tendency towards herding behavior was thus observed. The 
average standard deviation of the preliminary forecasts was significantly higher than the av-
erage standard deviation of the final forecasts. This is also a sign of herding behavior. We 
observed hardly any indications of anti-herding, however: only one in 29 of the revisions of 
forecasts were not carried out in the direction of the consensus forecast, but in the opposite 
direction. The rational strategy was followed significantly more often in the treatment positive 
- 9 - 
and treatment negative than in the treatment neutral. Adjustments of the forecasts in the 
direction of the consensus forecast (herding behavior) occurred significantly less often in the 
treatments positive and negative than in the treatment neutral. 
Herding behavior can be observed very frequently. The mood of the subjects has an influence 
on the occurrence of herding: the tendency towards herding behavior is stronger in a neutral 
mood than in a positive or negative mood. In addition, less attention is paid to the rational 
strategy in a neutral mood than in a positive or negative mood. 
Fifth contribution – The Accuracy of Interest Rate Forecasts in the Asia-Pacific Region: Op-
portunities for Portfolio Management 
Future interest rate trends are of key significance for almost all investment decisions on the 
capital markets. This applies not only to price trends on the bond markets, but also to share 
prices (discounting rates) and exchange rates (interest rate parity theory). As a rule, financial 
market analyses normally begin with a forecast of future interest rate trends.  
It is therefore not surprising that the reliability of interest rate forecasts has been of great 
interest to academics and businesspeople for a considerable time now. In the past 40 years, a 
large number of empirical studies on the reliability of interest rate forecasts have been pre-
sented. The results varied, but were predominantly disappointing. Until today, forecasts of US 
interest rates have formed the main focus of studies, although European interest rates, par-
ticularly those in the UK and Germany, have also been analyzed. In the Asia-Pacific region, 
previous studies have largely focused on Japan. Otherwise there have been very few publica-
tions. At the same time, the economic significance of the Asia-Pacific area has increased con-
siderably: the region accounts for 60% of world economic growth, and the weighting of the 
Asia-Pacific bond market in the global bond indices already exceeds 21%. 
The study on interest rate forecasts in the Asia-Pacific region covers the period from 1990 to 
2015 and focused on interest rate forecasts from Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. As a basis we used 
forecasting data which had been published on a monthly basis in the journal Asia Pacific Con-
sensus Forecasts. In addition to the analysis of consensus forecasts, all of the forecast time 
series issued by banks, investment companies, consulting firms, associations and industrial 
companies were evaluated. This amounted to a total of 532 forecast time series with 85,264 
individual interest rate forecasts. The deployment of a large number of procedures to measure 
the quality of forecasts enabled us to create a comprehensive picture of forecasting perfor-
mance in the Asia-Pacific region. Comparisons to the naïve forecast were carried out with the 
aid of the Diebold-Mariano test. In order to assess the quality of the forecasts with regard to 
the direction of the interest rate trends, the sign accuracy test was used, while the unbiased-
ness test enabled a search for systematic forecasting errors. Finally, the existence of topically-
oriented trend adjustments was tested for with the aid of the TOTA coefficient. 
The results were very sobering in part. A very large proportion of all forecast time series are 
characterized by the phenomenon of topically-oriented trend adjustments. This means that 
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the overwhelming majority of all forecast time series tend to reflect the present rather than 
the future. In addition to this, almost all of the forecast time series proved to be distorted.  
However, some of the results of the study are also surprisingly positive. The sign accuracy test 
revealed that almost half of the forecast time series grasped the future trend (rising or falling 
interest rates) significantly better than a random walk forecast. In this context, at least part of 
the forecasts for Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Thailand proved to be particularly successful.  
Compared to the naïve forecast, some of the interest rate forecasts analyzed, particularly 
those for interest rates in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand were sur-
prisingly positive.  
Overall it can be stated that - at least in some countries and for some forecast horizons - fore-
casts of future interest rate trends in the Asia-Pacific region are significantly more successful 
than those made in other parts of the world. This has consequences for portfolio manage-
ment: it opens up opportunities to achieve excess returns by investing selectively. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the meaningfulness of fine wine as an alternative investment, with par-
ticular focus on the costs of investing in fine wine. Is fine wine suitable for further diversifying 
and thus improving the risk-return profile of portfolios invested in global equities and bonds? 
This analysis takes place in an initial stage on an index basis and in a second stage on the basis 
of real investment opportunities. The reference currencies are the US dollar and the euro. In 
order to observe stock indexes, the MSCI World Index is used, and for bonds the JPM World 
Government-Bond Index is deployed. Regarding the data for investment in fine wine, the main 
focus is on the Liv-ex-50 Index. The time period is defined by the availability of the data. For 
the observation of indices, the period is from the beginning of 2004 to May 2018. For obser-
vation on the basis of a real investment the period is from March 2010 to May 2018. In the 
case of the real investment, index funds are used for the data analysis of equities and bonds. 
As there is no index fund for fine wine, the Liv-ex-50 index is used including all of the costs of 
a real investment.  
Various portfolio compositions are used for the periods indicated. On the one hand, a portfolio 
of 50% equities and 50% bonds is compared to a portfolio of 45% equities, 45% bonds and 
10% fine wine. On the other hand, a portfolio of 25% equities and 75% bonds is compared to 
a portfolio of 20% equities, 70% bonds and 10% fine wine. As benchmarks, the annualised 
return, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio of the respective portfolios are calculated. 
The results for the periods indicated are sobering. The inclusion of fine wine leads - at an index 
level - to only a slight improvement of the annualised return, but to a marked increase in risk. 
When considering the real investment, the considerable costs of an investment in fine wine 
come to bear. The annualised return is lower and at the same time the risk is higher than that 
of portfolios which do not include fine wine. It is only when the index is viewed in euros that 
a slight improvement of the Sharpe ratio in one portfolio can be recorded. When costs are 
considered, the inclusion of fine wine leads to a worsening of the Sharpe ratio in all cases. This 
result is a significantly more critical verdict on this diversification opportunity than was noted 
in the previous studies by Masset and Weisskopf (2010), Masset and Henderson (2010), Bouri 
(2014), Bouri et al. (2016) and Aytac et al. (2016). By contrast, our results confirm the studies 
which point out the high costs of investment in fine wine and which reach largely negative 
findings when analysing real investments in wine investment funds (Burton and Jacobsen, 
2001, Masset and Weisskopf, 2015). 
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1 Introduction 
Don’t put all your eggs in one basket. One of the most important principles in investing is to 
hold a diversified portfolio. This means spreading one’s capital between different investment 
forms in order to reduce dependency on one form of investment, because no matter how 
convinced one may be by an investment, things can turn out differently to how one imagined.  
For centuries, investors have been practicing the concept of spreading financial investments 
widely. By investing in securities of different geographical origins and from various issuers, the 
risk of a portfolio is reduced. The fundamental principles of portfolio diversification can be 
seen in the brochures of investment funds as early as 1870 (Rutterford and Sotiropoulus, 
2016). The theoretical basis of portfolio theory was laid down by Harry Markowitz (Markowitz, 
1952). Via the diversification of assets, the risk of a portfolio (as measured by the standard 
deviation) can be reduced while maintaining the same expected return, or the returns can be 
increased without also increasing the risk involved. In order to achieve this, one has to not 
only take the individual risk into account when selecting equities, but also the price trends of 
various forms of investments over the course of time. When one asset loses value, another 
can gain. So, if they are not completely correlated, portfolio risk can be reduced by mixing 
different forms of investment. Spreading one’s investments is possible in various ways. It can 
be done via different asset classes, or also by investing internationally in a range of countries 
and currencies. The best-known asset classes are equities, bonds and money-market instru-
ments. These are referred to as classical or traditional asset classes, while all other types are 
described as alternative asset classes.1 The price movements of alternative asset classes are 
different from those of the classical asset classes, which is what makes them so interesting. 
This is also the reason why they are suitable for diversification and for reducing portfolio risk.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in the years 2008/2009, interest rates fell signifi-
cantly worldwide. Due to the very low returns, the prices of many bonds were noticeably 
higher than their redemption value. Until the point in time when the bond is repaid, there will 
therefore be price losses, so other investment opportunities with a chance of price increases 
thus gain in attractiveness. This is also one of the reasons why there has been impressive 
growth in alternative investments (Kräussl, 2017). Alongside hedge funds, private equity and 
commodities, so-called exotics or collectables are also increasingly being viewed as invest-
ment opportunities.2  
An issue which has been debated more frequently in recent years is investment in wine (Ash-
ton, 2010), whereby the positive aspects of diversification are particularly emphasized. The 
foundation for this is the fact that the factors which influence wine prices differ significantly 
from those which influence the prices of classical asset classes. The main influences on wine 
prices are the weather and thus the quality of the wine, the origin and classification3 of the 
wine, and their evaluation by independent experts (above all Robert Parker).4 The great influ-
ence the weather has is indisputable: a lot of rain in winter, a growth period with warm tem-
peratures and a dry phase towards the end of the growth period and during harvesting are 
                                                          
1 There is no standardised definition of the term ‘alternative investments’. Everything which is not stocks or 
bonds should therefore be viewed as alternative investments (Fraser-Sampson, 2011). 
2 An overview of studies on the performance of collectables can be found in Burton (1999). 
3 The classification of wines in Bordeaux was first carried out at the time of the 1855 World Exhibition for wines 
from Medoc. The first growths (at that time there were four, since 1973 there have been five) were classed as 
Premier Grand Crus. These are the Chateaux Haut-Brion, Lafite-Rothschild, Latour, Margaux and Mouton-Roth-
schild. 
4 See Ashenfelter et al., 1995, Ali et al., 2010, Dubois and Nauges, 2010, Hay, 2010, Masset et al., 2015, Ashton, 
2016. 
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ideal conditions for high-quality wines. The influence of expert evaluations is more limited, 
because the quality of the wine is initially determined by the weather and the know-how of 
the producer. The assessment by experts ultimately only confirms the quality determined by 
the above-mentioned factors (Lecocq, 2006). In addition, an IMF study also established eco-
nomic growth in the emerging markets as an important influence on the development of wine 
prices (Cevik, 2011). The factors which influence wine prices thus differ considerably from the 
factors which determine the values of traditional asset classes. This is already a good indicator 
that wine could be suited towards improving the risk-return profile of securities portfolios. 
For wine to be suitable as an investment, certain conditions must be fulfilled. The term fine 
wine investments is used when the following are in place: (1) There is a secondary market, (2) 
the wine has the potential to improve in the bottle, (3) the winery has a longer track record in 
the production of high-quality wines, and (4) there are positive evaluations by independent 
experts. The annual trading volume in the fine wine market is estimated to be around $4-5bn 
(in 2004 this was only approx. $ 1bn) 5. Unlike other commodities such as gold or oil, fine wine 
is not traded on a standardized basis; there are too many different wines and too many trading 
places. The founding of the London International Vintners Exchange (Liv-ex) in 1999 was there-
fore a milestone in the professional trade with fine wine. Liv-ex is the world’s most important 
electronic exchange for fine wine. It provides a weekday market for wine dealers, traders and 
brokers. The difference to auction houses is that only registered traders are allowed to trade 
here. In addition, the wines traded here are solely those which comply with the definition of 
fine wine, and not antique wines. Liv-ex calculates and publishes its own research and price 
index and follows strict transparency rules. The daily database of Liv-ex goes back as far as 
2004 and thus provides sufficient history for the analysis in this study.6 
Studies have been dealing with wine as an investment since the end of the 1970s. Krasker 
(1979) concluded that the returns from storing wine are no higher than from investing in no-
risk investments. His database were the prices of wines from Bordeaux and California which 
were auctioned between 1973 and 1977 by Heublein, at the time a very well-known wine 
trader. Jaeger (1981) observed a longer period from 1969 to 1977 and reduced the assumed 
storage costs by using Freemark Abbey Winery as a basis for his calculations. He determined 
a performance above risk-free investments. In a long-term study covering the period 1900 to 
2012, Dimson et al. (2015) came - on the basis of auction results and a ‘value-weighted arith-
metic repeat sales regression’7 approach - to a geometrically-weighted average return of 5.3%. 
Taking storage and insurance costs into account, this is reduced to 4.1% (transaction costs can 
reduce the result further). For their study, the authors collected the prices of five wines. The 
wines are: Haut-Brion, Lafite-Rothschild, Latour, Margaux and Mouton-Rothschild. The major-
ity of the prices originate from Christie’s auction house in London. For an overview of the 
studies dealing with the issue of the performance of wine investments, see Storchmann 
(2012).  
For this paper, studies which mainly focus on the diversification features of wine are of great 
relevance.  These studies use time series of indices as their basis for calculations, and the ma-
jority of them come to positive results. According to them, the risk-return profile is signifi-
cantly improved by including wine in a portfolio of traditional asset classes. In a study on the 
                                                          
5 Most of the trading volume of wine is accounted for by dealers, and approx. 10% by auctions of the Liv-ex wine 
exchange (source: liv-ex.com). 
6 Bouri (2013) argued the case for using Liv-ex index data: it can be viewed as a reference for the fine wine market. 
7 Price trends are calculated here on the basis of transactions for exactly the same wines over time. 
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period from 1983 to 2002, Kumar (2010) compared the Fine Wine 50 index8 with the FTSE 100 
(UK equities), the Dow Jones Industrial Average (US equities), UK treasury bonds and US 30-
year treasury bonds. His results show that investing in wine is more profitable than investing 
in stocks or bonds. Its volatility is higher than that of bonds, but lower than that of equities. 
The positive diversification effects in particular are emphasized. The portfolio with the highest 
return in Sterling and US dollars consisted entirely of wine. The minimum variance portfolio in 
Sterling consisted of 18% wine, 4% equities and 78% bonds. In US dollar it consisted of 1% 
wine, 1% equities and 98% bonds. It was shown that the Sharpe ratio9 of the portfolio was 
higher with the inclusion of wine than without it.  
In an analysis covering the period 1996 to 2007, Masset and Henderson (2010) showed on the 
basis of data from the Chicago Wine Company10 that investing in wine is advantageous. An 
attractive return was obtained and the correlation with equities was not significant. This 
means that investment in wine leads to a meaningful diversification of portfolios. The portfolio 
with the highest Sharpe ratio contains a higher proportion of wine than equities.  
Masset and Weisskopf (2010) established that for the period 1996-2009 that the General Wine 
Index11 and above all the Grand Crus from Bordeaux from the best vintages achieved a better 
return than stocks, and at the same time exhibited lower volatility. A look at other wine indices 
also confirms that higher returns and lower risks were obtained than in the Russell 3000 Index. 
In another study, Bouri (2014) compared two portfolios over the period 1988-2013 against a 
benchmark portfolio of 100% US stocks (S&P 500). The first of these portfolios contained 50% 
fine wine (Liv-ex-Fine Wine Investables Index) 12 and 50% US stocks. The second portfolio was 
a minimum variance portfolio consisting of US stocks and fine wine. It comes to the conclusion 
that adding wine investments to an equities portfolio leads to a reduction of risk. Particularly 
in times in which equities are losing value, wine shows its positive diversification effects. 
Aytac et al. (2016) considered the period 2007-2014 in their study. On the basis of Liv-ex indi-
ces13 as well as WineDex indices14, gold, French equities (CAC indices), bonds (EMTX)15 and a 
worldwide equities portfolio (MSCI World), they came to the conclusion that the inclusion of 
Bordeaux wines improved the efficiency in every case. Investors thus obtain a higher return 
for the same risk if they include wine in their portfolios. The results for the WineDex indices 
are clearly better than those of the London Liv-ex wine exchange. Both the Sharpe ratios and 
the modified Sharpe ratios16 improved.  
 
                                                          
8 This is an index which was calculated on the basis of auction results. It contained wines from ten producers 
from five vintages. The vintages were from 1961-1990. 
9 The Sharpe ratio, also called the reward to variability ratio, measures the average return earned in excess of a 
risk-free interest rate per unit of volatility. 
10 The Chicago Wine Company (TCWC) was founded in 1974 and held its first wine auction in April 1977. It was 
thus the second company after Heublein to hold wine auctions in the USA.  
11 The index data is from the Chicago Wine Company and contains all auctions which took place from January 
1996 to February 2007. 
12 The index of the Liv-ex fine wine market in London consists of Bordeaux wines from the 24 leading producers. 
The selection takes place on the basis of evaluations by the wine critic Robert Parker (at least 95 out of 100 
points). 
13The indices are entirely transparent and can be viewed on the web page https://www.liv-ex.com/news-and-
insights/indices/. 
14 The indices are calculated on the basis of wine auctions in France. They consist of 40 representative wines of 
the region from the last ten vintages. No information is available on the weighting of the index components. 
15 The EMTX indices cover the whole of Europe and were developed in 2003 by EuroMTS and Euronext. 
16 The modified Sharpe ratio assumes a skewed rather than a normal distribution of returns. 
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Bouri et al. (2016) analyzed monthly data for the period 2001-2014 and focused on the ad-
vantages in terms of diversification of investing in wine at times in which traditional asset 
classes are doing poorly: they examined the function of wine as a hedge and safe haven. For 
investments in wine, the Liv-ex Fine Wine Investables Index was used. The UK stock market 
was represented by the FTSE 100 Index. In the periods indicated, a differentiation was made 
between bull markets (from 2004-2007 and 2009-2014) and bear markets. They came to the 
conclusion that the risk-return ratio of a portfolio is improved by adding wine to it. Fine wine 
is thus considered to function as a hedge in negative market periods. 
The main issue in this study is whether fine wine as an alternative asset can make a positive 
contribution towards diversification in a portfolio which is already broadly diversified in terms 
of the traditional assets of stocks and bonds. A positive contribution towards diversification is 
an increase of the annualized return over the observation period with the same level of risk 
(as measured by standard deviation) or a reduction of risk with the same return. In order to 
consider return and risk, the Sharpe ratio is used. The Sharpe ratio measures the over-return 
(the return in excess of the risk-free interest rate) per unit of risk. The higher the Sharpe ratio, 
the more attractive is the portfolio. In the studies mentioned, the analysis is carried out on 
the basis of index data. Index figures do not contain any costs and are merely useful for a 
theoretical view, so in this study calculations on the basis of real investments are used in ad-
dition to calculations on the basis of index values. A real investment can be carried out by 
purchasing investment funds. In the case of actively managed investment funds, investors del-
egate their investment decisions to experts who have specific expertise in this asset class. For 
this service, experts receive payment from their investors. In the case of fine wine, the dele-
gation of investment decisions to experts appears particularly meaningful. This is because (1) 
there is no central market place and therefore there is no single price, (2) it is difficult to obtain 
access to market-relevant information due to a lack of regulation, and (3) high costs can be 
mitigated by economies of scale. In order to measure the success of funds which invest in fine 
wine, Masset and Weisskopf (2015) examined the performance of nine wine funds over the 
period 2000-2013. Only one of the nine funds considered 17 succeeded in achieving a higher 
Sharpe ratio than the benchmark index18. In their study, they also drew attention to the prob-
lem of liquidity in wine funds. In the years 2012 and 2013, for example, there were already 
two funds which had to close due to liquidity problems and contradictions in evaluations.19 
The reason for the closure of the funds was a high number of fund shares being returned by 
investors. If the contents of the fund cannot be liquidated quickly in such a case, the fund has 
to close.20  
Alongside investing in actively managed investment funds, buying a passive index tracker is 
another way of investing in an asset class. Passive funds aim to replicate an index. Their per-
formance is therefore very close to that of the underlying index. The advantage are the 
                                                          
17 This was the Nobles Cru Fund. However, it should be noted that the fund used a method to evaluate the wines 
in its fund which it has developed itself and which is not comparable with other funds.  
18 The benchmark index is the Liv-ex-Fine Wine Investables Index. 
19 In autumn 2012 the Nobles Cru Fund had to close. After doubts about the correctness of the evaluation method 
of the fund wines, a large number of investors returned their shares. The Nobles Cru Fund had by far the best 
results in the Masset and Weisskopf study. In June 2013 The Vintage Wine Fund also had to close due to poor 
performance and accelerated sales. 
20  Some open real estate funds in Germany suffered the same fate in 2010. After doubts arose in the press about 
the evaluations of properties in the fund, shareholders rushed to return their holdings. When the liquidity of the 
fund had been used up it had to close. In some cases, it took years for the properties to be sold and for the 
investors to be reimbursed. In cases where shares in the fund were sold in a hurry, some investors suffered losses 
of up to a third of their investment. 
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significantly lower fees compared to actively managed funds. In this study, real investments 
are therefore considered on the basis of index funds. In the traditional asset classes, there are 
suitable funds available, but for investments in fine wine there has been no index fund until 
now. An index is therefore calculated which takes into account all of the actual costs of the 
investment. 
In order to determine whether including fine wine in a portfolio is meaningful, the underlying 
investment universes have to be established. This applies to the stocks, bonds and the invest-
ment in fine wine. The goal is to ensure a well-diversified portfolio. Sufficient and easily real-
izable liquidity should also be present. This means that it must be possible to invest in the 
markets represented by the indices, and that they are not only available as a calculated index. 
On the equities side, the MSCI World Index was therefore chosen, which is broadly diversified 
according to countries as well as sectors of industry. It represents the global stock markets. 
The bond side is represented by the J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Index: this global 
index is composed of the bonds of the leading industrial nations and is broadly diversified 
according to countries as well as maturities. With regard to the selection of a wine index, the 
majority of recent studies concentrate on the indices of the London International Vintners 
Exchange (Liv-ex). In the case of an index for investment in fine wine, transparency, investa-
bility and liquidity are decisive for the analysis. Transparency means that all information about 
the index must be available. This includes the index components, the weighting of the com-
ponents, and the time and extent of changes in the index. The question of the price at which 
the wines in the index are calculated also has to be transparent. Investability means that all of 
the wines in the index are available, and that the wines are traded regularly. The criterion of 
liquidity means that the bid-ask spread is not too large, and that the order book consists of a 
sufficient number of positions. Due to the criteria to be fulfilled, the use of an index of the Liv-
ex wine exchange in London is absolutely necessary, because only these indices fulfil all of the 
criteria. Which Liv-ex index is selected depends on the criterion of the highest level of liquidity. 
For years now, the five most sought-after wines at the London wine exchange have been the 
five first growths from Medoc/Bordeaux. The proportion of Bordeaux wines in total Liv-ex 
trading is falling, but they still accounted for over 70% in 2017. The Liv-ex Fine Wine 50 Index 
consists of the last ten physically available vintages of all of the Premier Grand Crus from Bor-
deaux. The composition of the index is changed at the end of June every year. The five wines 
from the oldest vintages leave the index, and the five newly-available wines are included in 
the index (for the current composition of the index, see Appendix 1).21 At this point, one could 
argue that in the last few years in particular, the wines from Burgundy have increased in value 
particularly, and that one should perhaps choose an index containing these wines. However, 
the decisive criterion is liquidity, and for an investment in the index components the majority 
of the wines of the index, or even all of the wines, should be sufficiently tradeable. That only 
applies to the Liv-ex-50 Index. 
For the comparison of a real investment, suitable index funds for the mentioned index uni-
verses have to be selected. To this end, an adequate history going back to March 2010 is 
                                                          
21 Chateau Latour announced in 2012 that it was no longer going to sell any more wines en primeur (i.e. while 
they are still in the vats, as wine futures). In future, Latour will only put its wines on the market when it considers 
them ready to drink. For this reason, the last physically available vintage from Chateau Latour is 2011. For all 
other producers it is the 2015 vintage. The composition of the index with regard to Chateau Latour has had to 
adjust itself to the decision on the release of new vintages. This decision means that the 2011 vintage from Cha-
teau Latour will remain in the index until a new vintage is sold. Until this point in time, the percentage proportion 
of the annual index adjustment (in relation to the entire index) will be reduced from 20% to 16% (8 out of 50 
wines). 
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required, given that from that time the data for the calculation of the wine index including the 
costs is available. It is also important that at that point in time the index fund contained a 
certain amount of assets, thus signalizing sufficient tradability. A higher level of assets in the 
fund additionally ensures that the fix cost components of the fund do not have any significant 
negative effects on its performance. On the basis of these criteria, the iShares MSCI World 
Ucits ETF22 (fund launched on 28 October 2005) was chosen for the investment in stocks. On 
the bonds side, it is the iShares Global Government Bond Ucits ETF (fund launched on 6 March 
2009). As all of the costs are included in the price of the fund, the fund price can be used as 
the basis for the calculation of performance. For the real investment in fine wine, the Liv-ex 
50 Index including costs is used. The data required for the calculation was made available by 
Liv-ex. Until now there have been no studies in which bid-ask spread data from the Liv-ex wine 
exchange has been taken into account. A particularly interesting question here is whether the 
costs of the actual investment in wine are higher than those of the investment in the tradi-
tional asset classes. Burton and Jacobsen (2001) already highlighted the high costs of an in-
vestment in wine. When transaction, insurance and storage costs are considered, the annual 
return is reduced by up to 3.7 percentage points according to their calculations. 
Two portfolios were established as a starting point which can be considered as representative 
for different risk preferences. On the one hand, a portfolio is used which consists of 50% each 
of stocks and bonds (portfolio A1), and on the other hand a portfolio consisting of 25% stocks 
and 75% bonds (Portfolio B1). 10% of fine wine is added to both of these portfolios (Portfolio 
A2 and Portfolio B2).23 In the calculation, an annual rebalancing24 at the start of the year is 
presumed. 
Due to the results of the previous studies, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: In a broadly diversified portfolio of traditional asset classes, a positive diversifi-
cation effect is achieved by including fine wine.  
The first null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 1: In a broadly diversified portfolio of traditional asset classes, no positive di-
versification effect is achieved by including fine wine. 
The results of Burton and Jacobsen (2001) give grounds for the presumption that the positive 
diversification effect will disappear when taking the costs of an investment in fine wine into 
account. The second hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Taking all cost components into account, the risk-return ratio of a portfolio con-
sisting of traditional asset classes is not improved by adding fine wine.  
The second null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 2: Taking all cost components into account, adding fine wine leads to an im-
provement of the risk-return ratio of a portfolio consisting of traditional asset classes. 
 
                                                          
22 iShares is the name of the index provider. It belongs to the investment company BlackRock. UCITS is the ab-
breviation of Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities and is a term which refers to the 
EU regulations on investment funds. ETF stands for Exchange Traded Fund and means that this is an exchange-
traded index fund. 
23 The portfolios then consist of 45% stocks, 45% bonds, 10% wine, and 70% bonds, 20% stocks and 10% wine. 
24 The index weightings which have changed due to price trends are reset to their initial levels. 
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2 Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
A calculation using historical data forms the basis of the analysis. The results of the calcula-
tions with historical data are considered to be an indication that they might also apply to the 
future. In a first step, a connection is made to the approaches used in the previous studies and 
a calculation is made using index figures (Aytac, 2016, Bouri, 2016). An index is composed of 
the price data of the index components and is normally calculated on a daily basis. It therefore 
represents a specific investment universe. Indices are benchmarks which supply a data basis 
for asset allocation and diversification decisions, as well as the calculation of key figures (Ku-
mar, 2010). With regard to equities, the MSCI World Index was chosen for the calculation with 
index values. This global index is broadly diversified: It is composed of stocks from 23 coun-
tries, and the weighting is made according to market capitalization. Due to the size of the US 
stock market, the focus is therefore on US companies (index weighting approx. 60%, followed 
by Japan with around 9%). The bond market is represented by the J.P.Morgan Global Govern-
ment Bond Index. This global index is composed of government bonds of the 13 most im-
portant industrial nations and is broadly diversified in terms of countries (the index weighting 
of the USA is approx. 40% here, followed by Japan with around 20%). The index covers the 
entire range of maturities from one to up to ten years to maturity. The Liv-ex Fine Wine 50 
Index was chosen to represent fine wine. It consists of the last ten physically available vintages 
of all of the Premier Grand Crus from Bordeaux. The calculation on the basis of the indices 
covers the period from the beginning of 2004 to the end of May 2018. This period of time was 
chosen because it corresponds to the maximum availability of the data for the Liv-ex 50 Index 
of the London wine exchange. The calculation is carried out on the basis of monthly index 
figures which were taken from Datastream.25 
As the indices are calculated on the basis of gross prices, costs are not taken into account. In 
a second step, the calculation on the basis of an actual investment is carried out. Investors 
who invest their own funds are predominantly interested in real opportunities and risks. A 
calculation on the basis of an index is therefore not very meaningful. This analysis is thus much 
closer to reality than previous studies. Stocks and bonds are both represented by investment 
funds. Here, the costs of an actual investment are taken into account. Passively managed in-
dex funds in particular are suited to reflect the exposure in a chosen asset class, because they 
are not subject to the risk of a deviation from the index in terms of returns which is due to 
active management. Deviations from the performance of the index are only due to the mod-
erate fees which are included in index funds. For the calculation on the basis of the actual 
investments, the performance data of the iShares MSCI World Ucits ETF are used for the eq-
uities and that of the iShares Global Government Bond Ucits ETF for bonds. An adequate data 
basis is available for both of these stock exchange-traded index funds. The data required was 
made available by the fund company iShares. In the case of fine wine, on the other hand, there 
is no index fund available, and the calculation is made on the basis of an index where all costs 
are inclusive. The basis of the calculation is the Liv-ex 50 Index. The costs for the investment 
in the wines of the index via the Liv-ex trading platform were made available for the period 
from March 2010 to May 2018. This period thus forms the starting point for a comparison on 
the basis of an actual investment. Figure 1 summarizes the two perspectives. 
                                                          
25 Information on the composition of the index is in the appendix. 
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Table 1: Basic data 
 Period Stocks Bonds Fine wine 
Index compari-
son 
01/2004-
05/2018 
MSCI World JPM World Liv-ex 50 
Real investment 03/2010-
05/2018 
iShares MSCI 
World Ucits ETF 
iShares Global-
Government 
Bond Ucits ETF 
Liv-ex 50 includ-
ing costs 
2.2 Methodology 
In order to analyze the diversification properties of fine wine, the above-mentioned portfolio 
components must be combined into an overall portfolio. The composition of the portfolio is 
determined by the degree of risk aversion of the subjects. The higher the degree of risk aver-
sion, the lower the proportion of the riskier asset. We oriented ourselves towards the system 
used in previous studies (Canner et al. 1997, Masset and Weisskopf, 2010, Aytac, 2015), which 
linked the proportion of equities in the portfolio with the willingness to take risks. We can use 
two portfolios as an example: they only differ in the size of the proportion of stocks and bonds 
in the portfolio. Portfolio A1 consists of 50% stocks and 50% bonds. Portfolio B1 consists of 
75% bonds and 25% equities. Alternative investments or exotic asset classes are usually only 
included in small portions, as they are subject to special risks. Studies which have analyzed the 
inclusion of alternative asset classes used between 5% and 15% (Bessler and Wolff, 2015). We 
followed this system and considered the inclusion of 10% fine wine to be appropriate. Portfo-
lio A2 is thus composed of 45% stocks, 45% bonds and 10% fine wine. After the inclusion of 
fine wine, Portfolio B2 is structured as follows: 20% stocks, 70% bonds and 10% fine wine. 
Figure 2 summarizes the portfolios. 
Table 2: Portfolio compositions 
 Portfolio A1 Portfolio B1 Portfolio A2 Portfolio B2 
Stocks 50% 25% 45% 20% 
Bonds 50% 75% 45% 70% 
Fine wine 0% 0% 10% 10% 
 
In the analysis, the portfolio is composed of up to three parts. Due to increases and decreases 
in values, the index weightings shift over the years. Indices which have a better performance 
than others present in the portfolio obtain a higher index weighting. In order to compensate 
for the shifting of the index weightings, rebalancing is carried out at the beginning of the year. 
The index weightings are thus reset to the initial level.  
In order to judge performance, the annualized return of the respective portfolio is calculated 
over the observation period. For risk, the standard deviation is calculated. The standard devi-
ation represents the overall risk of the portfolio; however, the simultaneous consideration of 
return and risk is decisive. The Sharpe ratio, also called the reward to variability ratio, is a 
suitable tool for this purpose. It measures the average return earned in excess of the risk-free 
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rate per unit of volatility or total risk. The higher the figure, the better. The Sharpe ratio is 
calculated according to the following formula (Sharpe, 1964): 
S(x) = (rx-Rf) / StdDev (x), 
whereby S(x) is the Sharpe ratio, rx is the portfolio return, Rf the risk-free interest rate, and 
StdDev (x) is the standard deviation. In US dollars, the 3-Month US Treasury Bill rate26 was 
used as the risk-free interest rate (Rf). In euros it is the 3-month Libor rate27. 
The calculation was carried out in the base currency of US dollars as well as in euros. The dollar 
is the world’s most significant investment currency, with the highest trading volume of any 
currency. It can thus also be viewed as the most representative currency. The euro is the 
world’s second most-important reserve currency. The data series of the stock and bond index 
are available in US dollars as well as euros. The wine index used is quoted in sterling and is 
changed into US dollars28 and euros. Table 3 shows an overview of all the portfolios which 
were compared. 
For the calculation on the basis of the actual investments, the performance data of the iShares 
MSCI World Ucits ETF are used for equities and that of the iShares Global Government Bond 
Ucits ETF for bonds. There is no index fund for the investment in the Liv-ex 50 wine index. The 
calculation of the Liv-ex 50 is carried out on the basis of traded prices or the mid-prices29 of 
the index components. As is usual in index calculations, transactions fees, bid-ask spreads, and 
storage and insurance costs are not taken into account. Transaction costs are the fees which 
are charged for buying and selling. At the Liv-ex wine exchange they are a percentage of the 
transaction volume. Bid-ask spreads are the difference between the best buying price and the 
best selling price on the stock exchange. As the Liv-ex 50 wine index is calculated from the 
mid-prices between the bid and ask price, there is a price deviation when transactions are 
made. This price difference has to be taken into account in the calculation of the index includ-
ing costs. The following costs are therefore included in the calculation of the index including 
costs: (1) The cost of the initial investment30, (2) the cost of the annual change of the compo-
sition of the index31, (3) the annual storage and insurance costs for the storage of the wines in 
the wine exchange’s warehouse, and (4) the annual subscription fees for access to the stock 
exchange. An exact list of the costs can be viewed in Appendix 232. An annual management 
fee, such as those contained in stock and bond funds, is ignored. The bid-ask daily data for the 
                                                          
26 The data was taken from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed.org. For 
the period 01/2004 to 05/2018 the average interest rate was set at 1.22%, and for the period 03/2010 to 05/2018 
it was set at 0.3%. 
27 The data is available from the website https://de.global-rates.com. For the period 01/2004 to 05/2018 the 
average interest rate was set at 1.36%, and for the period 03/2010 to 05/2018 it was set at 0.25%. 
28 The rate of the US dollar to the British pound is referred to as the cable. The reason for this is that a cable was 
laid on the bed of the Atlantic in the mid-19th century in order to enable messages to be transmitted. 
29 The mid-price method can be viewed at https://www.liv-ex.com/news-and-insights/indices using the link: Mid 
Price logic here. 
30 One-off purchase of the portfolio at the ask price plus transaction costs. 
31 The five oldest vintages are sold, and the five new physically available vintages are bought (spread plus trans-
action costs, purchase at the ask price, sale at the bid price). The changeover of the vintages of Chateau Latour 
takes place on an irregular basis and is dependent on the release of new vintages.  
32 As some fees are volume-dependent, an investment amount of £10 million is assumed. 
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individual wines of the Liv-ex 50 Index are used to calculate the costs of an initial investment 
and the costs of the annual index adjustments.33 
Table 3: Portfolio comparisons, hypotheses 
Index calculation Hypothesis 1: 
Portfolios with a higher Sharpe ratio 
Portfolio A1 in USD vs. Portfolio A2 in USD A2 
Portfolio B1 in USD vs. Portfolio B2 in USD B2 
Portfolio A1 in EUR vs. Portfolio A2 in EUR A2 
Portfolio B1 in EUR vs. Portfolio B2 in EUR B2 
Real investment Hypothesis 2: 
Portfolios with a higher Sharpe ratio 
Portfolio A1 in USD vs. Portfolio A2 in USD A1 
Portfolio B1 in USD vs. Portfolio B2 in USD B1 
Portfolio A1 in EUR vs. Portfolio A2 in EUR A1 
Portfolio B1 in EUR vs. Portfolio B2 in EUR B1 
3 Results 
The index data for the period between the beginning of 2004 and the end of Mai 2018 in USD 
shows a surprising picture regarding performance and standard deviation as well as the 
Sharpe ratio (see Table 4). The annualized return of the wine index at +6.96% is below that of 
the equities (+7.13%) and above that of the bonds (+3.80%). Risk as measured by the standard 
deviation is highest in the wine index by a clear margin. Its figure of 29.07% is significantly 
above that of the equities (16.35%) and bonds (5.29%). The Sharpe ratios reflect this relation-
ship between return and risk. The wine index has the lowest Sharpe ratio at 0.2. The bonds 
have the highest Sharpe ratio at 0.49, while that of the equities is 0.36. In order to calculate 
the risk-free interest rate, the average interest rate of the 3-month Treasury Bill rate of 1.22% 
was determined over the period. 
The results do not, however, reveal anything about possibly positive characteristics in terms 
of portfolio diversification, because the deciding factor are the correlations. The portfolio with 
50% stocks and 50% bonds (A1) achieved an annualized return of 6.04% with a standard devi-
ation of 7.54%. Adding 10% fine wine34 (A2) increases the return to 6.31% while simultane-
ously increasing the standard deviation to 9.07%. The Sharpe ratio shows a clear picture. The 
inclusion of the wine index reduces the Sharpe ratio from 0.64 to 0.56. It must be noted that 
this result speaks against including fine wine in this portfolio. The results of the second port-
folio consisting of 25% stocks and 75% bonds (B1) are just as clear. The return of the portfolio 
consisting of traditional asset classes can be increased from 5.04% to 5.35% by including fine 
                                                          
33 Given that the index is calculated according to the mid-price method, the transactions at bid or ask prices (at 
half the spread) are included in the calculation of the index including costs. 
34 The composition of the portfolio is then: 45% stocks, 45% bonds and 10% fine wine. 
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wine (B2). However, at the same time, the risk in terms of the standard deviation also rises 
clearly from 4.44% to 6.18%. The Sharpe ratio of 0.86 is reduced to 0.67 by the inclusion of 
fine wine, while the return-risk profile thus worsens considerably. 
Expectations regarding the improvement of the risk-return profile by including fine wine were 
not fulfilled. On the contrary, the Sharpe ratios worsened in both cases. One could possibly 
make the selection of the Liv-ex 50 wine index responsible for this: the index consists entirely 
of Bordeaux wines. Since 2015, wines from Burgundy have achieved significantly higher re-
turns than those from Bordeaux. However, this argument can be countered by the fact that 
the Liv-ex 50 was among the best-performing indices over the entire observation period, while 
wines from Burgundy only started to increase in value considerably from 2015 onwards. On 
the other hand, a look at liquidity speaks against this: a broader index with a larger number of 
less ‘liquid’ wines would clearly lose when the return including all costs is calculated. The ad-
vantage of the gross price increases in Burgundy wines would soon be counteracted by the 
high costs. 
Table 4: Index comparison in US dollars (1/2004-5/2018) 
Period 
2004-
5/2018 
100% 
stocks 
(MSCI 
World in 
USD) 
100% 
bonds 
(JPM 
World in 
USD) 
100% 
Fine 
wine 
(Liv-ex 
50 in 
USD) 
Portfolio 
A1 
(50% 
stocks, 
50% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
A2 
(45% 
stocks, 
45% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Portfo-
lio B1 
(25% 
stocks, 
75% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
B2 
(20% 
stocks, 
70% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Return (an-
nualized) 
7.13% 3.80% 6.96% 6.04% 6.31% 5.04% 5.35% 
Standard 
deviation 
16.35% 5.29% 29.07% 7.54% 9.07% 4.44% 6.18% 
Sharpe ra-
tio 
0.36 0.49 0.20 0.64 0.56 0.86 0.67 
 
As long as equities are represented by the globally-diversified MSCI World Index, bonds by the 
globally diversified JPM World Index and fine wine by the Liv-ex-50 Index, no positive diversi-
fication effect can be attached to the inclusion of fine wine in two differently-weighted port-
folios. On this basis, its inclusion cannot be recommended. The diverging results of previous 
studies can be traced back to a different data basis: they used different time period, different 
indices and a different base currency. 
In order to address the issue of the different base currency, we also carried out a calculation 
with the euro as the base currency (see Table 5). Here one can see a change in the overall 
picture in favor of fine wine. When Portfolio A1 with 50% stocks and 50% bonds is considered 
from a risk-return perspective, it has a Sharpe ratio of 0.2. This figure is identical to that of 
Portfolio A2 which includes 10% wine. In the case of Portfolio B2 consisting of 25% stocks and 
75% bonds, the inclusion of 10% wine creates a slightly positive diversification effect. The 
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Sharpe ratio increased to 0.17 (previously 0.16) in the portfolio consisting of 20% stocks, 70% 
bonds and 10% wine. 
Table 5: Index comparison in euros (1/2004 - 5/2018) 
Period 
2004-
5/2018 
100% 
stocks 
(MSCI 
World in 
EUR) 
100% 
bonds 
(JPM 
World in 
EUR) 
100% 
fine 
wine 
(Liv-ex 
50 in 
EUR) 
Portfolio 
A1 
(50% 
stocks, 
50% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
A2 
(45% 
stocks, 
50% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Portfolio 
B1 
(25% 
stocks, 
75% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
B2 
(20% 
stocks, 
70% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Return 
(annual-
ized) 
5.47% 2.19% 5.30% 4.40% 4.71% 3.41% 3.76% 
Standard 
deviation 
22.04% 12.03% 35.73% 15.12% 16.53% 12.79% 14.26% 
Sharpe ra-
tio 
0.19 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.17 
 
The index comparison can only provide a theoretical indication of diversification properties. 
The reason for this lies in the calculation of the index. Indices do not contain any costs, and it 
is therefore not possible to invest in them at the prices given. The cheapest way to invest in 
indices is via index funds. Index funds are  
offered by a multitude of fund companies. They allow investors to invest in the index universe 
at low fees. Their performance is that of the index minus the costs. In the traditional asset 
classes, the availability of index funds is very high, and the costs are low. In the case of alter-
native asset classes, however, availability is very low, or non-existent as in the case of fine 
wine.  
For the calculation of the Liv-ex 50 Index including costs, the spreads between the prices of 
the wines at which an immediate sale is possible (bid price) and the prices at which an imme-
diate purchase is possible (ask price) play a decisive role. As the index is recomposed at the 
end of June every year, the buying and selling has to be done at exactly this point in time: 
wines which no longer form part of the index are sold at the current buying rate (bid price), 
and wines which are newly included in the index are bought at the selling rates (ask prices). 
Figure 1 shows the average spreads of all index figures over the period of analysis.35  
Compared to the index data, the fund data for the period between March 2010 and May 2018 
shows a strongly diverging picture regarding performance and standard deviation as well as 
the Sharpe ratio36  (see Table 6). This is definitely also due to the changed time scale, but 
                                                          
35 A glance at the Liv-ex trading page shows that during the changeover of the index the calculation of transac-
tions at bid or ask prices is legitimate. A potential wine index fund with a fund volume of only £10 million would 
have to sell over forty 12 bottle cases of the current oldest vintage (2006) for the index changeover. Due to the 
need for a timely changeover, this would presumably only be possible at average prices below the bid price. 
36 The average risk-free interest rate was set at 0.3% for the period 03/2010-05/2018. 
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above all it is because this is now fund data which contains all the costs of an investment. The 
iShares MSCI World Ucits ETF USD exhibits an annualized performance of +9.69% with a stand-
ard deviation of 11.10%. The Sharpe ratio is 0.85. The iShares-FTSE-G7 Government Bond Ucits 
ETF USD only achieved an annualized return of +1.32% with a standard deviation of 5.69%. 
The Sharpe ratio is 0.18. The Liv-ex 50 Index including costs exhibits an annualized perfor-
mance of 0.02% with a standard deviation of 17.42%. The Sharpe ratio is -0.02. Here one can 
already note the difference to the analysis of the index data: by looking at a real investment, 
all of the key figures are - as expected - worse. This is shown most clearly in the investment in 
fine wine.  
Figure 1: Average bid-ask spreads of all index figures of the Liv-ex 50 
 
 
When the two portfolios including fine wine are compared, the annualized performance com-
pared to the portfolios without fine wine is lower. For the portfolio with 50% stocks and 50% 
bonds, the annualized return over the period between March 2010 and May 2018 was 5.67% 
compared to 5.19% for the portfolio including 10% fine wine. At the same time, risk as shown 
by the standard deviation rose from 5.25% without wine to 5.91% with wine. The portfolio 
with 75% bonds and 25% stocks achieved a performance of 3.54% compared to only 3.06% 
for the portfolio with 10% wine. The standard deviation of the portfolio without wine was 
4.18%. Including 10% fine wine increased the risk to a figure of 5.13% for the standard devia-
tion. In both portfolios, the inclusion of 10% fine wine leads to an even clearer worsening of 
the risk-return profile than the calculation on an index basis. The Sharpe ratios also fall ac-
cordingly, from 1.02 to 0.83, and from 0.78 to 0.54. 
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Table 6: Index funds comparison in US dollars (3/2010 - 5/2018) 
Period 
3/2010-
5/2018 
100% 
stocks 
(MSCI 
World 
iShares 
ETF in 
USD) 
100% 
bonds 
(FTSE G7 
Gov-
ernm. 
Bond 
iShares 
in USD) 
100% 
fine 
wine 
(Liv-ex 
50 in 
USD incl. 
costs) 
Portfo-
lio A1 
(50% 
stocks, 
50% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
A2 
(45% 
stocks, 
45% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Portfo-
lio B1 
(25% 
stocks, 
75% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
B2 
(20% 
stocks, 
70% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Return (an-
nualized) 
9.69% 1.32% 0.03% 5.67% 5.19% 3.54% 3.06% 
Standard 
deviation 
11.10% 5.69% 17.42% 5.25% 5.91% 4.18% 5.13% 
Sharpe ra-
tio 
0,85 0,18 -0,02 1,02 0,83 0,78 0,54 
 
Here again, the funds are also considered in euros (see Table 7). The small diversification suc-
cess of fine wine seen from the perspective of the index in euros cannot be repeated in a 
comparison of the index funds with the wine index in euros including costs. Both of the port-
folios with the inclusion of 10% fine wine exhibit a poorer risk-return relationship than those 
without wine. The Sharpe ratios fall.  
Table 7: Index funds comparison in euros (2/2010 - 5/2018) 
Period 
3/2010-
5/2018 
100% 
stocks 
(MSCI 
World 
iShares 
ETF in 
EUR) 
100% 
bonds 
(FTSE G7 
Gov-
ernm. 
Bond 
iShares 
in EUR) 
100% 
fine 
wine 
(Liv-ex 
50 in 
EUR incl. 
costs) 
Portfo-
lio A1 
(50% 
stocks, 
50% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
A2 
(45% 
stocks, 
45% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Portfo-
lio B1 
(25% 
stocks, 
75% 
bonds) 
Portfolio 
B2 
(20% 
stocks, 
70% 
bonds, 
10% fine 
wine) 
Return 
(annual-
ized) 
7.69% -0.51% -1.79% 3.75% 3.28% 1.66% 1.19% 
Standard 
deviation 
17.27% 9.39% 20.70% 12.50% 12.87% 10.63% 11.06% 
Sharpe ra-
tio 
0.43 n.a.37 n.a. 0.28 0.24 0.13 0.08 
 
                                                          
37 The higher the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio the better is only valid for positive figures of the excess return 
(McLeod and van Vuuren, 2004). All calculated portfolios do have a positive excess return. 
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The results reflect the high cost burden involved in a real investment in fine wine. The trans-
action costs in connection with the high bid-ask spreads lead - in comparison to the traditional 
asset classes - to a clear worsening of the figures. The Total cost of ownership is below 0.28% 
(TER38 0.5%) for the equity funds, and below 0.17% (TER 0.2%) for the bond index funds. The 
annual total expense ratio in the case of the wine index (without taking the initial investment 
into account) is 1.15%, and with the initial investment it is 1.77%).   A management fee was 
not taken into account. 39 Studies which have not explicitly taken the aspect of costs into ac-
count cannot in good faith recommend an investment in fine wine in order to diversify a port-
folio. Taking all cost components into account, the risk-return ratio of a portfolio consisting of 
traditional asset classes is worsened by adding fine wine. No positive diversification effects 
can be achieved. 
The evaluation of the hypotheses takes place on the basis of a table of results (Table 8) in 
which the portfolios with the highest Sharpe ratios are shown. The portfolios with a higher 
proportion of equities are identified by the letter A, while those with a lower proportion of 
equities are identified by the letter B. The portfolios which do not include fine wine bear the 
number “1”, while those which include 10% fine wine bear the number “2”. 
Table 8: Portfolio comparisons, results of the hypotheses 
Index calculation Results of hypothesis 1: 
Portfolios with a higher Sharpe ratio 
Portfolio A1 in USD vs. Portfolio A2 in USD A1 
Portfolio B1 in USD vs. Portfolio B2 in USD B1 
Portfolio A1 in EUR vs. Portfolio A2 in EUR A1=A2 
Portfolio B1 in EUR vs. Portfolio B2 in EUR B2 
Real investment Results of hypothesis 2: 
Portfolios with a higher Sharpe ratio 
Portfolio A1 in USD vs. Portfolio A2 in USD A1 
Portfolio B1 in USD vs. Portfolio B2 in USD B1 
Portfolio A1 in EUR vs. Portfolio A2 in EUR A1 
Portfolio B1 in EUR vs. Portfolio B2 in EUR B1 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, hypothesis 1 must be discarded. The null hypothesis proved to 
be correct. Only in one of the four portfolios (Portfolio B2 in EUR consisting of 70% bonds, 20% 
stocks and 10% fine wine) does a slight increase of the Sharpe ratio occur due to the inclusion 
of fine wine. In the other three cases, the inclusion of wine does not lead to an improvement 
                                                          
38 In the case of both index funds, the total cost of ownership is below the total expense ratio (TER) shown. The 
TER includes all annual administration fees. Transaction and trading fees are not taken into account. At the same 
time, returns from securities lending are also not included. These returns exceed other fees, so that the total 
cost of ownership (calculated as the difference between the performance of the index and the index fund’s per-
formance) is lower than the TER.  
39 Nevertheless, these costs are clearly below the 3.7% p.a. calculated by Burton and Jacobsen (2001). Due to the 
establishment of the Liv-ex wine market, investment in fine wine has become considerably cheaper. 
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of the Sharpe ratio. When a real investment including costs is considered, hypothesis 2 is con-
firmed. Null hypothesis 2 has to be discarded. All of the portfolios in US dollars and euros have 
a higher Sharpe ratio without fine wine. No positive diversification effects can be established. 
40 This study thus assesses the possibilities for diversification much more critically than the 
previous studies by Masset and Weisskopf (2010), Masset and Henderson (2010), Bouri 
(2014), Bouri et al. (2016) and Aytac et al. (2016). At the same time, those studies are con-
firmed which highlight the high costs involved in fine wine investment, and which come to 
predominantly negative conclusions about real investments in wine investment funds (Burton 
and Jacobsen, 2001, Masset and Weisskopf, 2015). 
4 Summary 
In the search for alternative asset classes for portfolio diversification, the positive qualities of 
investment in fine wine have increasingly been reported on in the past 15 years. Whereas 
older studies had to fall back on data from wine auction houses, newer ones predominantly 
use index data from the London fine wine market Liv-ex, which was established in 1999.  
However, making calculations on the basis of index data contains pitfalls. Index data differs 
from a real investment in that it does not take into account the costs which are incurred. This 
question is of particular relevance for investments in fine wine, as there have been no such 
index funds until now. Some wine investment funds do exist, but their strategies are neither 
transparent nor is the performance convincing (Masset and Weisskopf, 2015).  
This study took into account the possible costs of a real investment in all of the asset classes 
considered. With this data, the diversification features of the inclusion of fine wine in a global 
portfolio which was already broadly diversified were examined and compared with an analysis 
on the basis of index data alone.  
At an index level, the inclusion of fine wine merely leads to a slight improvement of the annu-
alized return, but at the same time to an increase in risk. Only in the case of one portfolio in 
euros was the Sharpe ratio somewhat better after the inclusion of 10% fine wine. When con-
sidering an actual investment, the high costs of investing in fine wine play a role. In US dollars 
and euros, the annualized returns are lower in comparison to the portfolios without fine wine, 
and at the same time the risk levels are higher. The inclusion of wine always leads to a de-
crease in the Sharpe ratio. 
The conclusion on the diversification properties of fine wine in a portfolio which is already 
broadly diversified in traditional asset classes can be - fittingly - described as sobering. Fine 
wine does not lead to any improvement of the Sharpe ratio from the index perspective in US 
dollars, and when the base currency is euros only a slight increase is achieved in one out of 
two portfolios. Viewed according to costs, there is not a single case where the risk-return pro-
file was improved by adding fine wine. This finding is clearly contradictory to those of the 
previous studies. However, on the positive side it can be noted that the costs of an actual 
investment in fine wine have been noticeably reduced by the establishment of the Liv-ex Wine 
Exchange. 
 
                                                          
40 A calculation with a uniform moderate spread of 4% which diverges from the actual bid/ask spreads as could 
be observed in recent years does not lead to any diverging results with regard to the diversification properties 
of fine wine. 
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Appendix 1: Index compositions 
Equities, composition of the MSCI World Index 
Country Index weighting Number of companies 
USA 60.26% 631 
Japan 8.99% 321 
United Kingdom 6.53% 102 
France 3.98% 79 
Germany 3.46% 65 
Canada 3.45% 90 
Switzerland 2.72% 37 
Australia 2.46% 67 
Hong Kong 1.35% 48 
Holland 1.29% 21 
Spain 1.06% 22 
Sweden 0.93% 31 
Italy 0.85% 24 
Denmark 0.62% 17 
Singapore 0.49% 26 
Finland 0.38% 12 
Belgium 0.37% 10 
Norway 0.25% 9 
Israel 0.18% 11 
Ireland 0.18% 6 
Austria 0.09% 5 
New Zealand 0.06% 7 
Portugal 0.06% 3 
 
Bonds, composition of the JPM World Government Bond Index 
Country Index weighting 
USA 40.25% 
Japan 19.72% 
France 8.17% 
United Kingdom 7.15% 
Italy 7.09% 
Germany 5.46% 
Spain 4.67% 
Belgium 2.02% 
Australia 1.68% 
Holland 1.63% 
Canada 1.33% 
Denmark 0.50% 
Sweden 0.31% 
  
Term  
1-3 years 24.39% 
3-5 years 19.28% 
5-7 years 12.07% 
7-10 years 12.56% 
10+ years 31.69% 
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Fine Wine, Liv-ex 50 Index, equally weighted according to producer and vintage 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Chateau 
Haut-
Brion 
   X X X X X X X X X X 
Chateau 
Margaux 
 
   X X X X X X X X X X 
Chateau 
Mouton 
Roth-
schild 
   X X X X X X X X X X 
Chateau 
Lafite 
Roth-
schild 
   X X X X X X X X X X 
Chateau 
Latour 
 
X X X X X X X X X X    
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Appendix 2: List of costs of the Liv-ex 50 Index  
An investment of £10 million (pounds sterling) is presumed. 
 
Trading costs (bid-ask spread) 
The Liv-ex 50 contains 50 wines. Every year at the end of June, the five oldest vintages are 
replaced by the five physically available new vintages. As the index is equally weighted, in 
this way 20% of the index is traded (currently 16%, until a new vintage of Chateau Latour is 
released). This index adjustment is carried out at the bid-ask spreads available at the end of 
June. The vintages to be sold are sold at bid prices, and the vintages to be bought are bought 
at ask prices. The first investment was made at the selling rates valid at that time (ask 
prices). 
 
Transaction costs 
1% transaction costs per transaction. It is assumed that a transaction volume of £20,000 per 
year is reached. This is the condition for a transaction fee of 1%. 
 
Insurance  
£10 per month plus 0.015%. This corresponds to 0.18% p.a. 
 
Storage 
£0.55 per case and month. From a volume of £10 million and at an average bottle price of 
£500, the price for a 12-bottle case is £6,000s. At an investment of £10 million, this would be 
1,666 cases. 1,666 x 0.55 x 12 = 0.11% p.a. 
 
Liv-ex subscription fee 
Here, the Liv-ex ‘gold’ pricing package with direct market access is presumed. The fee 
amounts to £500 per month, £6000 per year. This is equivalent to 0.06% p.a. 
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Abstract 
This experimental study examines the influence of herding (following the majority of fellow 
gamblers or the most successful gambler (guru)), status-quo bias, and the gambler’s fallacy on 
diversification behavior. We find that neither herding nor status-quo bias contributes signifi-
cantly to non-optimal portfolio choices. The gambler’s fallacy, however, plays an important 
role in these decisions. Many subjects appear to find patterns in a history of random events 
and then use these “patterns” to infer the sequence of future events. The gambler’s fallacy is 
significantly responsible for the fact that the optimal structure of a portfolio is considered in 
only 37.7% of all choices made by an investor. 
Keywords 
Behavioral finance, experiments, portfolio choice, non-optimal diversification, herding, guru, 
status-quo bias, gambler’s fallacy 
JEL Classification 
G02, G11, D81, D84 
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1 Introduction 
Markowitz (1952) shows that it is useful for risk-averse investors to split capital among differ-
ent investment instruments. Practice shows, however, that investors often have strongly un-
derdiversified portfolios.1 
Experimental economic research increasingly addresses the question of why investors seem 
to find it so difficult to make useful portfolio diversifications. Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015) 
show that many investors have difficulty dealing with the correlations of income return devel-
opments.2 The meaning of the correlations is systematically misjudged. Take the example of 
1/n heuristics, where investors distribute their capital equally among all investment alterna-
tives seemingly without noticing or caring how strongly the income returns of these instru-
ments are correlated. Morrin et al. (2012) provide evidence that many subjects tend toward 
1/n heuristics (for similar findings, see Fernandes, 2013; Baltussen and Post, 2011). Rieger 
(2012) reveals that investors systematically miscalculate the probabilities of occurrence. Fell-
ner, Güth, and Maciejovsky (2004) conclude that investors often suffer from an illusion of ex-
pertise, and hence overestimate the advantageousness of their own choice of investment. 
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009) note that diversification decisions are distorted by the phe-
nomenon of mental accounting. Weber, Siebenmorgen, and Weber (2005) detect that inves-
tors are subject to a home bias when choosing investment instruments for a portfolio. 
We conducted expert discussions with high-ranking bank managers,3 which revealed other 
possible reasons for suboptimal diversification decisions. It seems possible that many subjects 
are distracted from optimal diversification by observing the investment choices of other in-
vestors (herding). Being influenced by the successful investment decisions of prominent in-
vestors can play a significant role in this process (guru effect). Furthermore, optimal diversifi-
cation can be hindered by subjects holding on to existing portfolios (status-quo bias). Subjects 
can also be distracted from meaningful portfolio choices by exclusively following putative pat-
terns of random events (the gambler’s fallacy). 
The present study therefore addresses the question of whether or not (1) herding, (2) status-
quo bias, and (3) the gambler’s fallacy do, indeed, sidetrack subjects from making optimum 
diversification decisions. The literature provides multiple indications of the significant influ-
ence that these phenomena can exert on economic decisions. 
Looking at the herding literature first, the observation that subjects take their bearings from 
one another and thereby act as a herd traces as far back as Mackay (1841). Keynes (1936) 
points out the herding behavior of financial market actors and presents two possible explana-
tions for it (reputational herding and investigative herding). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Dimmock et al. (2016), Anderson (2013), Hibbert, Lawrence, and Prakash (2012), Goetzmann and 
Kumar (2008), Meulbroek (2005), Polkovnichenko (2005), Huberman and Sengmueller (2004), Agnew, Balduzzi, 
and Sundén (2003), Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002), Benartzi (2001), Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Barber and 
Odean (2000), Bode, van Echelpoel, and Sievi (1994), Blume and Friend (1975), and Lease, Lewellen, and Schlar-
baum (1974). 
2 For similar results, see also Eyster and Weizsäcker (2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009), and Hedesstrom, Svedsater, 
and Garling (2006). 
3 We thank Mr. Lothar Henning, Bethmann Bank Frankfurt, and Mr. Frank Weber, Sparkasse Lippstadt, for exten-
sive talks concerning investment behavior of bank customers. 
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continue along these lines, adding fuel to a fierce debate that has been raging for the past 25 
years. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) show that herding can 
even occur when subjects behave rationally and make reasonable decisions (informational 
cascades). Devenow and Welch (1996) were the first to clearly differentiate between rational 
herding (reputational herding, investigative herding, and informational cascades) and irra-
tional herding. There are numerous empirical findings that confirm herding behavior among 
actors on the financial market.4 Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider herding as a pos-
sible origin of non-optimal portfolio diversification. To date, there have not been any experi-
mental studies examining the potential influence of herding on diversification decisions. 
A special case of herding is the guru effect. Gurus are highly ranked religious authorities in 
Hinduism and Buddhism. In Western cultures, the term “guru” also refers to leaders whose 
followers trust them blindly and uncritically, and the term “guru effect” has been used to de-
scribe the situation where private investors rigorously copy the decisions of prominent and 
very successful investors. The gurus’ behavior is closely observed by many actors on the capital 
market, which is why it can lead to herding. In the research on this phenomenon, capital mar-
ket simulation with interacting artificial agents (agent-based computational economics) has 
established itself as a reliable research method. The method has revealed that the network 
structure of communication among the agents significantly influences events on the capital 
market. Gurus are so-called super nodes that have numerous direct communication links with 
other capital market actors and, for this reason, can trigger herding.5 Furthermore, the guru 
effect may contribute to distracting investors from optimal diversification decisions. There is 
as yet no research on how the influence of an investment guru impacts investor’s portfolio 
decisions. 
Many people find it difficult to make decisions and thus tend to avoid them, simply leaving 
things as they are, which is known as the status-quo bias (cf. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988). The psychological processes of this behavior are explained in detail by Anderson (2003). 
Especially in situations when investors accede to an existing security portfolio (e.g., by inher-
itance), they often tend to postpone or even completely fail to adjust the portfolio structure. 
Even if different performances of the stocks in the portfolio lead to an unintended imbalance, 
many investors, out of dread of adjusting the portfolio, fail to take appropriate action. Aside 
from dread, this lack of action is often grounded in reluctance to take responsibility for the 
portfolio’s future profit, or lack thereof. Many investors are afraid of regretting their own ac-
tions (cf. Inman and Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg et al., 2002; Kahnemann and Tversky, 
1982). There are now some empirical findings on the status-quo bias as it applies to financial 
                                                          
4 Huang, Wu, and Lin (2016), Choi (2016), Galariotis, Rong, and Spyrou (2015), Chang (2013), Kremer and Nautz 
(2013), Lin, Tsai, and Lung (2013), Belhoula and Naoui (2011), Boyson (2010), Kim and Jegadeesh (2010), Chiang 
and Zheng (2010), Spiwoks, Bizer, and Hein (2008), Chen, Wang, and Lin (2008), Walter and Weber (2006), Vo-
ronkova and Bohl (2005), Spiwoks (2004), Sias (2004), Ennis and Sebastian (2003), Chang, Cheng, and Khorana 
(2000), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999), Christie and Huang (1995), 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Klemkovsky (1977), Kraus and Stoll (1972). 
5 See, e.g., Panchenko, Gerasymchuk, and Pavlov (2013), Hein, Schwind, and Spiwoks (2008, 2012), Tedeschi, Iori, 
and Gallegati (2009, 2012), and Markose, Alentorn, and Krause (2004). Sumpter, Zabzina, and Nicolis (2012) show 
that a small number of leaders can heavily influence decisions. 
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market actors.6 Numerous experimental studies also provide evidence of the status-quo bias 
(see, e.g., Geng, 2016; Yen and Chuang, 2008). Hence, it seems reasonable to consider the 
status-quo bias as a possible reason for non-optimal diversification. There is as yet only one 
experimental study that directly addresses this topic: Brown and Kagel (2009) yield infor-
mation on the influence of the status-quo bias on non-optimal portfolio choices. 
Looking now at the literature on the gambler’s fallacy, we start with the experimental study 
by Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015) that found that irrelevant information can distract sub-
jects from optimal diversification decisions. Considering the history of random events in eval-
uating random processes seems particularly tempting to many subjects, a phenomenon 
known as the gambler’s fallacy. For example, if a coin toss shows “heads” three times in a row, 
many people assume that “tails” will show next. The history of unconnected random events, 
however, does not reveal anything about the future. The possibility for “heads” in the fourth 
toss is also exactly 50%. The gambler’s fallacy has long been a subject of interest,7 but no work 
has been done in the context of portfolio diversification. 
We conduct an experiment to discover the reasons for insufficient portfolio diversification. In 
15 periods, the subjects must make individual decisions about the structure of a portfolio of 
stocks. By taking a between-subjects approach, we examine the possible influence of herding, 
the status-quo bias, and the gambler’s fallacy. We find that neither herding nor status-quo 
bias contribute significantly to non-optimal portfolio choices. The gambler’s fallacy, however, 
plays an important role in these decisions. 
2 Hypotheses and Experimental Design 
2.1 Identification of Optimal Portfolios 
Identifying optimal diversification decisions is difficult even in the easiest of cases, when there 
are only two stocks (A and B) involved that are independent in their income return develop-
ment. Not only must the efficient frontier of all possible stock combinations be determined, 
but the investor’s indifference curve must be considered (see Figure 1). 
A strongly risk-averse investor (Subject 1) finds his ideal combination of stocks in the lower 
margin of the efficient frontier. A less risk-averse investor (Subject 2), however, finds his ideal 
combination of stocks in the upper margin of the efficient frontier. Although there are reliable 
empirical methods to differentiate between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects,8 
capturing the exact layout of the indifference curves for a specific subject remains impossible. 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Freiburg and Grichnik (2013), Bryant, Evans, and Bishara (2012), Gubaydullina, Hein, and Spiwoks 
(2011), Kempf and Ruenzi (2006), Choi et al. (2004), Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003), and Patel, Zeckhauser, 
and Hendricks (1991). 
7 See e.g. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016), Suetens, Galbo-Joergensen, and Tyran (2016), Stöckl et al. (2015), 
Powdthavee and Riyanto (2012), Barron and Leider (2010), Ayton and Fischer (2004), Clotfelter and Cook (1991), 
Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1974). 
8 See, e.g., Lönnqvist et al. (2015), Charness, Gneezy, and Imas (2013), Crosetto and Filippin (2013), Dohmen et 
al. (2011), Eckel and Grossmann (2002, 2008), Lejuez et al. (2003), Holt and Laury (2002), and Gneezy and Potters 
(1997). 
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Some studies try to solve this problem by considering all stock combinations on the efficient 
frontier as an ideal choice. However, this approach does not consider that only one exact point 
of the efficient frontier can be deemed the optimal combination of stocks for an individual 
investor. 
Figure 1: Identification of Optimal Stock Combinations in Consideration of the Efficient Fron-
tier and Individual Risk Aversion, or Individual Indifference Curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
To avoid results so vague that interpretation of them is an exercise in futility, we employ the 
method of Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015): The subjects are offered two entirely uncorre-
lated alternatives for investment (A and B), which are identical regarding the expected income 
return and risk. By doing so, the efficient frontier is reduced to a single point (point Z in Figure 
2). In this environment, it is of no importance whether a strongly or a less risk-averse subject 
makes the decision. In both cases, only the exactly equal mix of both investment alternatives 
(A and B) can be interpreted as the ideal combination of stocks. Only with this methodology 
can precise results in an experiment on diversification be obtained. 
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Figure 2: Precise Identification of an Ideal Combination of Stocks with a Punctiform Efficient 
Frontier (Point Z). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ours is an individual decision experiment that follows the approach of Gubaydullina and 
Spiwoks (2015). The subjects can choose between two different risky securities, A and B. In 
each period, they assemble a four-stock portfolio. The possible portfolios are AAAA, AAAB, 
AABB, ABBB, and BBBB. Stock A and stock B both generate an income return of ±0 experi-
mental currency units (ECU) or +7 ECU in each period. Both possible returns occur with a prob-
ability of 50% and follow a random process. Stock A’s performance is independent of Stock B’s 
performance. Both stocks thus have an expected value of 3.5 ECU. A portfolio consisting of 
four stocks is expected to generate a return of 14 ECU per period (see Table 1). The ECUs are 
converted into Euros in the ratio of 10:1, resulting in an expected value of €1.40 per period. 
Hence, the subjects can profit from their investment behavior if it is successful. 
The five possible portfolios may have the same expected income return of 14 ECU per period 
but the exposure to risk – henceforth expressed by the standard deviation – is different for 
1 
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each portfolio.9 The standard deviation of the combination AAAA is 14.0, whereas the stand-
ard deviation of the combination AABB is only 9.9 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Expected Values and Standard Deviations of the Income Return for the Five Portfolios 
Considering the Possible Random Events for Stocks A and B in ECU 
Random Events A: +7; B: +7 A: +7; B: ±0 A: ±0; B: +7 A: ±0; B: ±0   
SD  (p1 = 0.25) (p2 = 0.25) (p3 = 0.25) (p4 = 0.25) E(r) 
AAAA +28 +28 ±0 ±0 14 14.0 
AAAB +28 +21 +7 ±0 14 11.1 
AABB +28 +14 +14 ±0 14 9.9 
ABBB +28 +7 +21 ±0 14 11.1 
BBBB +28 ±0 +28 ±0 14 14.0 
p = probability of occurrence; E(r) = expected value of income return; SD = standard deviation. 
2.2 Rational Strategy 
A rational, risk-averse subject should always choose the combination AABB. Since the ex-
pected income returns of the five possible portfolios are identical, it is rational for each risk-
averse subject to choose the portfolio with the minimum variance – independent of the de-
gree of the subject’s risk aversion. 
This choice is intuitive. Regarding the structured components of the given stocks, the subjects 
can recognize the portfolio with the minimum variance without having to make any mathe-
matical calculations. Using simple plausibility, it can be established that the income return 
level is most when both stocks A and B are equally represented in the portfolio (see Table 1). 
However, considering the numerous empirical findings on the incapability or reluctance of 
subjects to make reasonable diversification decisions, we expect clear deviations from the ra-
tional strategy (always portfolio AABB) to occur in this experiment. 
We thus arrive at our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The subjects are going to behave rationally, which means that they are going to 
exclusively choose the portfolio with the minimum variance (AABB). 
The experiment consists of three treatments. The rational investment strategy (always AABB) 
is easily realizable in all three treatments. Therefore, the subjects’ tendency toward rational 
diversification decisions is analyzed in all three treatments (see Table 2). 
 
                                                          
9 Whether or not the subjects exhibit herding behavior, whether or not they are subject to the status-quo bias, 
and regardless of whether or not they fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy does not influence their payout. If herding, 
status-quo bias, or the gambler’s fallacy lead to frequent deviation from the optimal strategy (always portfolio 
AABB), only the exposure to risk increases. The expected payout, however, remains unaffected. In fact, the ex-
periment only shows random differences concerning the payouts. Neither consequent herding nor a permanent 
status-quo bias or a perpetual gambler’s fallacy lead to systematically higher payouts than the optimal strategy. 
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Table 2: Contribution of the Three Treatments to the Objects of Investigation 
Treatment 
 
Rational Behav-
ior 
Hypothesis 1 
Herding 
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 
Status-Quo Bias 
Hypotheses 5, 6 
Gambler’s Fallacy 
Hypotheses 7, 8 
Treatment 1 
VIEW+0%OPT X X X X 
Treatment 2 
NOVIEW+0%OPT X X  X 
Treatment 3 
VIEW+100%OPT X  X X 
2.3 Herding 
As are investigating herding, or the influence of the guru effect, the subjects must be given 
the opportunity to copy the portfolio decisions of the majority or those of the most successful 
fellow investor in each period. This results in an experiment that is structured in multiple pe-
riods. The portfolios can be rearranged at no cost before the start of each period. 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the portfolios of each subject as well as their investment suc-
cess are published in a ranking. Thus, before they decide whether or not to restructure their 
own portfolio, the subjects are given insight into their fellow investors’ portfolio choices in the 
past period and into the portfolio of the most successful subject. This allows the subjects to 
follow the majority or the most successful investor (guru). In Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT), 
the subjects do not receive any information about the other subjects’ behavior or their invest-
ment success. They are informed solely of their own success and therefore do not have the 
option of following a guru or the majority because neither are detectable (see Figure 3 and 
Table 2). 
Given the numerous empirical findings on the occurrence of herding in the financial market, 
we expect the portfolios to assimilate during Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). Thus our second 
hypothesis reads as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: The subjects are not going to converge in the 15 periods of Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) and will not form a herd. 
Since the investment behavior and success of the other subjects cannot be observed in Treat-
ment 2, we expect the subjects to be less distracted from the rational strategy (always port-
folio AABB). Thus our third hypothesis reads as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: The average deviation from the rational strategy (always portfolio AABB) is not 
going to be stronger in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). 
If deviations from the rational strategy occur more often and are stronger in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT), this should show in the average exposure to risk. 
Hypothesis 4: The average exposure to risk is not significantly higher in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). 
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Figure 3: Interrelation of the Three Treatments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Status-Quo Bias 
To reveal, or not, the presence of status-quo bias, we equip the subjects with different stocks 
in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT): 25% of the subjects each start with portfolio AAAA, portfolio 
AAAB, portfolio ABBB, and portfolio BBBB; 0% of the subjects start with the optimal portfolio 
(AABB). The subjects were allowed to reassemble their portfolios before the first period. In 
Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), 100% of the subjects receive the optimal portfolio (AABB) at 
the beginning of the experiment, which they can again reassemble before it starts (see Figure 
3 and Table 2). As the status-quo bias has often been empirically established, we assume that 
the optimal portfolio (AABB) is more frequently selected during the 15 periods of Treatment 
3 (VIEW+100%OPT) than during Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). 
Hypothesis 5: The average deviation from the rational strategy (always portfolio AABB) will 
not be stronger in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT). 
If the deviations from the rational strategy are stronger and occur more often in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT), this should show in the average exposure to risk. 
Hypothesis 6: The average exposure to risk will not be higher in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) 
than in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT). 
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(NOVIEW+0%OPT) 
Treatment 3 
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Status-Quo Bias? Herding? 
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2.5 The Gambler’s Fallacy 
To detect whether the subjects have fallen prey to the gambler’s fallacy, we ask them in all 
three treatments, as well as between Periods 4 and 5 and Periods 10 and 11, about the reasons 
for their portfolio choices (in Period 5 and Period 11). The tendency toward the gambler’s 
fallacy can take effect in all three treatments and is therefore investigated in all three (see 
Table 2). 
As the gambler’s fallacy is an often observed phenomenon, we expect the subjects to try to 
detect patterns in the history of random events, which do not exist. For example: “After Stock 
A has generated a high income return, I will put my faith in Stock B” or “After Stock B has lastly 
returned no income, I will choose Stock B.” Responses like this are evidence of the gambler’s 
fallacy. We expect this type of answer to be given often. 
Hypothesis 7: The gambler’s fallacy is not going to be one of the main reasons for certain port-
folio choices. 
Evidence of the gambler’s fallacy can also be discovered by looking at the history of the game. 
If a positive (negative) event for Stock A (Stock B) frequently leads to a reduced (increased) 
interest in Stock A (Stock B) in the following period, the influence of gambler’s fallacy can be 
inferred. 
Hypothesis 8: A positive (negative) income return in the current period does not reduce (in-
creases) the popularity of this stock in the next period. 
2.6 Capture of Risk Attitude and Conduction of the Experiment 
The exclusive rational strategy for risk-averse investors is to always choose portfolio AABB. 
Therefore, deviations from the rational strategy will be identified only if risk-averse subjects 
are admitted to the experiment. To this end, we tested each subject according to Holt and 
Laury (2002) and cleared the starting field of risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects. To ensure 
that the task was fully understood by all subjects, we asked them control questions. Only those 
who answered all control questions correctly were admitted to the experiment. The complete 
instructions and control questions can be found in Appendix 1. 
The experiment was conducted from 19 May 2016 to 27 May 2016 at the Ostfalia Laboratory 
for Experimental Economic Research (Ostfalia Labor für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung 
OLEW) of the Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences in Wolfsburg. One-hundred-eighty-eight 
subjects took part in the experiment, 38 of whom showed to be risk-neutral or risk-loving. 
One-hundred-fifty subjects showed risk-averse behavior and thus were admitted to the actual 
experiment. Fifty-three subjects were exposed to Treatment 1, 46 subjects to Treatment 2, 
and 51 took part in Treatment 3. The subjects are students of the Ostfalia University of Applied 
Sciences in Wolfsburg, 84 of whom study at the Faculty of Business (44.7%), 28 at the Faculty 
for Health Services (14.9%), and 76 at the Faculty of Automotive Engineering (40.4%). Sixteen 
sessions were conducted in total. Ten to twelve subjects took part in each session. 
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The experiment was implemented in z-Tree (see Fischbacher, 2007). At the Ostfalia Lab, we 
used 12 workspaces, each equipped with a monitor, with a wall separating the subjects. The 
experiments were consistently overseen by a game master to prevent the subjects from com-
municating with each other or using unauthorized devices (like smartphones). The subjects 
did not receive a general show-up fee. When assessing their willingness to take risks, an aver-
age of €2.18 was paid out to each subject. The actual experiment resulted in a payout of 
€21.89 on average. In total, the subjects received an average payout of €24.07. The highest 
payout was €31.85, the lowest was €17.40. The experiment lasted 45 minutes on average. The 
payout can therefore be deemed highly attractive. All subjects appeared to concentrate and 
seemed motivated. 
3 Results 
3.1 Rational Strategy 
The results of the experiments partly meet the expectations but also reveal some surprising 
facts. Hypothesis 1 states that the subjects are going to behave rationally, which means that 
they are going to exclusively choose the portfolio with the minimum variance (AABB). Tables 
3 and 4 clearly show that Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. The optimal portfolio (AABB) is the 
most frequently chosen alternative in all three treatments, but more than 60% of all portfolio 
choices can be viewed as less than completely optimal (Table 3). This is also evident when 
analyzing the exposure to risk (average standard deviation of the portfolios). The t-test (one-
sample mean-comparison) shows that, in all three treatments, portfolios with standard devi-
ations significantly higher than the standard deviation of the optimal portfolio are chosen (Ta-
ble 4). Many subjects thus exhibit non-rational investment behavior. On the other hand, how-
ever, extreme portfolios (AAAA or BBBB) were chosen in only 21.4% of all portfolio decisions. 
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Three Treatments 
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Rational Strategy for all Three 
Treatments 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) 11.68% 18.73% 39.75% 19.36% 10.44% 
Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT) 8.68% 22.45% 31.89% 22.46% 14.49% 
Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) 8.36% 21.69% 40.93% 18.29% 10.71% 
Total 9.63% 20.88% 37.74% 19.95% 11.77% 
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Table 4: Exposure to Risk (Average Standard Deviation of the Portfolios) 
Treatment 
Rational Strategy: 
Average SD 
Actual: 
Average SD P-Value 
Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) 9.9 11.37 0.0000*** 
Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT) 9.9 11.49 0.0000*** 
Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) 9.9 11.29 0.0000*** 
Total 9.9 11.40 0.0000*** 
*** = significant with an error rate of 1%; ** = significant with an error rate of 5%; * = significant with an error rate of 10%; 
SD = standard deviation. 
3.2 Herding 
Herding should be reflected in either a quick or gradual assimilation of the subjects’ decisions. 
We therefore examine whether the decisions made by the subjects converge. Table 5 shows 
that the subjects’ behavior continues to be fragmented until the last period, that is, no herding 
occurs.10 
Table 5: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios at the End of the Game in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) 
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Session 1 30.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Session 2 33.3% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 
Session 3 11.1% 33.3% 44.4% 0.0% 11.1% 
Session 4 30.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% 
Session 5 0.0% 42.9% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% 
Session 6 37.5% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% 
In the next step, we compare decisions for the portfolio that was preferred by most subjects 
to the portfolio that was chosen against the majority opinion. We conclude that the subjects 
chose the portfolio based on majority opinion in the previous period for a total of 320 times. 
The portfolio that the majority did not prefer in the previous period was chosen 422 times. 
Since herding can also be a temporary phenomenon, it makes sense to show the frequencies 
separately according to periods and to check the significance of the frequencies using a Chi-
square goodness-of-fit test (Table 6). In Period 2 we can see, for instance, that 30 subjects 
follow the majority opinion of the previous period in choosing their portfolio, while only 23 
subjects do not do so. However, this difference is insignificant. In those periods with significant 
                                                          
10 The course of the six sessions of Treatment 1 are set out in Tables A-1 to A-6 in Appendix 2. 
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deviations (Periods 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13), those decisions not following the majority opinion 
always outbalance those that do. Hence, we cannot establish significant herding, evidenced 
by following the majority opinion, at any point during the experiment. 
Table 6: Portfolio Decisions According to and Opposing the Majority Opinion in Treatment 1 
Period Number of Portfolios 
According to the Ma-
jority Opinion in Previ-
ous Period 
Number of Portfolios 
Opposing the Majority 
Opinion in Previous 
Period 
P-Value 
2   30   23 0.336 
3   25   28 0.680 
4   31   22 0.216 
5   24   29 0.492 
6   24   29 0.492 
7   27   26 0.891 
8   20   33 0.074* 
9   18   35 0.020** 
10   18   35 0.020** 
11   19   34 0.039** 
12   22   31 0.216 
13   15   38 0.002*** 
14   22   31 0.216 
15   25   28 0.680 
total 320 422  
*** = significant with an error rate of 1%; ** = significant with an error rate of 5%; * = significant with an error 
rate of 10%. 
Neither is there much evidence of a “guru effect” (see Table 7). The guru obviously only im-
presses the subjects slightly. In 212 cases, their decision follows the previous leader’s portfo-
lio; they do not do so in 530 cases. Only in Period 7 are there more subjects following the 
guru’s opinion than those not doing so. The Chi-square goodness-of-fit test shows, however, 
that the difference is insignificant. In all periods – except for Periods 3 and 7 – the decisions 
not to choose the portfolio of the most successful subject is observed significantly more often. 
Overall, we conclude that there is no herding in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). Neither the ma-
jority opinion nor the opinion of the leading subject (guru) has much impression on the sub-
jects. Hypothesis 2 states that the subjects are not going to converge in the 15 periods of 
Treatment 1 and will not form a herd. Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. 
Contrary to our expectations, the portfolio with the minimum variance is chosen significantly 
more often in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). We as-
sumed that, by observing and following their fellow subjects’ behavior, the subjects would 
frequently deviate from choosing the optimal stock combination AABB. In Treatment 2, where 
the other subjects’ behavior cannot be observed, herding is generally impossible. As a matter 
of fact, the contrary turns out to be the case. While the portfolio with minimum variance 
(AABB) was chosen in 39.8% of all cases in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), it was selected in only 
31.9% of all cases in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows 
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that this unexpected difference is even statistically significant. The p-value is 0.021. Hypothe-
sis 3 states that the average deviation from the rational strategy (always portfolio AABB) is not 
going to be stronger in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 2. Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. 
Table 7: Portfolio Decisions Following and Not Following the Guru in Treatment 1 
Period Number of Portfolios 
Corresponding to the 
Leading Subject of the 
Previous Period 
Number of Portfolios 
Opposing the Leading 
Subject of the Previ-
ous Period 
P-Value 
2     6   47 0.000*** 
3   22   31 0.216 
4   12   41 0.000*** 
5   14   39 0.001*** 
6   19   34 0.039** 
7   28   25 0.680 
8   17   36 0.009*** 
9     7   46 0.000*** 
10   19   34 0.039** 
11   12   41 0.000*** 
12     9   44 0.000*** 
13   11   42 0.000*** 
14   16   37 0.004*** 
15   20   33 0.074* 
total 212 530  
*** = significant with an error rate of 1%; ** = significant with an error rate of 5%; * = significant with an error rate of 10%. 
We had expected that the possibility of following other subjects would lead to a significantly 
higher exposure to risk (average standard deviation of the portfolios) in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). Since herding did not develop, risk 
exposure did not increase. The average standard deviation of the portfolios in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) was 11.37. The average standard deviation of the portfolios in Treatment 2 
(NOVIEW+0%OPT) was 11.49. According to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, this difference 
is not relevant. The p-value is 0.5485. Hypothesis 4 states that the average exposure to risk is 
not significantly higher in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). 
Hence, Hypothesis 4 cannot be discarded. 
As an interim result, we conclude that the subjects do not behave rationally in making most 
of their portfolio choices. The optimal portfolio (AABB) is chosen in only 30 - 40% of all cases 
(39.8% in Treatment 1, 31.9% in Treatment 2). Herding is clearly not responsible for this. There 
is neither a lasting orientation toward the portfolio structure chosen by a majority of subjects 
nor a lasting orientation toward the portfolio structure of the most successful subject. 
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3.3 Status-Quo Bias 
To discover, or not, the presence of any status-quo bias, we now compare Treatment 1 with 
Treatment 3. In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), 25% of the subjects are given portfolio AAAA, 
25% portfolio AAAB, 25% portfolio ABBB, and 25% portfolio BBBB before the start of the ex-
periment. No subject receives the optimal portfolio AABB (see Table A-7 in Appendix 3). In 
Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), every subject received the portfolio with the minimum vari-
ance (AABB) (see Table A-9 in Appendix 3). The subjects are permitted to reassemble their 
portfolios before the beginning of the first period. 
We expected a tendency to follow the status-quo, as has often been found in the literature. 
That is, in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), where all subjects start with the optimal portfolio 
(AABB), the optimal portfolio structure should have been selected more often than in Treat-
ment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), in which no subject was provided with an ideally structured portfolio. 
As a matter of fact, the subjects did not retain their initial portfolios. In Treatment 3 
(VIEW+100%OPT), 39.2% of the subjects reassembled their portfolio before the start of the 
first period, resulting in only 60.8% of the portfolios having the ideal structure (AABB) before 
the start of the first period (see Figure 5 and Table A-9 in Appendix 3). Over the course of the 
game, this percentage drops even further.  
Figure 4: Percental Distribution of the Portfolios in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) 
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Figure 5: Percental Distribution of the Portfolios in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) 
 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the share of the optimal portfolio (AABB) increases to 45.3% 
even before the first period and ranges between 45% and 30% from Period 3 to Period 15 (see 
Figure 4 and Table A-7 in Appendix 3). 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), 39.8% of all portfolios have the optimal structure. In Treat-
ment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), only 40.9% of portfolios with this structure remain. This difference 
is small and non-relevant according to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The p-value is 
0.6626. Hypothesis 5 states that the average deviation from the rational strategy (always port-
folio AABB) will not be stronger in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 3 
(VIEW+100%OPT). Hypothesis 5 cannot be discarded. 
We assumed that, given the status-quo bias in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), the optimal 
portfolio (AABB) would be chosen more often than in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), which 
could have resulted in a significantly lower exposure to risk. As a matter of fact, the average 
exposures to risk (standard deviation) are 11.37 in Treatment 1 and 11.29 in Treatment 3. 
According to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, this difference is not relevant. The p-value is 
0.9741. Hypothesis 6 states that the average exposure to risk will not be higher in Treatment 
1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT). Hypothesis 6 cannot be rejected. 
As an intermediate result, we conclude that most subjects do not behave rationally when 
compiling their portfolios; however, this deviation from the rational strategy is not explained 
by status-quo bias. Hence, we cannot confirm the result by Brown and Kagel (2009). 
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3.4 The Gambler’s Fallacy 
It is plausible to believe that subjects inferred from past random events that a certain se-
quence of future events would occur, even though this is a nonsensical interpretation of inde-
pendent random events. To see if this was indeed the case, we assess the reasons the subjects 
gave for their portfolio choices at the beginning of Period 5 and at the beginning of Period 11. 
In the experiment, the subjects were asked to provide the following information: “Please give 
a short explanation for your decision in Period 5 (Period 11)! This explanation does not affect 
your result! You can openly state your considerations.” We expected to receive answers 
demonstrating that the subjects had indeed fallen prey to the gambler’s fallacy.11 
We differentiate between the following clusters of reasons: (1) Rational consideration (suita-
ble orientation toward the expected value of the income return and the risk); (2) herding (fol-
lowing the majority of investors); (3) herding (following the most successful investor, the 
guru); (4) status-quo bias (following the present portfolio); (5) the gambler’s fallacy (following 
the history of random events); (6) incomprehensible explanations;12 and (7) other reasons.13 
Figure 6: Percentage of the Named Reasons for the Portfolio Choices 
 
                                                          
11 Examples of answers demonstrating the gambler’s fallacy: “One of the stocks did not show a positive value 
development which is why I assume that this stock develops positively in the next period.” “The value of Stock A 
has developed more positively than Stock B which is why I hope that Stock B now develops positively.” “The 
performance of Stock B in period 10 was 0 and Stock A showed an added value of 7, which is why I assume that 
Stock B could gain in the next period.” “With Stock A having developed positively, I now invest in Stock B.” 
12 Incomprehensible explanations are, for instance, filling the answer box with random letters or only numbers. 
13 Other reasons are, for example: “I have to take a higher risk to achieve a higher ranking.” 
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It can be concluded that subjects often tried to forecast future random events from past ran-
dom events. This consideration was detected in 40.67% of the answers (see Figure 6). The 
frequency of this reasoning significantly exceeds a barely accidental distribution of answers. 
The Chi-square goodness-of-fit test shows a p-value of 0.000. Hypothesis 7 states that the 
gambler’s fallacy is not going to be one of the main reasons for certain portfolio choices. Hy-
pothesis 7 is rejected. It appears that the gambler’s fallacy contributes significantly to irra-
tional portfolio choices. 
The question remains whether a behavioral pattern explaining the gambler’s fallacy can be 
directly explained by analyzing the portfolio choices. The sequence of random events (income 
return of Stock A and Stock B) was structured by coin toss in advance and then taken as a basis 
in all treatments (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Sequence of Random Events and Resulting Gambler’s Fallacy 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Random Event 
of Stock A 
±0 +7 ±0 +7 +7 ±0 ±0 +7 ±0 ±0 +7 +7 ±0 ±0 +7 
Random Event 
of Stock B 
+7 +7 +7 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 ±0 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +7 ±0 ±0 
Preference 
Gambler’s Fal-
lacy 
  
A 
 
A 
 
A 
 
B 
 
B 
 
B 
 
A 
 
B 
 
B 
 
A 
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A 
 
A 
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weight of the 
Stock 
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B 
 
A 
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B 
 
A 
 
B 
 
B 
 
A 
 
A 
Observations 
in Field 1 of 
the 2x2 Matrix 
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3 
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5 
   
6 
 
7 
Observations 
in Field 4 of 
the 2x2 Matrix 
     
1 
 
2 
 
3 
  
4 
 
5 
  
6 
 
7 
  
The first row of Table 8 lists the periods of the experiment. The second and the third rows list 
the sequences of random events of Stock A and Stock B (income return of ±0 or +7). The fourth 
line shows which stock is preferred by the subjects who fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy. In 
Period 1, for instance, Stock A has an income return of ±0 ECU and Stock B has an income 
return of +7 ECU. This is the development that the subjects can see before Period 2. This re-
sults in a preference for Stock A. Before the start of Period 3, the “errant gambler” again pre-
fers Stock A. This is because, in the previous period, both stocks had a positive income return 
(+7 ECU) but for Stock A, it is the first in succession, while it is the second in succession for 
Stock B. Before Period 4, the events of Period 2 are repeated and result in yet another prefer-
ence for Stock A. Period by period, considerations such as these lead to preferences that are 
listed in the fourth line of the table. 
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If all portfolios of all subjects contain more Stocks A than Stocks B, we call this an overweight 
of Stock A. If all portfolios of all subjects contain more Stocks B than Stocks A, we call this an 
overweight of Stock B. We can establish that Stock A (Stock B) is being overly weighted if the 
gambler’s fallacy leads to a preference for Stock A (Stock B). And this is exactly what occurs in 
the fifth row of Table 8 (for more specific detail, see Table A-10 in Appendix 4). In seven peri-
ods (Periods 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 14, and 15), we would expect Stock A to be overly weighted accord-
ing to the gambler’s fallacy, which is indeed the case (see sixth row in Table 8). In seven periods 
(Periods 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 13), we would expect Stock B to be overly weighted according 
to gambler’s fallacy, which is also the case (see seventh row in Table 8). In a 2 x 2 matrix on 
the predictive accuracy of the gambler’s fallacy regarding the overweight of stocks A and B in 
Periods 2–15, the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test shows that a predictive accuracy of 14:0, 
which is highly significant (p-value = 0.000). 
Hypothesis 8 states that a positive (negative) income return in the current period does not 
reduce (increases) the popularity of this stock in the next period. Hypothesis 8, therefore, 
must be rejected. It is obvious that the gambler’s fallacy affects the subjects’ portfolio choices 
and thereby contributes to the fact that the rational choice (to always chose the portfolio with 
the minimum variance) is observed in only 37.7% of all decisions made by the subjects. 
This result specifically confirms the study by Stöckl et al. (2015) that also demonstrates that 
investment decisions can be influenced by the gambler’s fallacy. We can also conclude that 
the gambler’s fallacy is rather unaffected by general conditions. It occurs regardless of 
whether information is or is not provided about the other subjects’ behavior, and also mani-
fests regardless of whether or not subjects start with an optimal portfolio. Stöckl et al. (2015), 
too, affirm the stability of the gambler’s fallacy under various modes of communication or in 
the event of group decisions. 
Barron and Leider (2010) also find indications of the gambler’s fallacy. However, in their study, 
the gambler’s fallacy does not prove stable if long historic time series of random events are 
shown to the subjects. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) also find indications of gambler’s 
fallacy, which in their study is stronger in inexperienced subjects than in experienced subjects. 
Furthermore, Suetens, Galbo-Joergensen, and Tyran (2016) show that the gambler’s fallacy 
can change into a hot-hand fallacy if a certain event reoccurs in unusually long streaks. Our 
results are in accordance with the studies by Huber, Kirchler, and Stöckl (2010) and Ayton and 
Fischer (2004). These studies show that the gambler’s fallacy manifests in the prognosis of 
random events. But these studies also show that, when estimating people’s success, the hot-
hand fallacy is predominant. 
4 Conclusion 
The present experimental study examines subjects’ diversification behavior. It focuses on the 
research question of whether herding (being guided by most fellow investors or by the most 
successful investor (guru)), status-quo bias, and / or the gambler’s fallacy can explain why 
many subjects maintain clearly underdiversified portfolios. Although much empirical evidence 
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has been found to explain the influence of these phenomena (herding, status-quo bias, and 
the gambler’s fallacy) on many economic decisions, they have not been experimentally exam-
ined in the context of diversification decisions. 
This experiment follows the approach by Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015): There are only 
two alternatives for investment (Stock A and Stock B), which can produce only two results. 
Either they bring an income return of ±0 ECU or a return of +7 ECU per period. Both results 
occur with a probability of 50%. Stock A’s return and Stock B’s return are independent events. 
In this environment, the efficient frontier is reduced to one point (equal mixture of Stock A 
and Stock B), so that the subjects’ degree of risk aversion does not influence optimal portfolio 
choice. 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the subjects receive information on their fellow investors in 
each period. They learn who chose which portfolio and how successful everyone was with 
their decisions. In Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT) this information is not provided. A compar-
ison of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 is intended to indicate the extent to which subjects are 
distracted from making optimal portfolio choices due to herding behavior (being guided by 
most fellow investors or by the most successful investor (guru)). Herding was not observed: 
The subjects neither followed most of their fellow investors nor did they emulate the most 
successful investor (guru). We draw the conclusion that herding does not play a significant 
role in explaining non-optimal portfolio choices. 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the subjects start with different portfolios. Each of the port-
folios AAAA, AAAB, ABBB, and BBBB is given to 25% of the subjects at the start of the experi-
ment. In Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), 100% of the subjects receive the optimal portfolio 
(AABB). If status-quo bias is playing a role in diversification decisions, the optimal portfolio 
should be chosen more often in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) and the average exposure to 
risk should be less than in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). However, the experiment did not re-
veal a significant difference between Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 regarding the choice of 
optimal portfolios or the average exposure to risk. Hence, status-quo bias does not explain 
non-optimal portfolio choices. In this respect, our results clearly contradict the study by Brown 
and Kagel (2009). 
Over the course of the experiment, the subjects were asked twice about their reasons for 
making a certain decision. We conclude from their answers that many subjects are inclined to 
infer future developments from past random events. If a positive event (+7 ECU) has occurred 
for Stock A (Stock B), the subjects tend to assume that Stock B (Stock A) will be the optimal 
choice in the next period. Conversely, if a negative event (±0 ECU) has occurred for Stock A 
(Stock B), the subjects tend to assume that Stock A (Stock B) will be the optimal choice in the 
next period. This phenomenon, known as the gambler’s fallacy, is clearly visible when analyz-
ing the subjects’ portfolio choices. This result particularly confirms the study by Stöckl et al. 
(2015) that shows that investment decisions can be influenced by the gambler’s fallacy and 
that the latter is stable under different general conditions. 
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Most portfolio choices (62.3%) in this experiment were non-optimal. However, neither herd-
ing nor status-quo bias contributed to this irrational behavior. The gambler’s fallacy, however, 
had a substantial influence on the subjects’ portfolio choices. 
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Appendix 1: Instructions, Control Questions, Screenshot, Assessment of Risk 
Attitude 
Instructions (Treatment 1 and Treatment 3) 
The Game 
By investing in stocks, you can benefit from the income return. There are two securities (Stock 
A and Stock B) to choose from. In each period of the game, the value of Stock A is changed by 
+0 experimental currency units (ECU) or +7 experimental currency units (ECU); both events 
occur with a probability of 50%. The same is true for Stock B. Both securities have an expected 
value of +3.50 ECU per period. The performances of both stocks are independent random 
events. 15 periods will be played in total and in each period, you have 4 units at your disposal 
that must be invested. The 4 units can be invested in the following portfolio combinations: 
 
Portfolio 1: AAAA 
Portfolio 2: AAAB 
Portfolio 3: AABB 
Portfolio 4: ABBB 
Portfolio 5: BBBB 
 
The game starts at period 0. At period 0, you have the possibility to restructure the portfolio 
that was randomly assigned to you. The performance of the stocks for the single periods were 
previously determined by 15 x two coin tosses (one toss for Stock A and one toss for Stock B). 
“Heads” signifies a good period (+7 ECU) and “tails” signifies a weak period (+0 ECU). You can 
earn up to 420 ECU in the 15 periods. 
For maximum transparency, you will be shown your results and all subjects will be ranked 
after each period. The ranking is established according to the total earnings. You will therefore 
be able to compare the performance of your portfolio to the performance of the other sub-
jects’ portfolios. You can also earn up to €3.85 in a lottery, detailed information on which you 
will receive in due course. 
 
The Payout 
In the 15 periods, you can earn up to 420 ECU with the securities. 1 ECU equals €0.10. The 
maximum payout is €42.00 (420 x 0.10). Up to €3.85 from the lottery are added to this sum. 
In total, you can earn up to €45.85. You will receive your money at the end of the experiment. 
 
Please note: 
• Please keep quiet during the experiment! 
• Please do not look at your seatmate’s monitor! 
• Auxiliary devices (calculators, smartphones etc.) are not allowed. All electronic devices 
must be switched off! 
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Instructions (Treatment 2) 
The Game 
By investing in stocks, you can benefit from the income return. There are two securities (Stock 
A and Stock B) to choose from. In each period of the game, the value of Stock A is changed by 
+0 experimental currency units (ECU) or +7 experimental currency units (ECU); both events 
occur with a probability of 50%. The same is true for Stock B. Both securities have an expected 
value of +3.50 ECU per period. The performances of both stocks are independent random 
events. 15 periods will be played in total and in each period, you have 4 units at your disposal 
that must be invested. The 4 units can be invested in the following portfolio combinations: 
 
Portfolio 1: AAAA 
Portfolio 2: AAAB 
Portfolio 3: AABB 
Portfolio 4: ABBB 
Portfolio 5: BBBB 
 
The game starts at period 0. At period 0, you have the possibility to restructure the portfolio 
that was randomly assigned to you. The performance of the stocks for the single periods were 
previously determined by 15 x two coin tosses (one toss for Stock A and one toss for Stock B). 
“Heads” signifies a good period (+7 ECU) and “tails” signifies a weak period (+0 ECU). You can 
earn up to 420 ECU in the 15 periods. For maximum transparency, you will be shown your 
results after each period. You can also earn up to €3.85 in a lottery, detailed information on 
which you will receive in due course. 
 
The Payout 
In the 15 periods, you can earn up to 420 ECU with the securities. 1 ECU equals €0.10. The 
maximum payout is €42.00 (420 x 0.10). Up to €3.85 from the lottery are added to this sum. 
In total, you can earn up to €45.85. You will receive your money at the end of the experiment. 
 
Please Note: 
• Please keep quiet during the experiment! 
• Please do not look at your seatmate’s monitor! 
• Auxiliary devices (calculators, smartphones etc.) are not allowed. All electronic devices 
must be switched off! 
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Control Questions 
Control questions (tick the box): 
 
1. What is your task in this game? 
ʘ Solving mathematical problems. 
ʘ Investing in stocks and taking part in a lottery. (correct) 
ʘ Giving economic forecasts. 
 
2. How many different securities are there to choose from and how many free stocks do 
you receive? 
ʘ There are 4 different securities to choose from and I receive 2 free stocks. 
ʘ There are 2 different securities to choose from and I receive 2 free stocks. 
ʘ There are 2 different securities to choose from and I receive 4 free stocks. (correct) 
 
3. On what does the payout depend in the 15 periods? 
ʘ On the dividend payouts. 
ʘ On the performance of the stocks. (correct) 
ʘ On the DAX market trend. 
 
4. How many different combinations of the portfolio are possible? 
ʘ 2 
ʘ 4 
ʘ 5 (correct) 
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Screenshot Treatment 1 (recreated to increase readability) 
 
You are subject 10. Your result in period 1: 
The performance of 
Stock A in Period 1 is  
The performance of 
Stock B in Period 1 is 
Your payout for Period 
1 is 
Your total payout so 
far amounts to 
±0 ECU +7 ECU 14 ECU 14 ECU 
Previous results of all subjects: 
Ranking according to 
Previous Success 
Subjects Pay-out so far Last Portfolio Compo-
sition 
1 3 28 ECU BBBB 
1 5 28 ECU BBBB 
3 4 21 ECU ABBB 
4 7 14 ECU AABB 
4 9 14 ECU AABB 
4 10 14 ECU AABB 
7 1 7 ECU AAAB 
7 6 7 ECU AAAB 
9 2 0 ECU AAAA 
9 8 0 ECU AAAA 
There are still two stocks to choose between (Stock A and Stock B). The value developments 
for both stocks are independent random processes with the possible results +7 ECU (good 
period development) and ±0 ECU (unprofitable period development). 
You receive 4 stocks. You can choose whether to receive 4 Stocks A, 3 Stocks A and one Stock 
B, 2 Stocks A and 2 Stocks B, one Stock A and three Stocks B or 4 Stocks B. The value develop-
ments of the stocks in period 2 were previously determined by two coin tosses (one toss for 
Stock A and one toss for Stock B). “Heads” means a good development in the period whereas 
tails stands for a negative period development (±0 ECU). 
Do you want to reallocate your portfolio? If not, please click on “O.K.”! If so, please choose 
your preferred portfolio and then click on “O.K.”! 
I choose: ʘ 4 Stocks A 
ʘ 3 Stocks A + 1 Stock B 
ʘ 2 Stocks A + 2 Stocks B 
ʘ 1 Stock A + 3 Stocks B 
ʘ 4 Stocks B 
 
 
 
 
 
  
O.K. 
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Instructions to Determine the Risk Preference 
Each decision is a choice between “version A” and “version B”. Each version is comparable to 
a lottery with different payouts and different probabilities of occurrence. 
You have 10 decisions to make and enter. One of these decisions will be considered to deter-
mine your payout from the lottery as follows: After you entered all your decisions, a ten-sided 
dice is thrown to select one of the 10 decisions. Each of the decisions therefore has a 10% 
probability of being chosen. The selected lottery (A or B) is then played. The probability of 
occurrence is simulated by an urn containing table tennis balls: In an urn with 10 table tennis 
balls the number of orange balls determines the probability of the higher payout. 
Example for decision no. 8: In an urn with 10 table tennis balls are 8 orange-colored and 2 
white balls. The probability that a randomly picked ball is orange is therefore 80%. If the picked 
ball is orange, you will receive €2.00 in version A and €3.85 in version B. If the picked ball is 
white, you will receive €1.60 in version A and €0.10 in version B. So: You make 10 decisions 
(either A or B), one of them is randomly selected (with a dice) and played (with an urn and 10 
table tennis balls) – the result will determine your payout from the lottery. Please answer the 
following control questions about the lottery before making any decisions. 
Risk 
level 
Version A:  
 
Version B: 
 
Your 
Deci-
sion A 
or B 
p(€2.00) 
P
ay
o
u
t 
p(€1.60) 
P
ay
o
u
t 
p(€3.85) 
P
ay
o
u
t 
p(€0.10) 
P
ay
o
u
t 
1 10% €2.00 90% €1.60 10% €3.85 90% €0.10  
2 20% €2.00 80% €1.60 20% €3.85 80% €0.10  
3 30% €2.00 70% €1.60 30% €3.85 70% €0.10  
4 40% €2.00 60% €1.60 40% €3.85 60% €0.10  
5 50% €2.00 50% €1.60 50% €3.85 50% €0.10  
6 60% €2.00 40% €1.60 60% €3.85 40% €0.10  
7 70% €2.00 30% €1.60 70% €3.85 30% €0.10  
8 80% €2.00 20% €1.60 80% €3.85 20% €0.10  
9 90% €2.00 10% €1.60 90% €3.85 10% €0.10  
10 100% €2.00 0% €1.60 100% €3.85 0% €0.10  
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Control Questions to Determine the Risk Preference 
Control questions (tick the box): 
 
1. What is the minimum and the maximum payout in the lottery? 
ʘ The minimum payout is €0.00 and the maximum payout is €1.60. 
ʘ The minimum payout is €0.10 and the maximum payout is €3.85. (correct) 
ʘ The minimum payout is €0.10 and the maximum payout is €1.60. 
 
2. If the dice selects the 7th decision and you choose version A and have drawn a white 
table tennis ball from the urn, what is your payout? 
ʘ €0.00 
ʘ €2.00 
ʘ €1.60 (correct) 
 
3. How many white table tennis balls are in the urn if the dice chooses the tenth decision? 
ʘ 10 
ʘ 0 (correct) 
ʘ 5 
 
4. How many orange table tennis balls are in the urn if the dice chooses the fourth deci-
sion? 
ʘ 6 
ʘ 0 
ʘ 4 (correct) 
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Appendix 2: Results of Treatment 1 per Session 
Table A-1: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 1, Session 1) 
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Initial 
Distrib. 25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
- - 
Period 1 20.0% 0.0% 60.0% 20.0% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 10.0% 20.0% 70.0% 0.0% 0.0% AABB BBBA 
Period 3 20.0% 10.0% 30.0% 10.0% 30.0% AABB AABB 
Period 4 20.0% 10.0% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 5 0.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 30.0% AABB AAAA  
Period 6 0.0% 10.0% 60.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 7 0.0% 10.0% 80.0% 0.0% 10.0% AABB AABB 
Period 8 10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 10.0% 20.0% AABB AABB 
Period 9 10.0% 0.0% 40.0% 10.0% 40.0% AABB BBBA 
Period 10 10.0% 10.0% 30.0% 20.0% 30.0% AABB, BBBB BBBB, AABB 
Period 11 20.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 10.0% AABB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 12 20.0% 0.0% 50.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 13  20.0% 10.0% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB BBBB 
Period 14 30.0% 0.0% 40.0% 30.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 15 30.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA 
In Session 1 of Treatment 1, 60% of the subjects have already settled on portfolio AABB. This 
number increases to 70% in Period 2. Subject to some variations, it increases to 80% in Period 
7. In Period 10, however, it recedes to 30%. 
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Table A-2: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 1, Session 2) 
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Initial Distribu-
tion 25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
- - 
Period 1 0.0% 22.2% 44.4% 33.3% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 3 0.0% 11.1% 55.6% 33.3% 0.0% AABB AABB, ABBB 
Period 4 11.1% 11.1% 55.6% 22.2% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 5 0.0% 11.1% 55.6% 22.2% 11.1% AABB ABBB 
Period 6 11.1% 0.0% 44.4% 44.4% 0.0% AABB AABB, ABBB 
Period 7 11.1% 0.0% 55.6% 33.3% 0.0% AABB, ABBB AABB, ABBB 
Period 8 11.1% 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% AABB ABBB 
Period 9 11.1% 22.2% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% AABB AAAB 
Period 10 11.1% 11.1% 44.4% 22.2% 11.1% AABB AABB 
Period 11 22.2% 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% 0.0% AABB BBBB, ABBB 
Period 12 0.0% 11.1% 44.4% 33.3% 11.1% AABB AAAA 
Period 13  11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 55.6% 11.1% AABB BBBB 
Period 14 22.2% 44.4% 22.2% 0.0% 11.1% ABBB BBBB, ABBB 
Period 15 33.3% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% AAAB BBBB, AAAB 
In Session 2 of Treatment 1 we again observe a trend toward the stock combination AABB. In 
the first period, 44% of the subjects chose this portfolio structure, and 67% do so in the second 
period. Subsequently, however, these decisions recede to 11% in Period 13, only to end at 
22% in the last period. 
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Table A-3: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 1, Session 3) 
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Initial Distri-
bution 
25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 11.1% 33.3% 33.3% 11.1% 11.1% - - 
Period 2 11.1% 0.0% 77.8% 11.1% 0.0% AAAB, AABB BBBB 
Period 3 11.1% 44.4% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 4 0.0% 22.2% 66.7% 0.0% 11.1% AAAB, AABB AAAA, AAAB, AABB 
Period 5 0.0% 11.1% 44.4% 22.2% 22.2% AABB AAAB 
Period 6 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 22.2% 44.4% AABB BBBB 
Period 7 0.0% 22.2% 55.6% 0.0% 22.2% BBBB BBBB 
Period 8 11.1% 0.0% 55.6% 11.1% 22.2% AABB AAAB, AABB, BBBB 
Period 9 11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% AABB AAAA 
Period 10 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 44.4% 22.2% ABBB BBBB 
Period 11 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% ABBB BBBB 
Period 12 11.1% 11.1% 66.7% 0.0% 11.1% AABB AAAA, BBBB 
Period 13  0.0% 0.0% 55.6% 22.2% 22.2% AABB AAAA, BBBB 
Period 14 11.1% 22.2% 55.6% 0.0% 11.1% ABBB BBBB 
Period 15 11.1% 33.3% 44.4% 0.0% 11.1% AAAB AAAA, AAAB 
In Session 3 of Treatment 1, an increasing number of subjects choose portfolio BBBB. None of 
the subjects in Period 3 decides for this combination. In Period 4, 11% make this decision, and 
as much as 22% do so in Period 5, and even 44% in Period 6. This development, however, is 
not continued but collapses rather quickly. 
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Table A-4: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 1, Session 4) 
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Initial Dis-
tribution 
25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 0.0% 30.0% 40.0% 30.0% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 10.0% 30.0% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 3 0.0% 20.0% 50.0% 30.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA, AABB, ABBB 
Period 4 10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 5 0.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% AAAB, AABB AAAB 
Period 6 0.0% 30.0% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 7 10.0% 50.0% 20.0% 10.0% 10.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 8 10.0% 20.0% 55.0% 20.0% 0.0% AAAB BBBB 
Period 9 0.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 10.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 10 0.0% 10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% AAAB, AABB, ABBB AABB 
Period 11 10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB, ABBB AABB 
Period 12 10.0% 10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0% AAAB, AABB AAAA 
Period 13  0.0% 50.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% ABBB BBBB 
Period 14 30.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% AAAB AABB 
Period 15 30.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% AABB AAAA 
In Session 4 of Treatment 1, similar results are achieved. The portfolio structure ABBB is in-
creasingly considered by the subjects. In Period 7, this portfolio is selected by 10% of the sub-
jects, and by 20%, 30%, and 40% percent in the subsequent periods. This development stops 
abruptly after that. In Periods 13 to 15, this combination is no longer chosen. 
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Table A-5: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 1, Session 5) 
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Initial Distri-
bution 
25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 0.0% 14.3% 71.4% 14.3% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 0.0% 28.6% 57.1% 14.3% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 3 0.0% 28.6% 42.9% 28.6% 0.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 4 0.0% 28.6% 42.9% 14.3% 14.3% AABB ABBB 
Period 5 0.0% 71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 6 0.0% 14.3% 57.1% 28.6% 0.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 7 0.0% 0.0% 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% AABB ABBB 
Period 8 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 57.1% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 9 0.0% 14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 0.0% ABBB AAAB 
Period 10 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 57.1% 0.0% AABB, ABBB AABB 
Period 11 14.3% 42.9% 28.6% 0.0% 14.3% ABBB AAAB, ABBB 
Period 12 14.3% 28.6% 0.0% 57.1% 0.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 13  0.0% 14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 0.0% ABBB AAAB, ABBB 
Period 14 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 28.6% 28.6% AABB, ABBB ABBB 
Period 15 0.0% 42.9% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% AABB, ABBB, BBBB AAAB, ABBB 
In Session 5 of Treatment 1, the combination ABBB is again popular for some time. The num-
ber of subjects deciding for this portfolio increases from Period 5 (14%), over Periods 6 and 7 
(29%) to Period 8 with 57%. Subject to some variations, this choice recedes to 14% in Period 
15.   
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Table A-6: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 1, Session 6) 
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Initial Distri-
bution 
25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% - - 
Period 2 25.0% 25.0% 12.5% 25.0% 12.5% AABB BBBB 
Period 3 25.0% 37.5% 37.5% 0.0% 0.0% AAAA, AAAB, ABBB ABBB 
Period 4 25.0% 62.5% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% AAAB, AABB AABB 
Period 5 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 6 25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 37.5% 12.5% AAAA, AAAB, AABB, ABBB AAAA 
Period 7 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% 37.5% 37.5% ABBB ABBB 
Period 8 37.5% 0.0% 25.0% 37.5% 0.0% ABBB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 9 12.5% 25.0% 25.0% 12.5% 25.0% AAAA, ABBB AABB 
Period 10 25.0% 12.5% 50.0% 0.0% 12.5% AAAB, AABB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 11 37.5% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% AABB BBBB 
Period 12 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% AAAA AAAA 
Period 13  37.5% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% BBBB BBBB 
Period 14 37.5% 37.5% 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% AAAA BBBB 
Period 15 37.5% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% AAAA, AAAB AAAA 
In Session 6 of Treatment 1, no herding can be established for portfolio AAAB. In Period 1, this 
combination is chosen by 13% of the subjects, by 25% in Period 2, by 38% in Period 3, and by 
as much as 63% in Period 4. In the following period, this development suddenly stops. As early 
as Period 7, this portfolio is no longer chosen by any of the subjects. 
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Appendix 3: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game 
Table A-7: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 1) 
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Initial Distri-
bution 
25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
Period 1 7.5% 18.9% 45.3% 24.5% 3.8% 
Period 2 9.4% 17.0% 56.6% 15.1% 1.9% 
Period 3 9.4% 24.5% 43.4% 17.0% 5.7% 
Period 4 11.3% 28.3% 43.4% 11.3% 5.7% 
Period 5 3.8% 26.4% 37.7% 18.9% 13.2% 
Period 6 5.7% 11.3% 41.5% 28.3% 13.2% 
Period 7 5.7% 15.1% 47.2% 17.0% 15.1% 
Period 8 13.2% 13.2% 41.5% 22.6% 9.4% 
Period 9 7.5% 17.0% 32.1% 26.4% 17.0% 
Period 10 7.5% 9.4% 37.7% 30.2% 15.1% 
Period 11 22.6% 22.6% 37.7% 9.4% 7.5% 
Period 12 13.2% 9.4% 34.0% 28.3% 15.1% 
Period 13  11.3% 18.9% 32.1% 24.5% 13.2% 
Period 14 22.6% 22.6% 34.0% 9.4% 11.3% 
Period 15 24.5% 26.4% 32.1% 7.5% 9.4% 
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Table A-8: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 2) 
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Initial Distri-
bution 
25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
Period 1 2.2% 15.2% 52.2% 21.7% 8.7% 
Period 2 8.7% 30.4% 17.4% 34.8% 8.7% 
Period 3 4.3% 28.3% 32.6% 21.7% 13.0% 
Period 4 10.9% 34.8% 15.2% 19.6% 19.6% 
Period 5 8.7% 13.0% 50.0% 13.0% 15.2% 
Period 6 15.2% 13.0% 39.1% 17.4% 15.2% 
Period 7 13.0% 19.6% 30.4% 28.3% 8.7% 
Period 8 4.3% 39.1% 28.3% 10.9% 17.4% 
Period 9 8.7% 21.7% 21.7% 21.7% 26.1% 
Period 10 4.3% 13.0% 37.0% 26.1% 19.6% 
Period 11 15.2% 26.1% 26.1% 17.4% 15.2% 
Period 12 0.0% 10.9% 39.1% 32.6% 17.4% 
Period 13  4.3% 19.6% 28.3% 32.6% 15.2% 
Period 14 15.2% 30.4% 26.1% 21.7% 6.5% 
Period 15 15.2% 21.7% 34.8% 17.4% 10.9% 
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Table A-9: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game (Treatment 3) 
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Initial Distri-
bution 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Period 1 5.9% 19.6% 60.8% 7.8% 5.9% 
Period 2 5.9% 29.4% 43.1% 11.8% 9.8% 
Period 3 9.8% 17.6% 43.1% 21.6% 7.8% 
Period 4 11.8% 25.5% 21.6% 23.5% 17.6% 
Period 5 5.9% 13.7% 51.0% 15.7% 13.7% 
Period 6 9.8% 25.5% 37.3% 17.6% 9.8% 
Period 7 5.9% 25.5% 41.2% 19.6% 7.8% 
Period 8 7.8% 35.3% 33.3% 17.6% 5.9% 
Period 9 0.0% 13.7% 47.1% 33.3% 5.9% 
Period 10 3.9% 9.8% 47.1% 27.5% 11.8% 
Period 11 17.6% 15.7% 41.2% 17.6% 7.8% 
Period 12 3.9% 21.6% 39.2% 21.6% 13.7% 
Period 13  5.9% 23.5% 27.5% 23.5% 19.6% 
Period 14 13.7% 25.5% 39.2% 13.7% 7.8% 
Period 15 17.6% 23.5% 41.2% 2.0% 15.7% 
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Appendix 4: Further Results 
Table A-10: Manifestation of the Gambler’s Fallacy in the Portfolio Choices of All Treatments 
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2 ±0 +7 A 8.00% 25.33% 40.00% 20.00% 6.67% 6.67% Yes 
3 +7 +7 A 8.00% 23.33% 40.00% 20.00% 8.67% 2.67% Yes 
4 ±0 +7 A 11.33% 29.33% 27.33% 18.00% 14.00% 8.67% Yes 
5 +7 ±0 B 6.00% 18.00% 46.00% 16.00% 14.00% -6.00% Yes 
6 +7 +7 B 10.00% 16.67% 39.33% 21.33% 12.67% -7.33% Yes 
7 ±0 ±0 B 8.00% 20.00% 40.00% 21.33% 10.67% -4.00% Yes 
8 ±0 +7 A 8.67% 28.67% 34.67% 17.33% 10.67% 9.33% Yes 
9 +7 ±0 B 5.33% 17.33% 34.00% 27.33% 16.00% -20.67% Yes 
10 ±0 ±0 B 5.33% 10.67% 40.67% 28.00% 15.33% -27.33% Yes 
11 ±0 +7 A 18.67% 21.33% 35.33% 14.67% 10.00% 15.33% Yes 
12 +7 ±0 B 6.00% 14.00% 37.33% 27.33% 15.33% -22.67% Yes 
13 +7 +7 B 7.33% 20.67% 29.33% 26.67% 16.00% -14.67% Yes 
14 ±0 +7 A 17.33% 26.00% 33.33% 14.67% 8.67% 20.00% Yes 
15 ±0 ±0 A 19.33% 24.00% 36.00% 8.67% 12.00% 22.67% Yes 
Table A-10 shows that the gambler’s fallacy did indeed consistently influence the subjects’ 
portfolio choices. The first column lists those periods of the game in which the gambler’s fal-
lacy could take effect. No random events existed before Period 1, which is why the gambler’s 
fallacy could not take effect before the portfolio choice in Period 2. The second and third col-
umns of Table A-10 list the random events of the previous periods. The fourth column shows 
which stock is preferred by the subjects who fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy. In Period 1, for 
instance, Stock A has an income return of ±0 ECU and Stock B has an income return of +7 ECU. 
This is the development that the subjects can see before Period 2. This results in a preference 
for Stock A. Before the start of Period 3, the “errant gambler” again prefers Stock A because, 
in the previous period, both stocks had a positive income return (+7 ECU) but for Stock A, it is 
the first in succession, while it is the second in succession for Stock B. Before Period 4, the 
events of Period 2 are repeated and result in yet another preference for Stock A. Period by 
period, considerations such as these lead to preferences that are listed in the fourth column 
of Table A-10. 
Columns 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Table A-10 show the percentages of the five possible portfolio 
compilations (AAAA, AAAB, AABB, ABBB and BBBB) for all three treatments (Treatment 1, 
Treatment 2, and Treatment 3; for detailed results, see Tables A-7, A-8, and A-9 in Appendix 
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3). Column 10 of Table A-10 displays an unweighted spread, calculated by subtracting the 
portfolio decisions that chose Stock B (Columns 8 (Y) and 9 (Z)) from those that prefer Stock A 
(Columns 5 (W) and 6 (X)). We calculate: (W + X) – (Y + Z). In Period 2 this means: (8.00 + 25.33) 
– (20.00 + 6.67) = 6.67. 
If the subtraction results in a positive value, it can be concluded that the subjects preferred 
Stock A to Stock B when compiling their portfolios. If the subtraction results in a negative 
value, it can be concluded that the subjects preferred Stock B to Stock A when assembling 
their portfolios. Consequently, we can expect that a preference for Stock A results in a positive 
balance and that a preference for Stock B results in a negative balance. In Column 11 of Table 
A-10, we analyze which periods match our expectations, and we can see that this occurs with-
out exception. When in Column 4 the Stock A (Stock B) is listed, then the balance in Column 
10 is positive (negative). 
Considering that the subjects fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy and accordingly develop pref-
erences for Stock A or Stock B (Column 4 of Table A-10), then we can find a suitable explana-
tion for the surplus of Stock A (positive indication in Column 10) or, respectively, for the sur-
plus of Stock B (negative indication in Column 10) in all periods. 
Table A-11: Variances and Standard Deviations of the Five Portfolios Considering the Actual 
Events for Stock A and Stock B in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) 
Period Events Performance of Portfolios 
 Stock A Stock B AAAA AAAB AABB ABBB BBBB 
1 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
2 +7 +7 +28 +28 +28 +28 +28 
3 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
4 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
5 +7 +7 +28 +28 +28 +28 +28 
6 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 
7 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
8 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
9 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 
10 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
11 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
12 +7 +7 +28 +28 +28 +28 +28 
13 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
14 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 
15 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
  Variance 209.07 115.27 84.00 115.27 209.07 
  
Stand. 
Dev. 
14.46 10.74 9.17 10.74 14.46 
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Abstract 
The procedures previously used to determine risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-
loving) exhibit a number of weaknesses. In part, they are so complex and sophisticated that 
the subjects frequently give spontaneous, ill-considered answers. In this way, their actual risk 
preference can often not be correctly determined. In addition, in this process there are situa-
tions and circumstances in which it is not possible to clearly assign subjects to one of the three 
categories of risk preference. In addition, with the previous approaches, loss aversion – which 
has an important influence on risk preference – is not taken into consideration, or only insuf-
ficiently. We propose here a new procedure to determine risk preference which is (1) ex-
tremely simple and clear, which (2) enables unambiguous differentiation between risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects, and which (3) takes the influence of loss aversion on risk 
preference into account in an appropriate way. 
Keywords  
Risk preference, loss aversion, portfolio choice, diversification behavior, behavioral finance, 
experimental research 
JEL Classification 
B49, C91, G11, G40 
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1 Introduction 
Markowitz (1952) shows that for risk-averse subjects it usually makes sense to hold diversified 
securities portfolios. However, there are many empirical findings which reveal that under-di-
versified portfolios are very frequently held.1 Experimental economic research examines this 
contradiction and finds many reasons why suboptimal decisions are frequently made with re-
gard to diversification.2  
Meaningful experimental results on diversification behavior can normally only be obtained if 
clarity about the risk preference of the subjects can be achieved: Because that which is mean-
ingful for a risk-averse subject can be complete nonsense for a risk-loving subject, and vice-
versa. In the meantime there are a whole range of procedures available to determine risk 
preference.3 
In our view, a good procedure for determining risk preference must above all comply with 
three criteria: 
1. It must be a simple and clear procedure. 
2. It must be possible to clearly and unambiguously differentiate between risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects.  
3. The influence of loss aversion on risk preference should not be neglected. 
We consider these three criteria to be key. (1) The procedure has to be simple and clear so 
that we can really record the risk preferences of the subjects. In the case of complex and con-
fusing decision-making situations, subjects frequently lose patience and then give spontane-
ous, ill-considered answers. This can sometimes lead to a blurring of their risk preference ra-
ther than it being revealed. (2) In the previous approaches used, there are certain combina-
tions of circumstances in which risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects make – with 
good reason – the same decisions. In that case, it is not possible to differentiate between the 
three forms of risk preference. (3) As we will show later on, risk preference is significantly 
determined by the possibility of suffering losses. Procedures to measure risk preference which 
do not contain the possibility of losses systematically underestimate the proportion of risk-
averse subjects. 
Our study is divided up into four sections. First, we evaluate the previous approaches against 
the background of the three criteria we have postulated. In the following chapter we present 
our new procedure to measure risk preference. Using an experimental investigation we 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Dimmock et al. (2016), Anderson (2013), Hibbert, Lawrence and Prakash (2012), Goetzmann 
and Kumar (2008), Meulbroek (2005), Polkovnichenko (2005), Huberman and Sengmueller (2004), Agnew, Bal-
duzzi and Sundén (2003), Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli (2002), Benartzi (2001), Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Barber 
and Odean (2000), Bode, van Echelpoel and Sievi (1994), Blume and Friend (1975), and Lease, Lewellen and 
Schlarbaum (1974). 
2 See, for example, Filiz et al. (2018), Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015), Fernandes (2013), Morrin et al. (2012), 
Rieger (2012), Eyster and Weizsäcker (2011), Baltussen and Post (2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009), Hedesstrom, 
Svedsater and Garling (2006), Fellner, Güth and Maciejovsky (2004), Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009), Weber, 
Siebenmorgen and Weber (2005).  
3 See, for example, Lönnqvist et al. (2015), Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013), Crosetto and Filippin (2013), Eckel 
and Grossmann (2002, 2008), Lejuez et al. (2002), Holt and Laury (2002), and Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
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subsequently show that loss aversion should not be neglected when measuring risk prefer-
ence. In the final chapter we summarize the most important results of the investigation. 
2 The Previous Approaches and their Weaknesses 
In the following section we discuss the approaches of Holt and Laury (2002), Eckel and Gross-
man (2008), and Crosetto and Filippin (2013). In addition, we briefly consider the approaches 
used by Lejuez et al. (2002), Gneezy and Potters (1997), the DOSPERT questionnaire created 
by Weber, Blais and Betz (2002), and the socio-economic panel (Schupp and Wagner, 2002; 
Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer, 1993). 
2.1 The Multiple Price List Method of Holt and Laury (2002) 
In the multiple price list method of Holt and Laury (2002), subjects are asked to make ten 
decisions choosing between two lotteries in each case (Table 1). As the first decision, lottery 
A ($2.00 with a probability of 10% or $1.60 with a probability of 90%) is set against lottery B 
($3.85 with a probability of 10% and $0.10 with a probability of 90%). The subject has to decide 
whether they would play lottery A or lottery B. This is followed by the other nine comparisons 
between lottery A and lottery B. From the sequence of the ten decisions, conclusions about 
the risk preferences of the subject are then drawn. 
Table 1: The Lottery Alternatives of Holt and Laury (2002) 
 Lottery A Lottery B 
No. Prob. Event Prob. Event Prob. Event Prob. Event 
1 10% $2.00 90% $1.60 10% $3.85 90% $0.10 
2 20% $2.00 80% $1.60 20% $3.85 80% $0.10 
3 30% $2.00 70% $1.60 30% $3.85 70% $0.10 
4 40% $2.00 60% $1.60 40% $3.85 60% $0.10 
5 50% $2.00 50% $1.60 50% $3.85 50% $0.10 
6 60% $2.00 40% $1.60 60% $3.85 40% $0.10 
7 70% $2.00 30% $1.60 70% $3.85 30% $0.10 
8 80% $2.00 20% $1.60 80% $3.85 20% $0.10 
9 90% $2.00 10% $1.60 90% $3.85 10% $0.10 
10 100% $2.00 0% $1.60 100% $3.85 0% $0.10 
Prob. = probability of occurrence; event = random event. 
The main problem of this approach is the complexity of the decision-making situation. Neither 
the expected returns nor the extent of the risk exposure of the alternatives A and B are clearly 
recognizable for the subjects. Accordingly, many subjects decide randomly or based on a gut 
feeling. In this situation, it frequently occurs that ten decisions are made where the decision-
making process cannot be clearly interpreted. Jacobson and Petrie (2009) as well as Charnes 
and Viceisza (2011) show that between 55% and 75% of the decision-making processes cannot 
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be clearly interpreted. Charness et al. (2018) and Dave et al. (2010) also point out additional 
uncertainties in the interpretation of results.  
The approach used by Holt and Laury (2002) becomes somewhat clearer if one considers the 
expected returns and the risk (standard deviation) of the ten lottery alternatives (Table 2). In 
the first lottery alternative, lottery A has an expected return of $1.64 and a standard deviation 
of 0.12. Lottery B has an expected return of $0.48 and a standard deviation of 1.13. Risk-neu-
tral subjects orientate themselves solely towards expected returns and therefore decide in 
favor of alternative A. A risk-averse subject will also decide in favor of alternative A, because 
here the expected returns is higher and at the same time the risk is lower than that of alter-
native B. But how would a risk-loving subject decide? Expected returns would speak for alter-
native A, but the risk speaks for alternative B. How a risk-loving subject decides therefore de-
pends on the extent of their appetite for risk. Subjects with a great appetite for risk will choose 
alternative B because the higher risk more than compensates for the lower expected return. 
Subjects with a mild appetite for risk will choose alternative A because the higher expected 
return more than compensates for the lower risk. 
Table 2: The Expected Returns and Risk (Standard Deviation) of the Lottery Alternatives used 
by Holt and Laury (2002) and the Preferences of Risk-Neutral, Risk-Averse and Risk-Loving Sub-
jects 
 Lottery A Lottery B Preference Preference Preference 
No. E(A) SD E(B) SD Risk-Neutral Risk-Averse Risk-Loving 
1 1.64 0.12 0.48 1.13 A A A or B 
2 1.68 0.16 0.85 1.50 A A A or B 
3 1.72 0.18 1.23 1.72 A A A or B 
4 1.76 0.20 1.60 1.84 A A A or B 
5 1.80 0.20 1.98 1.88 B A or B B 
6 1.84 0.20 2.35 1.84 B A or B B 
7 1.88 0.18 2.73 1.72 B A or B B 
8 1.92 0.16 3.10 1.50 B A or B B 
9 1.96 0.12 3.48 1.13 B A or B B 
10 2.00 0.00 3.85 0.00 B B B 
E(A) = expected returns of lottery A; E(B) = expected returns of lottery B; SD = standard deviation. 
In the fifth decision, risk-neutral subjects choose alternative B, because the expected return 
of $1.98 is higher than that of alternative A ($1.80). Risk-loving subjects also choose alterna-
tive B because here both expected return and risk are higher than in alternative A. But how 
will risk-averse subjects react? The expected return would speak for alternative B, but the risk 
speaks for alternative A. How the subject decides now depends on the extent of their risk 
aversion. If they are highly risk-averse, they will choose alternative A because the lower risk 
offsets the lower expected return. If, however, they are only slightly risk-averse, they will de-
cide in favor of alternative B, because the higher expected return more than compensates for 
the higher risk. 
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Now the following question arises: How should subjects be classified who always prefer alter-
native A in the first four decisions and then prefer alternative B in the last six decisions? These 
can be either risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-loving subjects (see Table 2). It cannot therefore 
be guaranteed that they will be unambiguously assigned to one of the three possible catego-
ries of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-loving).  
The approach used by Holt and Laury (2002) therefore does not satisfy any of the three re-
quirements which we formulated at the beginning for reliable determining of risk preference: 
(1) It is complex and unclear. (2) It does not lead to a clear differentiation between risk-neutral, 
risk-averse and risk-loving subjects. (3) It does not take the possibility of losses into account. 
2.2 The Approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) 
The approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) has the advantage that the decision-making 
situation is significantly clearer than in the case of Holt and Laury (2002). The subjects decide 
in favor of one of five possible lotteries. In each lottery there are two possible events which 
each have a probability of occurrence of 50%. From lottery 1 to lottery 5, the expected values 
rise, as do the risks (Table 3, Figure 2).  
In the loss treatment the participants receive $6 for filling in a questionnaire4 in the run-up to 
the lottery. They can lose part of this $6 in lottery 4 and all of it in lottery 5. In order to remu-
nerate all subjects uniformly, the expected values are $6 higher in the no-loss treatment. The 
approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) thus also takes the possibility of losses into con-
sideration. 
Table 3: Lottery Alternatives in Eckel and Grossman (2008) 
No. Event Prob 
Return 
Loss 
Return 
No-Loss 
E(r) 
Loss 
E(r) 
No-Loss 
Risk 
SD 
1 
A 50% $10 $16 
$10 $16 0 
B 50% $10 $16 
2 
A 50% $18 $24 
$12 $18 6 
B 50% $6 $12 
3 
A 50% $26 $32 
$14 $20 12 
B 50% $2 $8 
4 
A 50% $34 $40 
$16 $22 18 
B 50% $-2 $4 
5 
A 50% $42 $48 
$18 $24 24 
B 50% $-6 $0 
Event = possible random event; Prob = probability of occurrence; Return Loss = payoff of the coincidental events 
in the loss treatment; Return No-loss = payoff of the coincidental events in the no-loss treatment; E(r) loss = 
expected value of the payoff in the loss treatment; E(r) no loss = expected value of the payoff in the no-loss 
treatment; SD = standard deviation. 
                                                          
4 Zuckerman’s sensation-seeking scale. See Zuckerman (1979, 1994). 
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The approach deployed by Eckel and Grossman (2008) is problematic in that the assignment 
of the subjects to the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-
loving) is by no means clear. This becomes apparent when one considers that risk-averse, risk-
neutral and risk-loving subjects exhibit fundamentally diverging indifference curves. Risk-
averse subjects have rising indifference curves, whereas risk-neutral subjects have absolutely 
horizontal indifference curves and risk-loving subjects have falling indifference curves (Figure 
1).  
Figure 1: The Form of the Indifference Curves for Risk-Averse, Risk-Neutral and Risk-Loving 
Subjects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E(r) = expected value of return; risk (standard deviation). 
If the space of possibilities which results from the five lotteries is considered, the following 
becomes recognizable: All of the subjects who choose lottery 5 can be risk-averse as well as 
risk-neutral or risk-loving (Figure 2). 
The approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) thus manages to fulfill two of the three 
criteria we have put forward: It is a simple and clear decision-making situation and the possi-
bility of making losses is also taken into account. However, the unambiguous identification of 
risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects is not possible. 
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Figure 2: Space of Possibilities in Eckel and Grossman (2008) as well as the Indifference Curves 
of a Risk-Averse (Unbroken Grey Line), a Risk-Neutral (Dotted Grey Line) and a Risk-Loving 
Subject (Dashed Grey Line) 
 
2.3 The Approach used by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) 
Crosetto and Filippin (2013) have proposed the most interesting approach yet to determine 
risk preferences. In this approach, the participants are faced with the following decision-mak-
ing situation: They have to decide how many of a total of 100 boxes they want to collect. One 
of the boxes contains a 'bomb'. The participants receive a payoff of €0.10 per box. After they 
have decided on a number of boxes (static version) or have ended the game by pressing the 
‘stop button’ (dynamic version),5 a number between 1 and 100 is drawn from an urn. If the 
number drawn is ≤ the number of collected boxes, the 'bomb' has exploded and the money is 
gone. If the number drawn is > the number of collected boxes, the subject receives a payment 
based on the multiplication of the number of boxes collected by €0.10. It can be expected that 
the subjects want to win as much money as possible. The more boxes they collect, the higher 
the payoff. At the same time, the risk of encountering the ‘bomb’ (number drawn ≤ the num-
ber of collected boxes) rises. The subjects thus have to weigh up how much risk is meaningful 
to them. The space of possibilities of this decision-making situation is shown in Figure 3. 
                                                          
5 Crosetto and Filippin deployed a static basic variation and a dynamic variant. In the static variant the subjects 
only see a picture of 100 boxes and have to decide how many they want to collect. In the dynamic PC version the 
100 boxes are shown on the screen. By pressing a start button the participants trigger the collection of one box 
per second until they press the stop button. 
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Figure 3: Space of Possibilities in Crosetto and Filippin (2013) 
 
From the first to the 50th box, expected returns rises gradually. At the same time the risk also 
increases steadily. From the 50th to the 75th boxes, the risk continues to rise, whereas expected 
returns falls. From the 75th to the 100th boxes, the risk as well as expected returns both de-
crease. The highest expected return is achieved if one collects exactly 50 boxes. Risk-averse 
subjects – depending on their risk aversion – will choose between one and 50 boxes. Risk-
loving subjects will choose between 50 and 75 boxes. Risk-neutral subjects will always collect 
exactly 50 boxes, because expected return reaches its maximum level there. The efficient fron-
tier of the space of possibility thus extends from one to 75 boxes. The section from 76 to 100 
boxes, however, is the non-efficient part of the space of possibility. 
The great advantage of this approach is the enormous clarity of the decision-making situation. 
In addition, loss opportunities can also be implemented easily, which Crosetto and Filippin 
(2013) in fact do in one of the treatments.  
Nevertheless, some criticism can be made: (1) If a subject collects exactly 50 boxes it is not 
possible to recognize whether they are risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-loving. While it is true 
that all risk-neutral subjects will collect exactly 50 boxes, one cannot conclude that all subjects 
who collect 50 boxes are risk-neutral. In view of the maximum expected return, slightly risk-
averse or slightly risk-loving subjects could also consider 50 boxes to be the most attractive 
option.6 (2) The decision-making situation is indeed very clear, but it is not simple. How many 
subjects recognize that the maximum expected return can be found at exactly 50 boxes? And 
how many subjects realize what the risk (standard deviation) is for the 100 different 
                                                          
6 Around 14% of the subjects decide to collect exactly 50 boxes. This means that a notable proportion of the 
subjects cannot be assigned unambiguously to one of the three categories (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-
loving). 
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possibilities? A considerable amount of calculating is required to work that out. (3) How should 
subjects who collect more than 75 boxes be characterized? Those persons who move in the 
non-efficient part of the space of possibilities are also either risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-
loving. There is no other possibility. However, which of these three alternatives they fit into 
cannot be said, because each subject who collects more than 75 boxes is obviously not aware 
of the shape of the space of possibilities. 
The three requirements we have put forward for a good process to determine risk preferences 
are not completely fulfilled here. The decision-making situation is clear, but it is not exactly 
simple. It is not possible in every case to unambiguously assign subjects to one of the three 
categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving). On the positive side, 
introducing a risk of loss is simple, which Crosetto and Filippin (2013) in fact do in one of the 
treatments. 
2.4 Further Approaches 
The method used by Lejuez et al. (2002) aims to create a relative comparison of risk preference 
between two or more subjects. However, his aim is not to assign them to one of the three 
categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving). The decision-making 
situation is designed as follows: A balloon and a pump are shown on a computer screen. With 
every click of a mouse, the balloon is pumped up a bit more and the participant receives €0.05. 
Their credit is shown on a temporary account. The subject can stop pumping at any time. If 
the balloon bursts, the credit accumulated is lost. A total of 90 rounds of the game are played, 
in which there are three different colored balloons (blue, yellow and orange). The three colors 
represent different probabilities of bursting. The subjects are only informed that the three 
different-colored balloons have a different bursting point, and that the balloon can even burst 
on the first pump. The average number of pumps made is used as an indicator for risk prefer-
ence. As no advance information is provided about expected returns and risk, this method is 
not suitable for assigning subjects to one of the three categories of risk preference: Only a 
relative comparison between subjects can take place. For example, it can be established that 
subject A acts more cautiously than subject B. However, whether subject A is risk-averse and 
subject B is risk-loving remains unclear. Subject A could be strongly risk-averse and subject B 
could be slightly risk-averse. Or subject A is slightly risk-loving and subject B is highly risk-lov-
ing. This remains unclear.  
The method used by Gneezy and Potters (1997) examines which proportion of their portfolio 
subjects invest in a risky asset. To do so, they are asked which proportion of 200 cents they 
want to bet on in a lottery which there is a probability of two thirds that they will lose the 
amount and a probability of one third that they will win two and a half times the amount. So 
if they win they retain the amount they wager plus two and a half times the amount as win-
nings. The lottery thus has a positive expected value. A total of nine rounds are played. In 
treatment H, the participants decide separately for each round which proportion of the 200 
cents they want to bet. In treatment L, decisions are made in advance for each of three rounds 
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of the game. The amount which is wagered thus remains constant for three rounds. Depend-
ing on the treatment, the participants are informed about the (aggregated) results after one 
or three lotteries and then they bet again. It is shown that the average amount placed as a bet 
in treatment L (decision in advance) is greater than in treatment H (separate decision for each 
round). The results reveal that an investment period spread over several periods leads to a 
larger proportion of the investor's assets being invested in a risky asset. In an adapted form, 
Charness and Gneezy (2010) established that the participants of the experiment would pay in 
order to have more frequent opportunities to change the composition of their portfolio. How-
ever, the structure of the experiment is not suited to assigning the subjects to one of the three 
categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving). Once again, the ap-
proach can only be used to establish that subject A acts more cautiously than subject B. The 
same issue arises as in the case of Lejuez et al. (2002). 
Another way of determining individual risk preference is to interview the subjects. A good 
example of this is the domain-specific risk taking questionnaire (DOSPERT) developed by We-
ber, Blais and Betz (2002). The questionnaire relates to a large number of high-risk activities 
or behaviors from five fields: (1) Sports and leisure, (2) health, (3) social issues, (4) ethics, and 
(5) finances. The questionnaire records the probability of the respondents taking risks, their 
perception of these risks and of the benefit which might result from the risks taken. A total of 
40 topics are evenly distributed over five fields, whereby only the field of finance is subdivided 
into (a) gambling and (b) investment risks. The participants estimate their own risk preference 
on a scale from 1 (low-risk) to 5 (high-risk). Assignation to one of the three categories of risk 
preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving) is not possible on the basis of this ques-
tionnaire. Once again, this approach can only be used to establish that subject A acts more 
cautiously than subject B. The same issues arise as in the case of Lejuez et al. (2002).  
Another example of surveying risk preference within the framework of a questionnaire is the 
socio-economic panel (SOEP). Schupp and Wagner (2002) as well as Wagner, Burkhauser and 
Behringer (1993) describe the approach used in the questionnaire. The idea is that the inter-
viewees provide information about their general risk preferences. Assignation to one of the 
three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving) is not possible on 
the basis of this questionnaire. The same applies to the differentiated versions of the SOEP 
approach (Schupp and Wagner, 2002; Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer, 1993). These ap-
proaches can only be used to establish that subject A acts more cautiously than subject B. The 
same issues arise as in the case of Lejuez et al. (2002). 
Lönnqvist et al. (2015) examine the time stability of various procedures for the measurement 
of risk preferences, while Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013) compare different procedures for 
the measurement of risk preferences. However, they do not provide a different approach for 
the identification of risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects. 
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3 The New Approach 
We propose a procedure for differentiating between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving 
subjects which is very clear and simple and which makes it possible to assign subjects unam-
biguously to the three categories of risk preference.  
It deals with a decision to choose between two lotteries.7 The subjects take a card – they can 
choose between taking a card from pile A or one from pile B. Both piles consist of four playing 
cards each. In pile A there are two cards which lead to a profit of €+4, and two cards which 
lead to a profit of €+6 (Figure 4). In pile B there are two cards which lead to no profit €±0, and 
two cards which lead to a profit of €+10 (Figure 5).  
Figure 4: The Four Cards in Pile A 
       
Figure 5: The Four Cards in Pile B 
       
The subjects are informed that the expected return in both piles is identical at €+5. In addition, 
the subjects are made aware of the fact that pile A leads to results which fluctuate slightly 
around the expected value (low-risk), while pile B leads to results which fluctuate considerably 
around the expected value (high-risk). The two piles of cards containing four cards each are 
not only shown on the screen, but can also be seen as real playing cards on the table of the 
game leader. The subjects are informed that the pile of cards which they decide for (A or B) 
will be shuffled and that they then have to take a card. The entire survey is programmed in z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). However, we have decided not to program random events in z-Tree, 
but to carry them out analogously. In this way we want to counteract the possible suspicion 
that it could be a manipulated random event. The subjects see the playing cards and can be 
                                                          
7 We were inspired by Bechara et al. (1994) here. 
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sure that there is a probability of exactly 50% that the favorable event (€+6 in pile A and €+10 
in pile B) will occur. In addition, they can also be sure that there is a probability of exactly 50% 
that the unfavorable event (€+4 in pile A and €±0 in pile B) will occur (Table 4).  
Table 4: Lottery Alternatives in the New Approach 
Pile Prob Return E(r) Risk (SD) 
A 
50% €+4  
€+5  1.0 
50% €+6  
B 
50% €±0  
€+5  5.0 
50% €+10  
Prob = probability; E(r) = expected value of the return; SD = standard deviation.  
The shuffling of the cards is left to a machine in order to avoid the suspicion that the game 
leader has an influence on random events. After the cards have been shuffled, the subjects 
have to take one of the four cards from the pile they have chosen. They then receive the pay-
ment which is noted on this card. Test questions are used to ensure that the subjects under-
stand the circumstances. The instructions for the game, the test questions and selected 
screenshots can be viewed in the appendix. 
The two lotteries lead to a clear space of possibilities (Figure 6) which also permits an unam-
biguous assignment of the subjects to the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-
neutral and risk-loving).  
The space of opportunities consists of only two points. The left point shows the expected re-
turn and risk profile of pile A (low-risk). The right point shows the expected return and risk 
profile of pile B (high-risk). 
The decision options for the subjects are: 
• I would like to take a card from pile A. 
• I would like to take a card from pile B. 
• I would like to take a card. I don't mind which pile I take one from. 
If one takes into account the form of the indifference curves for risk-averse, risk-neutral and 
risk-loving subjects (Figure 1), the decision made by the subjects leads to an unambiguous 
assignment to one of the three categories of risk preference: Risk-averse subjects prefer pile 
A. Risk-loving subjects prefer pile B. Risk-neutral subjects are indifferent as to whether they 
choose pile A or B (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Space of Possibilities of the New Approach as well as the Indifference Curves of a 
Risk-Averse (Unbroken Grey Line), a Risk-Neutral (Dotted Grey Line) and a Risk-Loving Subject 
(Dashed Grey Line) 
  
In this way, two out of the three criteria for a suitable procedure to record the risk preference 
of the test persons are fulfilled: (1) The decision-making situation is very clear and simple. The 
subjects know precisely which consequences their decision will have. They do not have to de-
cide on the basis of a gut feeling, but can make well thought-out, conscious decisions corre-
sponding to their preferences. (2) The three alternatives (pile A, pile B or indifference as to 
whether the card is from A or B) permit unambiguous conclusions about the three categories 
of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving). In the following chapter we will 
also take the influence of loss aversion on risk preference into account. 
4 Taking Loss Aversion into Account in the New Approach 
There is hardly another phenomenon in behavioral economics which has been the subject of 
as much research as loss aversion (for a comprehensive overview see, for example, Kahneman 
2011, Chapter 29; see also Rabin 2000; Fehr and Goette 2007; Tom et al., 2007). Frequently, 
subjects are strongly influenced in their actions by the effort to avoid losses. One would expect 
that risk preference would also be influenced by the possibility of the threat of losses. How-
ever, this presumption has not yet been confirmed. Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Crosetto 
and Filippin (2013) have both included treatments with the possibility of losses. In spite of this, 
notable effects on the risk preferences of the subjects could not be observed in either study. 
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Mukherjee et al. (2017) showed that in the case of small amounts up to $4, a profit had a 
greater positive influence on the well-being of the participants than an equally high loss had 
in negative terms. Here, an evaluation scale ranging from 0 (= no effect) to 5 (= very strong 
effect) was used. In the case of an amount of $25, however, the negative perception of a loss 
was more intense than the positive feeling of an equally large profit. These results indicate 
that loss aversion might only have an influence on risk preference when larger amounts are 
involved. In Eckel and Grossman (2008), losses between $-2 and $-6 can occur. And in Crosetto 
and Filippin (2013), losses of €-2.50 can occur.  
We will now carry out the new approach to establish risk preference in three variations in 
order to investigate the influence of loss aversion on risk preference in more detail. In Treat-
ment 1, there is no possibility of making a loss. In Treatment 2, a loss of €-2.50 can be made. 
In Treatment 3, a loss of €-25 can be made (Table 5). 
Table 5: Random Events, Expected Values and Standard Deviations in Treatments 1-3 
Treatment Pile Prob. Return E(r) SD 
1 
A 
50% €+4  
€+5  1.0 
50% €+6  
B 
50% €±0  
€+5  5.0 
50% €+10  
2 
A 
50% €+4  
€+5  1.0 
50% €+6  
B 
50% -2.5  
€+5  7.5 
50% €+12.5  
3 
A 
50% €+4  
€+5  1.0 
50% €+6  
B 
50% €-25  
€+5  30 
50% €+35  
Prob. = probability; E(r) = expected value of the return; SD = standard deviation.  
The results obtained by Mukherjee et al. (2017), Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Crosetto and 
Filippin (2013) lead us to expect that there will be no significant differences between Treat-
ment 1 and Treatment 2. The possible losses of €-2.50 are presumably too small to have an 
influence on the risk preferences of the subjects. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: In Treatment 2, not more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-loving) 
than in Treatment 1. 
The first null hypothesis which will have to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 1: In Treatment 2, significantly more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse 
(risk-loving) than in Treatment 1. 
The results of Mukherjee et al. (2017), however, give reason to presume that the danger of 
losses of €-25 can have an influence on the risk preferences of the subjects. The second hy-
pothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: In Treatment 3, more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-loving) 
than in Treatment 1. 
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The second null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 2: In Treatment 3, not more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-
loving) than in Treatment 1. 
If the presumption is correct that the possibility of a small loss does not really impress subjects, 
whereas that of a larger loss has a significant influence on risk preferences, it must also be 
possible to establish a difference between Treatment 2 and Treatment 3. Our third hypothesis 
is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: In Treatment 3, more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-loving) 
than in Treatment 2. 
The third null hypothesis which will have to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 3: In Treatment 3, not more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-
loving) than in Treatment 2. 
In our experiment we conduct a between-subjects comparison. A total of 157 students of the 
Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences in Wolfsburg took part in the experiment. 53 subjects 
played Treatment 1, 52 subjects played Treatment 2, and 52 subjects played Treatment 3. 53 
women (33.76%) and 104 men (66.24%) took part. 72 of the subjects study business manage-
ment (45.86%), 69 subjects study vehicle construction (43.95%) and 16 students study health 
care (10.19%). The experiment was carried out from 4-10 April 2018 in the Ostfalia Laboratory 
for Experimental Economic Research (OLEW) in Wolfsburg in Germany. The experiment is pro-
grammed in z-Tree. Only the playout of random events is carried out in an analogue way by 
taking a card from the respective selected pile.8 
The actual experiment is preceded by a real effort task. We give the subjects a task which is 
not enjoyable and which requires a considerable amount of time. The subjects are supposed 
to view the task as work which is paid for with an appropriate amount (€25). The subjects have 
to encode a total of 175 three-letter words in sequences of numbers. When they have en-
coded a word correctly, the next word appears. This real effort task is based on Erkal, Gan-
gadharan and Nikiforakis (2011). In order to make it more demanding, Benndorf, Rau and 
Solch (2014) change the assignment of numbers to letters for every word. We used this ap-
proach. 
In addition, we consider it to be important that payment for the real effort task made is in 
cash and is carried out directly afterwards and before the actual experiment (the selection of 
one of the two lotteries). Willingness to spend is noticeably reduced if payment is made in 
cash in comparison to credit or debit cards (see, for example, Prelic and Semester, 2001; Run-
nemark et al., 2015). It has also been shown that impulsive purchase behavior is restricted 
when a person is handling cash (see, for example, Thomas, Kaushik and Seenivasan, 2011). 
From this we conclude that immediate cash payment after the real effort task leads to the 
                                                          
8 We also chose this path in order to obtain maximum credibility with regard to an uninfluenced random process 
(see also Chapter 3). 
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subjects perceiving the amount as their own hard-earned money. In this way, the so-called 
house money effect9 is probably avoided or at least considerably reduced. 
We pay the subjects a show-up fee of €2. For the coding work (real effort task) the subjects 
earn €25, for which they require between 35 and 60 minutes. In the actual experiment the 
subjects earn an average of €5.56. Overall the subjects thus earn an average of €32.56. Read-
ing the instructions for the game, answering the test questions, carrying out the coding work, 
deciding between piles A and B and taking a card take up between 60 and 90 Minutes. The 
payment they receive is therefore at an appropriate, average level. The subjects gave the im-
pression of being very attentive and motivated. 
The results were clear and are largely in line with our expectations (Table 6). In Treatment 1 
(no possibility of loss), only 21 out of 53 subjects (39.62%) chose the low-risk variation (pile 
A). 28 subjects (52.83%) chose the risky variant (pile B). Four subjects (7.55%) were indifferent 
to whether they chose a card from pile A or B. In Treatment 2 (possibility of a small loss), 25 
out of 52 subjects (48.08%) chose the low-risk variation (pile A). 24 subjects (46.15%) chose 
the risky variant (pile B). Three subjects (5.77%) were indifferent to whether they chose a card 
from pile A or B. In Treatment 2, the low-risk pile A was chosen more often and the risky pile 
B was chosen less frequently than in Treatment 1. However, Pearson's chi squared test 
showed this difference to be insignificant, with a p-value of 0.418 (Table 7). The null hypothe-
sis 1 therefore has to be rejected. This confirmed our presumption (hypothesis 1) that a pos-
sibility of a small loss of €-2.50 does not have any significant influence on the risk preferences 
of the subjects. This result is in line with the findings of Crosetto and Filippin (2013) and those 
of Eckel and Grossman (2008).  
Table 6: Results of the Selection Decision According to Treatments 
Treat-
ment 
Pile A Pile B 
Decision 
for Pile 
A Num-
ber  
Decision 
for Pile 
B Num-
ber  
Indif-
ferent 
Num-
ber 
Decision 
for Pile A 
in % 
Decision 
for Pile 
B in % 
Indif-
ferent  
in % 
1 €+4/€+6 €±0/€+10 21 28 4 39.62% 52.83% 7.55% 
2 €+4/€+6 €-2.5/€+12.5 25 24 3 48.08% 46.15% 5.77% 
3 €+4/€+6 €-25/€+35 36 11 5 69.23% 21.15% 9.62% 
Table 7: Results of Pearson’s Chi Squared Test 
Comparison P-Value 
Treatment 1 (no possibility of loss) versus Treatment 2 (possibility of a small loss) 0.418 
Treatment 1 (no possibility of loss) versus Treatment 3 (possibility of significant loss) 0.001 
Treatment 2 (low possibility of loss) versus Treatment 3 (possibility of significant loss) 0.009 
                                                          
9 Thaler and Johnson (1990) showed that subjects take more risks when they have previously made a profit or if 
start-up capital is made available to them. This applies as long as their earlier profit or start-up capital have not 
been used up, and they are playing with ‘house money’, as it were. 
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In Treatment 3, however (possibility of a significant loss) a marked influence on risk prefer-
ences can be noted. Here, 36 out of 52 subjects (69.23%) chose the low-risk variation (pile A). 
Only eleven subjects (21.15%) chose the risky variant (pile B). Five subjects (9.62%) were in-
different to whether they chose a card from pile A or B. This is a marked difference in compar-
ison to Treatment 1 (no possibility of loss). Pearson's chi squared test also shows this differ-
ence with a p-value of 0.001 (Table 7). Null hypothesis 2 clearly has to be rejected. Our pre-
sumption that the possibility of a higher loss (€-25) leads more often to risk-averse behavior 
(hypothesis 2) is thus confirmed.  
The comparison between Treatment 2 (risk of a small loss) and Treatment 3 (risk of high loss) 
also reveals considerable differences. Pearson's chi squared test shows this difference with a 
p-value of 0.009 (Table 7). It is therefore clear that null hypothesis 3 also has to be rejected. 
Our presumption that a risk of a high loss influences the risk preference of subject considera-
bly more than a risk of a low loss (hypothesis 3) is thus confirmed. Crosetto and Filippin (2013) 
had already expressed the presumption that a probability of a high loss would have an effect 
on the measurement of risk preferences. Our results entirely confirm this presumption. 
Overall, it can be stated that taking a probability of a substantial loss into account leads to a 
more realistic recording of the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and 
risk-loving).  
5 Conclusion 
Experimental research on diversification behavior requires a clear differentiation between 
risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects, because decisions which can be absolutely 
meaningful for a risk-loving subject are completely inconceivable for a risk-averse subject and 
vice-versa. Robust findings in experimental research on diversification can only be obtained if 
it is known how to categorize the risk preferences of the subject. Differentiating between risk-
neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects is, however, a demanding task. The approach used 
by Holt and Laury (2002) has undoubtedly received the most attention. We have also used this 
procedure on several occasions (see, for example, Filiz et al., 2018; Gubaydullina and Spiwoks 
2015). However, we also had the impression that not all subjects dedicate themselves to the 
task with the necessary concentration, and in view of its complexity ultimately make sponta-
neous decisions which are not well-thought out (for similar observations see Jacobson and 
Petrie, 2009; Charness and Viceisza, 2011).  
The approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) is significantly simpler and clearer, and that 
deployed by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) even more so. However, all three procedures exhibit 
the weakness that in certain situations it is not possible to differentiate in an unambiguous 
and reliable way between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects. In addition, in 
these three approaches the influence of loss aversion on risk preference is not taken into con-
sideration, or not sufficiently.  
In the form of our Treatment 3 (probability of a substantial loss) we are proposing a new ap-
proach to discriminate between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects which is (1) 
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extremely simple and clear, and which (2) permits the clear assignment of subjects to the 
three categories of risk preference, and (3) takes the influence of loss aversion on risk prefer-
ence into account in an appropriate way. 
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Appendix: Instructions for the Game, Test Questions and Selected Screen-
shots 
The main instructions are from the study by Benndorf, Rau and Solch (2014). 
The Task 
In this game, you can earn money by completing a task. The task consists of coding 175 words 
into numbers. For every correctly coded word you receive credit of 14 cents. In total you can 
earn up to €25. In the task, three upper case letters correspond to one word. Every upper-
case letter must be assigned to a number. The coding for this can be found in the table below. 
Please take a look at the photo on the screen: 
 
In this example, the participant has already coded two words correctly. Now the three upper 
case letters have to be coded: V, B and U. The solution is provided in the table:  
• V is 398. (see the number entered above by the participant) 
• B is 463. 
• U is 575. 
To enter please click on the blue box below the first upper-case letter.  
When all three figures have been entered please click on OK with the mouse.  
The computer then checks whether ALL upper-case letters have been correctly coded into 
figures, i.e. whether all three figures were entered correctly. Only then is the word considered 
to be correct. If the wrong number is entered, the computer points this out (in red letters) 
after pressing the OK button. The current word remains on the screen until the correct number 
is entered. However, your previous entries (in the three fields under the upper-case letters) 
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are all deleted. The table remains the same, i.e. the numbers assigned to the letters remain 
identical. In the same way, the position of the upper-case letters in the table does not change. 
When the correct number is entered you receive the next randomly drawn word (again con-
sisting of three upper-case letters). The table continues to be randomly 're-shuffled': New 
three-digit figures are randomly selected and entered into the table as new mappings for the 
upper-case letters. The position of the upper-case letters in the table is randomly rearranged. 
Please note that all 26 upper-case letters of the German alphabet are used. 
Following on from this task you will take part in a lottery. You will be given detailed infor-
mation about the lottery when the time comes. 
Payment 
• Basic payment of €2. 
• For every correctly coded word you receive credit of 14 cents. In total you can earn up 
to €25 (175 x 14.2857 cents). 
• The money you might win in the lottery is added to this.  
Important Information 
• Please remain quiet during the game! 
• Do not look at your neighbor’s screen! 
• No aids are permitted (calculators, smartphones etc.) All electronic devices must be 
switched off! 
Test Questions (Treatment 1) 
Test question 1: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile A?  
a. The minimum payment is €+6 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
b. The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+6. (correct) 
c. The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
Test question 2: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile B?  
a. The minimum payment is €±0 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
b. The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+10. 
c. The minimum payment is €±0 and the maximum payment is €+10. (correct) 
Test question 3: How many different piles of cards are there? 
a. 1 
b. 2 (correct) 
c. 3 
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Test question 4: How high is the probability of occurrence of the best and worst possible re-
sults in the lottery? 
a. 100% 
b. 0% 
c. 50% (correct) 
Screenshot 1: Real Effort Task (Reconstructed in Order to Improve Readability) 
Coding 
Out of 175 words to be coded you are currently encoding word number 1  
Word:  Y E S 
Code:  
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Figure A-1: Real Effort Task  
O.K. 
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Screenshot 2: Instructions and Test Questions on the Lottery in Treatment 1 (Reconstructed 
in Order to Improve Readability) 
Lottery 
You can now take a card as part of a lottery. There are two piles of cards to choose from (pile 
A and pile B). The cards are drawn by hand. 
There are four cards in pile A. Two cards lead to a payment of €+4 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+6. 
There are four cards in pile B. Two cards lead to a payment of €±0 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+10. 
        Pile A                          Pile B 
 (consists of four cards)                (consists of four cards) 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please answer the following test questions about the lottery: 
Test question 1: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile A?  
ʘ The minimum payment is €+6 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+6. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
Test question 2: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile B?  
ʘ The minimum payment is €+/-0 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+10. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+/-0 and the maximum payment is €+10. 
 
Best possible event: €+6 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €+4 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
Low-risk (results fluctuate slightly around the 
expected value) 
Best possible event: €+10 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €±0 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
High-risk (results fluctuate considerably around 
the expected value) 
- 110 - 
Test question 3: How many different piles of cards are there? 
ʘ 1 
ʘ 2 
ʘ 3 
Test question 4: How high is the probability of occurrence of the best and worst possible re-
sults in the lottery? 
ʘ 100% 
ʘ 0% 
ʘ 50% 
 
 
Figure A-2: Instructions and Test Questions on the Lottery in Treatment 1 
Screenshot 3: Decision-Making Options on the Lottery in Treatment 1 (Reconstructed in Or-
der to Improve Readability) 
Lottery 
You can now take a card as part of a lottery. There are two piles of cards to choose from (pile 
A and pile B). The cards are drawn by hand. 
There are four cards in pile A. Two cards lead to a payment of €+4 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+6. 
There are four cards in pile B. Two cards lead to a payment of €±0 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+10. 
        Pile A                          Pile B 
 (consists of four cards)                (consists of four cards) 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O.K. 
Best possible event: €+6 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €+4 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
Low-risk (results fluctuate slightly around the 
expected value) 
 
Best possible event: €+10 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €±0 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
High-risk (results fluctuate considerably around 
the expected value) 
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You now have to decide which pile you want to take a card from. 
Make your selection now. Click on one of the three alternatives. 
ʘ I would like to take a card from pile A. 
ʘ I would like to take a card from pile B. 
ʘ I would like to take a card, but I don't mind which pile I take one from. 
 
 
 
Figure A-3: Decision-Making Options on the Lottery in Treatment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O.K. 
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Abstract: 
This experimental study examines the influence of emotions on the tendency towards herd 
behavior. The subjects forecast share prices, and while doing so they are offered the chance 
to orientate themselves towards other subjects and to possibly exhibit herding behavior. In a 
between-subjects design, three treatments are used (neutral, positive and negative mood). 
Mood is influenced by means of film excerpts which are shown to the subjects. It is shown 
that mood really does have an influence on the tendency towards herding behavior. A neu-
tral mood in particular favors a tendency towards herd behavior. 
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1 Introduction 
Herding usually refers to convergent social behavior. A common orientation of thoughts or 
behavior occurs not as a result of centralized coordination, but via the interaction of individu-
als. For centuries now there have been reports of events which correspond to this understand-
ing of herd behavior. As early as 1374, for example, there were reports of people entering a 
trance-like state while dancing, which led to mass hysteria and even deaths (Waller, 2009). 
Other forms of social contagion can occur, for example, during social unrest, due to political 
opinions or in modern hooliganism (Le Bon, 1896; Russel, 2004). Raafat, Chater and Frith 
(2009) illustrated a wide range of historical examples for the occurrence of herd behavior. 
In economics, herding takes place when subjects imitate the behavior of other subjects, or 
make economic decisions on the basis of the views, assessments or actions of others. A subject 
may have good reasons to exhibit herd behavior. For example, financial market analysts might 
align themselves with the majority opinion because in this way they can best avoid the danger 
of damage to their reputations. Institutional investors might imitate the investment behavior 
of others because they think that in this way they can increase their earnings. However, many 
investors copy the behavior of other investors in an ill-advised and completely irrational way 
- for example when they get carried along by what is generally thought to be a favorable stock-
market mood, or when they panic in the face of falling share prices. Sometimes, social con-
ventions or customs also play a role in the occurrence of herd behavior (Spyrou, 2013). 
Adam Smith (1759) and Charles Mackay (1841) were among the first to highlight the signifi-
cance of herding for the explanation of economic trends. Keynes (1936) also pointed out herd-
ing behavior among financial market participants and presented two explanations for it - rep-
utational herding and investigative herding. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) took up these 
thoughts and thus initiated an intensive discourse which has continued over the past three 
decades.  
Keynes (1936) assumed that financial market analysts tended towards herding because they 
had little to gain by having a highly individual opinion, and at the same time would be risking 
a considerable loss of reputation if it went wrong. However, if they aligned themselves with 
the majority opinion, they might be able to enhance their reputations slightly without taking 
the risk of endangering them. Financial market analysts who want to keep their well-paid jobs 
are thus behaving rationally when they always follow the opinion of the majority. In addition, 
Keynes (1936) assumed that financial market participants with a short-term orientation also 
tended towards investigative herding. Those who bet on short-term movements in the finan-
cial markets should not rely on information which will only be noticed months later by other 
capital market actors. They would be wiser to orientate themselves towards that which others 
consider to be relevant in the short term.  
The reputational herding and investigative herding approaches have been examined in a large 
number of studies. Cote and Sanders (1997) came to the conclusion that concerns about rep-
utations and the particular credibility of consensus forecasts favor herd behavior, which in 
turn leads to a worsening of the quality of forecasts. Bedke, Bizer and Spiwoks (2009) as well 
as Meub et al. (2015) confirmed via experiments that concerns about reputations are a deci-
sive factor in the formation of rational herding behavior.  
Some studies found a negative correlation between professional experience in years and the 
tendency towards herding behavior (Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000; Lamont, 2002; Clement 
and Tse, 2005; Krishnan, Lim and Zhou, 2005). Inexperienced analysts who diverge considera-
bly from the majority opinion with their forecasts are at greater risk of being made redundant 
than experienced analysts. Ashiya and Doi (2001) on the other hand found no indications that 
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the experience of analysts had any significance on the occurrence of herding behavior. Some 
studies show that analysts who were particularly successful in the past are less likely to exhibit 
herding behavior (Stickel, 1990; Cote and Sanders, 1997; Graham, 1999). Bhalla (2012) on the 
other hand, found no indications that analysts make independent forecasts. Spiwoks, Bizer 
and Hein (2008b) considered how coordinated behavior among financial market analysts can 
come about. They found that an orientation towards the naive forecast ensures that analysts 
lastingly remain within the protective environment of the herd. Others have also shown that 
the more difficult the relevant tasks the earlier herding behavior occurs (Olsen, 1996; Kim and 
Pantzalis, 2003). 
Banerjee (2010) as well as Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) showed that herding 
behavior can even occur when subjects act rationally and make a genuine effort to take mean-
ingful decisions (informational cascades). In this case the subjects try - on the basis of observ-
able decisions made by others - to deduce the latter’s private signals. All information (a priori 
probability, one’s own private signal and the private signals of others) is then used to maximize 
the probability of success of one's own decision. This can lead to herding behavior. Numerous 
experimental studies have found indications for the fact that informational cascades can really 
occur (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Hung and Plott, 2001; Celen and Kariv, 2004). A large number 
of variations of experiments have essentially confirmed these results. In laboratory experi-
ments, informational cascades have also occurred in the case of delayed decision-making so 
that subjects could benefit from observing others’ actions (Sgroi, 2003), or when there was 
the opportunity to purchase additional information (Kübler and Weizsäcker, 2004; Kraemer, 
Nöth and Weber, 2006); in the case of decisions which were not strictly sequential (Orlean, 
1995), and in the case of different signal qualities (Sasaki, 2005; Sumpter et al. 2012). Other 
experimental studies have expressed major doubts about how realistic informational cascades 
are (Spiwoks, Bizer and Hein, 2008a; Çelen and Kariv, 2004; Nöth and Weber, 2003; Huck and 
Oechssler, 2000). Some subjects assign an inappropriately high level of significance to their 
own private signal, while others falsely interpret the behavior of those who have made previ-
ous decisions. Some subjects orientate themselves solely towards a priori probability, while 
others orientate themselves exclusively towards the majority of previous decision-makers. 
Only a small number of subjects are able to apply the Bayesian rule, and many subjects simply 
follow their gut feeling. Only very few grasp all the relevant information and make rational 
deductions about the probability of success of the different alternatives. This frequently leads 
to overlaps in behavior which look like informational cascades but have nothing in common 
with the thoughts at the core of the concept. 
Devenow and Welch (1996) were the first to make a clear differentiation between rational 
herding (reputational herding, investigative herding and informational cascades) on the one 
hand and irrational herding behavior on the other. Irrational herding behavior often has a 
cultural background (social conventions) or is due to a lack of control over one's impulses and 
can only be explained psychologically (Baddeley, Curtis and Wood, 2004; Baddeley, 2010). 
Shleifer and Summers (1990) emphasized the irrational herding behavior of noise traders, for 
example. Their actions are frequently characterized by pseudo-signals such as recommenda-
tions by financial gurus (Black, 1986). Misinterpretations of the actions of third parties can 
also trigger irrational herding. For example, the purchase of a share can have the purpose of 
merely restoring the original weighting of a portfolio (rebalancing). Other investors might, 
however, interpret this purchase as an indication of the particular attractiveness of the share 
in question and therefore buy it too. Presumptions about the motives of other investors can 
form a distraction from more important information and lead to sub-optimal decisions 
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(Simonsohn and Ariely, 2008). Roider and Voskort (2016) interpret occurrences of herding be-
havior as unreflected mutual imitation. 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) pointed out that similar behavior should not be equated with 
herding. If many subjects do the same thing without taking note of each other or reacting to 
each other in any way, this is referred to as spurious herding. Galariotis, Rong and Spyrou 
(2015) presented empirical indications of spurious herding. A tendency towards non-conform-
ism can, however, lead to individual subjects consciously leaving a herd. For this phenomenon, 
known as anti-herding, several findings have been presented (Zitzewitz, 2001; Laux and 
Probst, 2004; Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati, 2006; Naujoks et al., 2009; Pierdzioch and 
Rülke, 2012; Pierdzioch, Rülke and Stadtmann, 2013). 
Table 1: Overview of herding behavior 
intentional herding spurious herding 
rational herding irrational herding 
reputational 
herding 
investigative 
herding 
informational 
cascades 
 
It is now considered certain that mood has an influence on economic decision-making (for an 
overview see, for example, George and Dane, 2016; Lerner et al., 2015; Vohs, Baumeister and 
Loewenstein, 2007; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Baumeister et al., 2007; Pham, 2007; Shiv et al., 
2005; Nofsinger, 2005; Lucey and Dowling, 2005; Watson and Vaidya, 2003; Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Teoh, 2002; Hirshleifer, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Isen, 2000; Loewenstein, 2000; 
Schwarz, 2000; Elster, 1998; Bless, Schwarz and Kemmelmeier, 1996; Elster, 1996; Johnson 
and Tversky, 1983).  
For example, the effects of sunshine, rain, cloud cover, wind strength, storms and other me-
teorological factors on market returns at stock exchanges worldwide have been thoroughly 
investigated (Kim, 2017; Kaustia and Rantapuska, 2016; Apergis, Gabrielsen and Smales, 2016; 
Bassi, Colacito and Fulghieri, 2013; Lu and Chou, 2012; Mirza et al., 2012; Floros, 2011; 
Symeonidis, Daskalakis and Markellos, 2010; Kang et al., 2010; Shu and Hung, 2009; Chang et 
al., 2008; Keef and Roush, 2007; Chang et al., 2006; Dowling and Lucey, 2005; Cao and Wei, 
2005; Tufan and Hamarat, 2004; Krivelyova and Robotti, 2003; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 
2003; Kamstra, Kramer and Levi, 2003; Pardo and Enric, 2002; Krämer and Runde, 1997; Saun-
ders, 1993). While doing so, attempts were also made to create a connection between the 
weather and the mood of capital market protagonists: Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) 
showed that stock market returns on days when the sun shines in the morning were higher 
on average than on days with bad weather.  This result was explained by sunshine favoring a 
positive atmosphere among investors. Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003) established that stock 
market returns varied according to the length of the day, which has been interpreted in a 
similar way to the results of Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003). Kaustia and Rantapuska (2016) 
carried out a similar study - however, they only observed a weak correlation between the 
effect of the length of a respective day, the weather and investment decisions.  
Experimental economic research is increasingly interested in the question of which influence 
positive and negative emotions have on investment decisions.  Grable and Roszkowski (2008), 
for example, showed in an experimental study that subjects whose positive emotions predom-
inate were willing to take greater financial risks, while Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) carried out 
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experiments to establish how different moods affected investment decisions. This showed 
that subjects tended to avoid risks when their mood is negative, while subjects whose mood 
was positive were willing to take more risks. According to this, subjects whose emotions are 
positive are more optimistic in relation to their investment decisions. Colasante, Marini and 
Russo (2017), however, came to the opposite conclusion. Their subjects were more risk-averse 
when under the influence of positive and negative emotions than those in a neutral mood. 
Kaplanski et al. (2015) showed that the mood of investors had an influence on their expecta-
tions in terms of returns, and also on their perception of risk. The happier the subjects were, 
the greater were their expectations in terms of their returns, and the lower the presumed risk 
of stock market investments.  Experiments carried out by Lee and Andrade (2014) showed 
that negative affects increase risk aversion in investment decisions. An overview of the studies 
dealing with the effects of mood on risk tolerance can be viewed in Lane (2017) and Duxbury 
(2015). Lahav and Meer (2012) as well as Andrade, Odean and Lin (2016) used experiments to 
examine the effect of emotions on speculative bubbles. They established that speculative bub-
bles were larger in the case of positive affects than with negative affects. Breaban and Nous-
sair (2018) followed a similar approach, though their findings were not as clear-cut. Gavriilidis, 
Kallinterakis and Tsalavoutas (2016) established that the positive atmosphere during Rama-
dan leads to an increase in herding behavior on the capital markets.  
By now there are thus a range of findings showing that the mood of subjects can influence 
their economic decisions. However, until now no-one has conducted experiments on whether 
different moods also have an effect on the likelihood of herding behavior.  Precisely this re-
search topic has now been addressed by this study. The task facing the subjects here was to 
forecast future share prices. 
2 Design of the experiment and hypotheses 
Forecasting future share prices is a challenge which active portfolio managers have to face on 
a daily basis. However, the percentage of successful share price forecasts is modest. The neo-
classical theory of economics assumes strong or at least semi-strong informational efficiency.  
In an environment of this kind, forecasting future capital market trends is impossible. How-
ever, the conditions for informationally efficient capital markets - namely rational and fully 
informed subjects with a uniform formation of expectations - are now clearly considered to 
be non-existent. Successful share price forecasts thus appear to be possible but are seldom 
achieved in practice.  The task of behavioral finance is to determine the cause of this apparent 
contradiction. Herding behavior can lead to stock market analysts using the available infor-
mation in a sub-optimal way. 
We orientated ourselves towards the approach used by Cote and Sanders (1997) to measure 
herding. The subjects have to make an initial estimate of a future share price. Subsequently 
they are informed about the average of the forecasts of all subjects (consensus forecast). Then 
they are allowed to change their original forecast once. If the subjects change their forecast 
in the direction of the consensus forecast, this is considered to be herding. If they change their 
forecast in the opposite direction, this has to be viewed as anti-herding. If the subjects do not 
change their forecast at all, neither herding nor anti-herding are present. 
 
With regard to the making of forecasts, we roughly orientated ourselves towards the studies 
by Meub et al. (2015) and that of Becker, Leitner and Leopold-Wildburger (2009). This 
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approach enables subjects to determine future share price levels via four fundamental influ-
encing factors which have a constant effect on the share price. An error-free forecast is made 
more difficult by a random influence which leads to a situation where even subjects who act 
rationally only manage to successfully forecast an average of 40% of share prices. The more 
the subjects deviate from a rational strategy, the lower the success rate of their forecasts. As 
a reward is given for every successful forecast, subjects have a financial incentive to make 
rational forecasts. The issue of a consensus forecast makes it possible for subjects to change 
their own forecast, and it can then be seen to what extent herding behavior leads to subjects 
diverging from a rational strategy.  
In order to examine the influence of mood on the occurrence of herding, we formed three 
treatments (positive, negative and neutral). The influencing of moods in the experiment was 
carried out by showing film excerpts, which is considered to be a tried and tested technique 
(Westermann et al., 1996; Allwood, Granhag and Jonsson, 2002; Kirchsteiger, Rigottii and Rus-
tichini, 2006;  Rottenberg, Ray and Gross, 2007;  Ifcher  and  Zarghamee, 2014; Oswald, Proto 
and Sgroi, 2015). Whether the subjects' mood has been successfully influenced is assessed 
with manipulation checks. 
Subjects make their forecasts as follows: The share price in € at the point in time t (Kt) is de-
termined by four influencing factors (the fundamental data At, Bt, Ct and Dt) and a random 
influence (Ɛt). The fundamental data is provided before each forecast is made. The subjects 
are also aware of the specific influence the fundamental data has on the share price. 
 (1)    Kt = 2 ∙ At + 3 ∙ Bt – 1 ∙ Ct + 4 ∙ Dt + Ɛt 
The random influence (Ɛt) moves within a range of €-40 and €+40. The probability of the events 
€-40, €-30, €-20, €+20, €+30 and €+40 is 10% each. The probability of the events €-10 and 
€+10 is 12%. The event €±0 has a probability of occurrence of 16% (Figure 1). 
Fig. 1: The probability distribution of the random influence Ɛt on the formation of the share 
price in €
 
 
The random influence for each period is determined by means of a lottery. As an example, 
here is how the share price was determined for Period 1. The subjects were informed that A1 
= 32, B1 = 26, C1 = 22 and D1 = 25.  
Hence:  
K1 = 2 ∙ 32 + 3 ∙ 26 – 1 ∙ 22 + 4 ∙ 25 + Ɛ1 = 220 + Ɛ1 
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The expected value for Ɛt is zero. In addition, €±0 is also the most frequently occurring random 
event (16%). A forecast is considered successful and is rewarded accordingly when it does not 
diverge more than €10 from the actual share price. Rational subjects will therefore, in accord-
ance with the expected value of the price, make a forecast of €220 (in the example of Period 
1). In 40% of all cases their forecasts will be correct, because the probability that the price is 
not more than €10 above or below the expected value is 12% + 16% + 12% = 40%. If one made 
a forecast of €230, the probability of success would only be 38% (16% + 12% + 10%). And if 
one made a forecast of €240, the probability of success would fall even further to 32% (12% + 
10% + 10%). A forecast of €280 would have a probability of success of 0%, because Ɛt moves 
between €-40 and €+40 and the tolerance between the actual share price and a successful 
forecast is only €10.   
The subjects play five rounds - in other words, they are supposed to make five preliminary and 
five final forecasts. Each successful forecast is rewarded with €10. The show-up fee is €5.  
The experiment is carried out as follows: before the beginning of the experiment an initial 
mood test is carried out in order to recognize any possible distortions of the research results 
due to an unusual mood beforehand. Then the subjects receive an instruction sheet in which 
the rules and requirements of the game are explained (see Appendix). Subsequently they have 
to answer test questions to ensure that they have understood how the game works (see Ap-
pendix). Then the subjects receive a history of the share price during the past ten periods as a 
line chart as well as an overview of the random events of the past ten periods as a bar chart 
(see Appendix).  
This is followed by the first film excerpt and a subsequent manipulation check. Then the fun-
damental data for the current period is announced. The subjects are allowed to use a pocket 
calculator to determine the expected value. After this they have to make their preliminary 
forecast. In the next step another film excerpt is shown and a second manipulation test is 
carried out. Then the consensus forecast is made available and the subjects are asked whether 
they want to change their forecasts. Finally, the actual share price is announced and the share 
price history chart is completed. This procedure is repeated a total of five times. At the end 
the subjects’ forecasting performance is determined and their performance-based payment 
and the show-up fee are paid.  
The three treatments differ with regard to the film excerpts shown: in the treatment “posi-
tive”, film excerpts are shown which usually create a positive mood. In the treatment “nega-
tive”, film excerpts are shown which usually create a negative mood. And in the treatment 
“neutral”, film excerpts are shown which normally create a neutral mood. 
Numerous findings from behavioral economics show that subjects by no means always make 
rational decisions. We therefore expect our subjects to also make forecasts which do not cor-
respond to the expected value of the share price. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The subjects will make forecasts which do not correspond to the expected value 
of the share price. 
The null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 1: The forecasts always correspond to the expected value of the share price. 
On the basis of numerous findings on the occurrence of herding among capital market partic-
ipants, we expect herding behavior to also appear in our experiment.  
The second hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: After the announcement of the consensus forecast, adjustments will be made 
to the forecasts which align them closer to this consensus forecast (herding behavior). 
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The second null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 2: After the announcement of the consensus forecast, no adjustments will be 
made to the forecasts which align them closer to this consensus forecast. 
In addition, we expect that herding behavior will also be evident in the standard deviation of 
the forecasts before and after the announcement of the consensus forecast. 
Our third hypothesis is therefore as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: the standard deviation of the forecasts before the announcement of the con-
sensus forecast (preliminary forecasts) will be higher than the standard deviation of the fore-
casts after the announcement of the consensus forecast (final forecasts). 
The third null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 3: the standard deviation of the forecasts before the announcement of the 
consensus forecast (preliminary forecasts) will not be higher than the standard deviation of 
the forecasts after the announcement of the consensus forecast (final forecasts). 
Against the background of previous research findings on the effect of emotions, we expect 
that a positive or negative mood will lead to a greater deviation from the rational forecast 
(forecast = expected value of the share price) than a neutral mood.  
The fourth hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: In the treatment “neutral”, more forecasts are made which correspond to the 
expected value of the share price than in the treatments “positive” and “negative”. 
The fourth null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 4: In the treatment “neutral”, the same number or fewer forecasts are made 
which correspond to the expected value of the share price than in the treatments “positive” 
and “negative”. 
In addition, we expect that subjects in a positive or negative mood will exhibit a different ten-
dency towards herding than subjects in a neutral mood.  
The fifth hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 5: In the treatments “positive” and “negative”, the frequency with which forecasts 
are corrected in the direction of the consensus forecast is different than in the treatment 
“neutral”. 
The fifth null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 5: In the treatments “positive” and “negative”, the frequency with which fore-
casts are corrected in the direction of the consensus forecast is the same as in the treatment 
“neutral”. 
3 Results 
The experiment was carried out between 14 December and 20 December 2018 in the Ostfalia 
Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research (OLEW) at the Ostfalia University of Applied 
Sciences in Wolfsburg,  Germany.  A total of 181 subjects took part in the experiment. Of these, 
60 played the treatment “neutral” (neutral mood), 63 played the treatment “positive” (posi-
tive mood) and 58 the treatment “negative” (negative mood).  
The subjects are students at the Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences in Wolfsburg. 92 sub-
jects (50.8%) study at the Faculty of Business, 14 subjects (7.7%) at the Faculty of Health Care, 
and 73 (40.3%) at the Faculty of Vehicle Technology. A total of 20 sessions were carried out. 
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The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In the Ostfalia Laboratory for 
Experimental Economic Research (OLEW) there are a total of 12 computer workplaces, which 
makes it possible to completely separate the subjects from each other. The experiments are 
constantly monitored by a  master of ceremonies so that communication between the sub-
jects and the use of prohibited aids (such as smartphones) can be ruled out.  
Overall the subjects received an average payment of €23.20. The highest payment was €45 
and the lowest was €5. Taking part in the experiment took an average of 50 minutes, so the 
payment can be considered to be very attractive. The subjects gave the impression of being 
highly concentrated and motivated. 
The influencing of the subjects’ mood via the film excerpts was successful (Figure 2). The av-
erage mood in the treatment “negative” exhibited a value of 3.21, while it was 5.64 in the 
treatment “neutral” and 6.89 in the treatment “positive”. 
Fig. 2: Successful influencing of mood in the three treatments 
 
 
In the Mann-Whitney U test the differences in the moods of the subjects were shown to be 
highly significant. The treatment “negative” differed significantly from the treatment “neu-
tral” (z = -7.838, p = 0.000).  The treatment “positive” also differed significantly from the treat-
ment “neutral” (z = -6.263, p = 0.000). Accordingly, the treatment “negative” also differed 
significantly from the treatment “positive” (z = -9.152, p = 0.000). In this way we established 
that the film excerpts achieved the intended influence on the subjects' mood. 
For their forecasts, rational utility maximisers always use the expected value, which results 
from the four fundamental data items and the random influence. However, only just under a 
third (32.41%) of the preliminary forecasts and also only just below a third of the final fore-
casts (30.97%) corresponded to this expected value (Tab. 2). Over two thirds of all forecasts 
were thus not based on rational considerations,  and in this way the subjects reduced the 
expected value of their payment. Not even one in ten subjects (9.94%) followed a rational 
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course of action throughout the experiment (Tab. 2). The average absolute deviation of the 
forecasts from the expected value was €18.26. In the t-test (one-sample mean comparison), 
the deviation from the rational strategy (average deviation of the of the forecasts from the 
expected value = 0) is highly significant (p = 0.000). Thus, null hypothesis 1 clearly has to be 
rejected. This confirmed our assumption that the subjects do not correspond to the neo-clas-
sical concept of homo oeconomicus. 
Table 2: Overview of the rational strategy 
  Treatment 
„neutral“ 
 Treatment 
„positive“ 
 Treatment 
„negative“ 
All  
treatments 
Rational strategy 
(preliminary fore-
cast) 
84 out of 298 
forecasts  
28.19% 
108 out of 315 
forecasts  
34.29% 
100 out of 290 
forecasts  
34.48% 
292 out of 903 
forecasts 
32.41% 
Rational strategy 
(final forecast) 
77 out of 298 
forecasts  
25.84% 
98 out of 315 
forecasts  
30.79% 
104 of 290 
forecasts 
35.86%  
279 out of 903 
forecasts 
30.97% 
Subjects with a 
rational strategy  
in all rounds 
3 out of 60 sub-
jects   
5.00%  
8 out of 63 sub-
jects 
12.70% 
7 out of 58 sub-
jects 
12.07%  
18 out of 181 
subjects 
9.94% 
 
Just over a third of the preliminary forecasts (35.99%) were revised after the announcement 
of the average of these forecasts (consensus forecast) (Tab. 3). The majority of these revisions 
(86.46%) were in the direction of the consensus forecast. For the subjects, it is easy to recog-
nize the forecast with which they can maximize the expected value of their payment. With the 
aid of the information on the fundamental data, the forecast with the highest probability of 
success can be worked out very simply. There is therefore no need to react to the announce-
ment of the consensus forecast, and there is no sensible reason for changing one's own pre-
liminary forecast in the direction of the consensus forecast. The revision of forecasts in the 
direction of the consensus forecast therefore has to be interpreted as a sign of herding behav-
ior. The average absolute adjustment of the forecasts in the direction of the consensus fore-
cast amounted to €28.27. In the t-test (one-sample mean comparison), the adjustment to-
wards the consensus forecast is shown to be highly significant (p = 0.000). Null hypothesis 2 
thus also has to be rejected. Our assumption that herding behavior would occur was con-
firmed. 
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Table 3: Overview of herding behavior 
  Treatment 
„neutral“ 
 Treatment 
„positive“ 
 Treatment 
„negative“ 
All treat-
ments 
Revised forecasts 125 out of 
298 forecasts 
41.95% 
106 out of 315 
forecasts 
33.65% 
94 out of 290 
forecasts 
32.41% 
325 out of 
903 forecasts 
35.99% 
Revision per con-
sensus (herding) 
117 out of 
298 forecasts 
39.26% 
85 out of 315 
forecasts 
26.98% 
79 out of 290 
forecasts 
27.24%  
281 out of 
903 forecasts 
31.12% 
Revision against 
the consensus 
(anti-herding) 
5 out of 298 
forecasts 
1.68%  
14 out of 315 
forecasts 
4.44% 
12 out of 290 
forecasts 
4.14% 
31 out of 903 
forecasts 
3.43% 
Other revisions 3 out of 298 
forecasts 
1.01% 
7 out of 315 
forecasts 
2.22% 
3 out of 290 
forecasts 
1.03% 
13 out of 903 
forecasts 
1.44% 
Subjects not exhib-
iting herding be-
havior in all rounds 
16 out of 60 
subjects 
26.67%  
20 out of 63 
subjects 
31.75% 
20 out of 58 
subjects 
34.48%  
56 out of 181 
subjects 
30.94% 
“Other revisions" are ones which are in the direction of the consensus forecast, but go so far 
beyond it that they are further from the consensus forecast than they were before the revi-
sion.10 
Table 4: Overview of the variance of the forecasts  
  Treatment 
„neutral“ 
 Treatment 
„positive“ 
 Treatment 
„negative“ 
All treat-
ments 
Average 
standard deviation 
preliminary forecast 
 
45.08 
 
34.74 
 
46.63 
 
41.25 
Average 
standard deviation 
final forecast 
 
34.92 
 
23.34 
 
21.00 
 
27.14 
 
This result is further substantiated when the standard deviations of the preliminary and the 
final forecasts are compared (Tab. 4). The preliminary forecasts have an average standard de-
viation of 41.25, while the average standard deviation of the final forecast is only 27.14. The 
Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that the standard deviation is reduced significantly by the 
                                                          
10 Here is an example of an “other revision”: the subject’s preliminary forecast is €200. The consensus forecast is 
€220. The subject’s final forecast is then €250. This is not anti-herding, because the forecast was changed in the 
direction of the consensus forecast. However, the subject cannot be accused of herding behavior either, because 
the final forecast is further from the consensus forecast than the preliminary forecast was. 
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revision of the forecasts (z = 2.023; p = 0.0431). Null hypothesis 3 thus has to be rejected too. 
This is a further clear indication of the occurrence of herding behavior. 
In addition, it can be seen that mood really does exercise an influence on the tendency to-
wards rational behavior. However, this influence turns out to be quite different to what was 
initially expected. The results of previous research showed that a neutral mood is best suited 
to promoting the pursuit of rational action. Positive and negative moods tend to reduce the 
ability and/or willingness to act rationally, it was thought. This experiment, however, reveals 
a completely different picture (Tab. 2). In the treatment “neutral”, only 84 of the 298 prelim-
inary forecasts (28.19%) are based on the rational approach. In the treatment “positive”, the 
figure is slightly higher at 108 out of 315 preliminary forecasts (34.29%). In the treatment 
“negative”, it is 100 out of 290 preliminary forecasts (34.48%). The picture is very similar for 
the final forecasts (Tab.2). In the treatment “neutral”, only 77 of the 298 preliminary forecasts 
(25.84%) are based on a rational approach. In the treatment “positive”, the figure is somewhat 
higher at 98 out of 315 preliminary forecasts (30.79%). In the treatment “negative”, it is 104 
out of 290 preliminary forecasts (35.86%). The Wilcoxon rank sum test shows that the differ-
ence between the treatment “neutral” and the treatment “positive” (p = 0.1669) is not signif-
icant, and neither is the difference between the treatments “positive” and “negative” (p = 
0.6707). Only the treatment “neutral” differs significantly from the treatment “negative” (p = 
0.0694). Null hypothesis 4 therefore cannot be rejected. The presumption that a neutral mood 
is more conducive to a rational strategy than a positive or negative mood was therefore not 
confirmed. The opposite was closer to the truth.  
It can be seen here that mood really does have an influence on the tendency towards herd 
behavior (Tab. 3). In the treatment “neutral”, 117 out of 298 forecasts (39.26%) were cor-
rected in the direction of the consensus forecast, while in the treatment “positive”, only 85 
out of 315 forecasts (26.98%) were revised in the direction of the consensus forecast. In the 
treatment “negative”, 79 out of 290 forecasts (27.24%) were adjusted in the direction of the 
consensus forecast. The Wilcoxon rank sum test shows that the difference in terms of herding 
behavior between the treatment “neutral” and the treatment “positive” (p = 0.0333) is signif-
icant, as is the difference between the treatments “neutral” and “negative” (p = 0.0438). There 
is no significant difference between the treatments “negative” and the treatment “positive” 
(p = 0.9143). Null hypothesis 5 thus has to be rejected. The presumption that mood does have 
an influence on the tendency towards herding behavior was thus confirmed. It can be seen 
that subjects in a neutral mood are particularly susceptible to herding behavior. 
4 Summary 
In this experiment, the influence of the subjects' mood on their tendency towards herding 
behavior in the context of share price forecasts was analyzed. The future share price is com-
posed - in a deterministic way - of four fundamental influencing factors which the subjects are 
informed of before every round of the game. A random influence with an expected value of 
zero and with the greatest probability for the event of ±0 makes forecasting more difficult. 
Subjects who act rationally forecast the future share price in accordance with the four funda-
mental influencing factors and presume a random event of Ɛ = ±0. In this way they can max-
imize their expected payment. First of all the subjects make a preliminary forecast. Then they 
are informed of the average of all of the preliminary forecasts (consensus forecast), after 
which they have the opportunity to revise their preliminary forecast.  
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The experiment is carried out using three treatments (neutral, positive and negative) The 
three treatments differ in terms of the mood which is created among the subjects. The sub-
jects’ mood is influenced by film excerpts which are shown before every preliminary and every 
final forecast is made. Manipulation checks confirm whether the film excerpts have achieved 
the desired mood change. 
The experiment produced the following results: 
1. The subjects did not act in accordance with homo oeconomicus, a figurative human 
characterized by the ability to make rational decisions, because they did not always 
choose the rational strategy. Less than a third of all forecasting decisions (31.62%) fol-
lowed the rational strategy, and less than a tenth of all subjects (9.94%) always made 
rational decisions. 
2. After the consensus forecast had been announced, the subjects frequently adjusted 
their forecasts (in 35.99% of all cases). These adjustments were almost exclusively in 
the direction of the consensus forecast. A clear tendency towards herding behavior 
was thus observed. 
3. The average standard deviation of the preliminary forecasts was significantly higher 
than the average standard deviation of the final forecasts. This is also a sign of herding. 
4. There was hardly any sign of anti-herding. Only 3.43% of the revisions of forecasts were 
not in the direction of the consensus forecast, and were thus in the opposite direction.  
5. The rational strategy was followed significantly more often in the treatments “posi-
tive” (34.29%) and negative (34.48%) than in the treatment “neutral” at 28.19%. 
6. Adjustments of the forecasts in the direction of the consensus forecast (herding be-
havior) occurred in the treatments “positive” (26.98%) and “negative” (27.24%) signif-
icantly less often than in the treatment “neutral” (39.26%).  
In summary, it can be stated that herding can be observed very frequently. The mood of the 
subjects has an influence on the occurrence of herding. The tendency towards herding behav-
ior is stronger in a neutral mood than in a positive or negative mood. In addition, less attention 
is paid to the rational strategy in a neutral mood than in a positive or negative mood. 
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Appendix: instructions and test questions 
Instructions 
 
 
              
Player number                              Computer number 
 
 
 
 
The Game 
 
In this game you are requested to make forecasts for the future trend of a share price. This 
share price in euros at the point in time t (Kt) is always determined by four influencing fac-
tors (the fundamental data At, Bt, Ct and Dt) and a random influence (Ɛt). The fundamental 
data is provided before each forecast is made. The subjects are also aware of the specific in-
fluence the fundamental data has on the share price. 
 
Kt = 2 ∙ At + 3 ∙ Bt – 1 ∙ Ct + 4 ∙ Dt + Ɛt 
 
The value of the random influence (Ɛt) moves within a range of €-40 and €+40. The probabil-
ity of the events €-40, €-30, €-20, €+20, €+30 and €+40 is 10% each. The probability of the 
events €-10 and €+10 is 12%. The event €±0 has a probability of occurrence of 16% (Figure 
1). 
 
Fig. 1: Distribution of the probability of the random influence Ɛt on the formation of the 
share price in euros 
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The random influence Ɛt for each period is determined by a lottery. On the next page you 
can see the random influences of the last 10 periods (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2: Random influences Ɛt of the last 10 periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As an example, here is how the share prices were determined for Period 6. 
 
The fundamental data and the random influence are as follows:  
 
A6 = €31; B6 = €26; C6 = €25; D6 = €31; Ɛ6 = €-40 
 
Hence:  
K6 = 2 ∙ €31 + 3 ∙ €26 – 1 ∙ €25 + 4 ∙ €31 + €-40 = €199 
  
In Figure 3 you can see the price movements of the share over the last ten periods. 
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Fig. 3: Price movements of the share over the last ten periods. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Share price in euros / period 
 
 
Procedure: 
After reading the instructions and answering the test questions you will see a film excerpt. 
Following this you will receive the figures of the fundamental data for the current period. 
You will be asked to make a forecast for the share price. Then you will see another film ex-
cerpt. Then you will receive the information about the consensus forecast. The consensus 
forecast is the arithmetical average of all preliminary forecasts made by the participants. 
Now you have the opportunity to revise your forecast. A total of five rounds are played. Be-
fore each round you see the trajectory of the share price and the random influences of the 
last rounds of the game. 
 
Payment: 
You will receive a show-up fee of €5 for taking part in the experiment. For every successful 
share price forecast you receive €10. A forecast is considered successful and is rewarded ac-
cordingly when it does not diverge by more than €10 from the actual share price. In total 
you can earn up to €55. Payment is made at the end of the experiment. 
 
Information: 
 
• Please remain quiet during the experiment 
• Do not look at your neighbors’ screen 
• Apart from a pocket calculator, no aids are permitted (smartphones, smart watches 
etc.) 
• Please note the respective time limits given on the upper right of the screen.  
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Test questions 
 
 
Multiple-choice test questions: 
 
1. What is your task in this game? 
a. Solving mathematical problems. 
b. Making forecasts for the future trend of a share price. (correct) 
c. Making diversification decisions. 
 
 
2. What is the probability of occurrence of the random influences €-10 and €+10? 
a. 16% 
b. 10% 
c. 12% (correct) 
 
 
3. What does the payment depend on? 
d. On the movement of the share price. 
e. On the success of the forecast. (correct) 
f. On the level of the DAX. 
 
 
4. The current share price is €232 and you forecast €241. How much is your payout? 
a. €5 
b. €0 
c. €10 (correct) 
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Abstract 
We analyzed interest rate forecasts from Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. We assessed 532 forecast 
time series with a total of 85,264 individual interest rate forecasts. To do so, we carried out a 
comparison to naïve forecasts and investigated the forecast time series for topically-orien-
tated trend adjustments. In addition, we deployed the sign accuracy test and the unbiasedness 
test. The results are very sobering in part: 95.9% of all forecast time series are characterized 
by the phenomenon of topically-orientated trend adjustments, and 99.4% of all forecast time 
series proved to be biased. Only a small proportion of the forecast time series (3.6%) reflected 
the future interest rate trend significantly more precisely than a naïve forecast. However, at 
the same time some of the results of the study are surprisingly positive. The sign accuracy test 
revealed that 48.3% of all forecast time series predict the interest rate trend significantly bet-
ter than a random walk forecast. 
Keywords  
Interest rate forecasts, survey forecasts, forecast accuracy, portfolio management, topically-
orientated trend adjustment behavior. 
JEL Classification 
E44, E47, G11, G12, G15, G17, G21, F37 
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1 Introduction 
Future interest rate trends are of key significance for almost all investment decisions on the 
capital markets. If the general level of interest rates in an economy rises, the prices of most 
bonds will fall. Only securities with a short residual term to maturity and floating-rate bonds 
remain largely unaffected by such developments. The longer the term to maturity and the 
lower the coupon, the greater the fall in bond prices. If the general level of interest rates falls, 
the opposite effect occurs, and the prices of most bonds rise. 
Interest rate trends are, however, also of great importance for investments in the stock mar-
ket. The fair value of a share is the total of all discounted future profits that this share provides. 
If one wishes to take a critical look at the current market price of a stock, it is wise not to 
compare its current price with the current fair value, but rather to determine the future fair 
value of the stock. If the current value is significantly below the fair value which it will have at 
the end of the investment horizon, it is an attractive investment. However, in order to estab-
lish the future fair value of a stock, one has to forecast the predominant future interest rate 
level, because this simultaneously represents the future discount rate in the determination of 
fair value.  
In the case of international portfolios, exchange rate movements also have to be taken into 
account. The interest rate parity theory shows that interest rate trends at home and abroad 
have great significance for exchange rates. 
As a rule, financial market analyzes normally begin with a forecast of interest rate trends, be-
cause bond and share prices – and ultimately also exchange rates – are significantly influenced 
by interest rates. It is therefore not surprising that the accuracy of interest rate forecasts have 
been of great interests to academics and business professionals for a long time now. In the 
past 40 years, around 50 studies have already been published on the accuracy of survey-based 
interest rate forecasts (see the comprehensive synoptic overview in Table 20 in the appendix). 
Some trends have emerged in these studies:  
Only a few studies considered the interest rate forecasts they analyzed to be largely reliable.1 
These were largely forecasts on the base rates of central banks or forecasts of short-term 
market rates such as the three-month money market rate. However, for portfolio manage-
ment, interest rate forecasts for bonds with maturities of at least a year are primarily of inter-
est, because active portfolio management strategies can be realized much more easily in this 
segment. There are also some studies with mixed findings.2 Here again, it is mostly forecasts 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Throop (1981), Tabak and Feitosa (2008), Baghestani and Marchon (2012), Knüppel and 
Schultefrankenfeld (2013) and Pierdzioch (2015). 
2 See, for example, Dua (1988), Zarnowitz and Braun (1992), Cho (1996), Gosnell and Kolb (1997), Greer (2003), 
Scheier and Spiwoks (2006), Goodhart and Lim (2008), Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein (2008), Chun (2009), Spiwoks, 
Bedke and Hein (2010), Jongen, Verschoor and Wolff (2011), Kunze, Kramer and Rudschuk (2013), Kunze and 
Gruppe (2014), Baghestani and Danila (2014), Beechay and Österholm (2014), Oliver and Pasaogullari (2015), and 
Miah, Khalifa and Hammoudeh (2016). 
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for short-term interest rates which come off well, while more than half of the studies take a 
very critical view of the quality of the interest rate forecasts which they examined.3 
Until now, US interest rate forecasts have been the main focus of research, although European 
interest rate forecasts – particularly British and German ones – have also been frequently ex-
amined. In the Asia-Pacific region there have been several studies focusing on Japan,4 but oth-
erwise there has only been little published research dealing with interest rate forecasts for 
the Asia-Pacific region. Goodhart and Lim (2008) looked at interest rate forecasts in New Zea-
land, while Baghestani, Arzaghi and Kaya (2015) analyzed their Australian counterparts. 
Jongen, Verschoor and Wolff (2011) investigated forecasts of interest rate trends in Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan for the period 1995-2009. 
However, this study limited itself to assessment criteria which do not provide a comprehen-
sive impression of the accuracy of the forecasts. Instead it compared survey forecasts with 
random walk forecasts or implicit forward rate forecasts. Miah, Khalifa and Hammoudeh 
(2016) analyzed interest rate forecasts from China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, among others. They examined the period 
2001-2012 and applied the efficiency test and the unbiasedness test. As a data basis they used 
the survey forecasts of Fx4casts.com. For us, this is definitely the most interesting study 
among those which have previously been carried out. However, we refer to a different data 
basis (Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts), and in addition to interest rate forecasts from China, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, we also look at 
forecasts from Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. We also take a longer period of time into 
account in our analysis (1990-2016).5 In addition, we use a far more comprehensive set of 
tools for the evaluation of the quality of forecasts: (1) Comparison to a naïve forecast with the 
aid of the Diebold-Mariano test, (2) examination of the forecast direction with the help of the 
sign accuracy test, (3) examination for systematic forecast errors with the aid of the unbiased-
ness test, and (4) test for the presence of possible topically-oriented trend adjustments with 
aid of the TOTA coefficient. 
Unlike many of the previous studies we not only examine the time series of the consensus 
forecasts, but also the forecast time series of the banks, investment companies, associations, 
consulting firms and industrial companies which participated in the survey. It cannot be ruled 
out that individual institutions might succeed in making forecasts which are more reliable than 
the consensus forecasts. Limiting the analysis to consensus forecasts might therefore mislead 
us. We evaluated a total of 532 time series with 85,264 interest rate forecasts. In this respect, 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Friedman (1980), Belongia (1987), Simon (1989), Hafer and Hein (1989), Francis (1991), Hafer, 
Hein and MacDonald (1992), Domian (1992), Ilmanen (1996), Kolb and Stekler (1996), Baghestani, Jung and 
Zuchegno (2000), Albrecht (2000), Spiwoks (2003), Brooks and Gray (2004), Benke (2004), Mose (2005), Baghe-
stani (2005), Benke (2006), Spiwoks and Hein (2007), Mitchell and Pearce (2007), Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein 
(2009), Gubaydullina, Hein and Spiwoks (2011), Schwarzbach, Kunze, Rudschuck and Windels (2012), Chortareas, 
Jitmaneeroj and Wood (2012), Butter and Jansen (2013), Spiwoks, Gubaydullina and Hein (2015), and Kunze, 
Wegener, Bizer and Spiwoks (2017). 
4 See, for example, Gosnell and Kolb (1997), Spiwoks and Hein (2007), Gubaydullina, Hein and Spiwoks (2011), 
Jongen, Verschoor and Wolff (2011), Butter and Jansen (2013), Spiwoks, Gubaydullina and Hein (2015), and 
Baghestani, Arzaghi and Kaya (2015). 
5 The Australian interest rate forecasts start in 1990. The other time series only begin later. 
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the study can be viewed as the most comprehensive analysis by far of interest rate forecasts 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Some surprising results were revealed in the process, which certainly opens up opportunities 
for active portfolio management strategies. For example, 61.5% of the forecast time series on 
the interest rates of Indian state bonds with ten years remaining to maturity (forecast horizon: 
13 months) predict the future interest rate trend (rising or falling) significantly better than a 
random walk forecast. With forecasting results of this kind, it should be possible to systemat-
ically obtain excess returns.  
The study is divided into five sections. In chapter 2 the data basis is described in detail. In 
chapter 3 the methods used are presented. The results of the study are shown in chapter 4. 
In the final chapter a summary of the study is provided. 
2 Data Basis 
Bates and Granger (1969) were the first to raise the question of whether better results could 
be achieved via a suitable combination of several forecasts than by means of choosing the 
(presumably) best forecast. The idea behind this is that many forecasts contain useful ele-
ments of information which are not found in other forecasts and which can be brought to-
gether in a consensus forecast (see, for example, Thiele 1993). This idea triggered a lively de-
bate on the possibilities and limitations of suitable combinations of forecasts, which culmi-
nated in 1989 in a special edition of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal 
of Forecasting. As a result of this debate, the company Consensus Economics created the spe-
cialist journal Consensus Forecasts. Since October 1989 it has been published on a monthly 
basis. Every month, Consensus Economics interviews more than 700 leading academics from 
the fields of economics and business for their forecasts in relation to various economic indi-
cators for over 85 countries. Alongside the forecasts of these experts, Consensus Economics 
also publishes a consensus mean, which is the arithmetical average of the experts’ forecasts.  
The interest rate forecasts for Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand which are analyzed here come from 
the regularly published journal Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts. We examined the forecasts 
which were published there in the period from January 1990 to December 2015. The forecasts 
relate to the period from April 1990 to the end of December 2016. The data for Australia in 
the initial years is from the journal Consensus Forecasts. For the period after the establish-
ment of the journal Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts in 1995, the Australian interest rate fore-
casts are taken from that periodical. We evaluated a total of 532 time series with 85,264 in-
terest rate forecasts. There is a detailed overview in Table 1. 
Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts differentiates between two forecast horizons: In the journal, 
the forecasts are occasionally described as three-month forecasts and twelve-month fore-
casts. In reality, however the forecast horizons are of four and thirteen months. This can be 
seen in the following example: In the edition of January 2015, which was available in around 
mid-January, the forecasts for the end of April 2015 and the end of January 2016 were 
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published. The forecasts themselves are handed in by the participating institutions at the be-
ginning of January. The actual period of time from the beginning of January 2015 to the end 
of April 2015 is four months, while the period of time from the beginning of January 2015 to 
the end of January 2016 is thirteen months. 
Table 1: Data Used from the Journal Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts 
Country Subject of Forecast  Number of 
Time Series 
Analyzed 
Number of 
Forecasts Ana-
lyzed 
Results in the 
Table 
Australia 10 Year Government Bond Yield 42 7,871 3 
Three Month Interest Rates 42 8,115 4 
China One-Year Base Lending Rate 30 3,507 5 
Hong Kong Prime Lending Rate 30 5,159 6 
Three Month Interest Rates 38 6,077 7 
India 10 Year Government Bond Yield 26 3,809 8 
Three Month Interest Rates 24 4,196 9 
Indonesia 10 Year Government Bond Yield 24 3,595 10 
Malaysia Base Lending Rate  30 4,374 11 
Three Month Interest Rates 36 5,842 12 
New Zealand 10 Year Government Bond Yield 36 6,566 13 
Three Month Interest Rates 36 6,552 14 
Singapore Prime Lending Rate 30 3,876 15 
Three Month Interest Rates 38 5,906 16 
South Korea Three Year Interest Rates 28 3,194 17 
Taiwan 10 Year Government Bond Yield 16 2,103 18 
Thailand Three Month Interest Rates 26 4,522 19 
∑  532 85,264  
We analyzed all of the forecast time series which have at least 80 items of data. We did not 
take time series with less than 80 observations into consideration. Under certain circum-
stances, time series which are too short or contain too large gaps can lead to inconclusive 
results in the procedures used to measure the quality of forecasts. 
3 Methods 
The following statistical tools were used to measure the quality of forecasts: Comparison to a 
naïve forecast with the aid of the Diebold-Mariano test (3.1), examination of the forecast di-
rection with the help of the sign accuracy test (3.2), the test for the unbiasedness of the fore-
casts (3.3) and the test for the presence of topically-orientated trend adjustments with the 
help of the TOTA coefficient (3.4).  
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3.1 Comparison to a Naïve Forecast with the Aid of the Diebold-Mariano Test 
The French mathematician Pierre Simon Laplace (1814) introduced the principle of indiffer-
ence (also known as the principle of insufficient reason) into the literature: A black box emits 
a figure x, and then the subject is requested to forecast which figure the black box will emit 
next. In view of the subject's complete lack of knowledge regarding the processes going on in 
the black box, it is not possible to give a single reason why the next figure should be larger 
than x. They can also not give a single reason why the next figure should be smaller than x. 
The only thing which an unknowing but sensible person can do is to forecast the figure x again 
for the future. In this way, a naïve forecast (everything remains the same) is understandable 
as long as one has no insight into the processes which lead to the figures which need to be 
forecast. Ever since it was identified, the naïve forecast has been considered to be the rock 
bottom in terms of forecast accuracy. Even a very rudimentary understanding of the processes 
at play should lead to better accuracy than that offered by a naïve forecast.  
Simple measurements of forecast quality (such as mean absolute error or mean squared error) 
enable us to make a comparison with a naïve forecast. However, these simple approaches do 
not permit an assessment of statistical significance. This deficit is avoided by using the 
Diebold-Mariano test (Diebold and Mariano, 1995). To do so, we calculate the mean squared 
error (MSE) for the time series of the expert prognoses and for the time series of the naïve 
forecasts. The test statistics of the Diebold-Mariano test are defined as follows: 
1 2
1
( ( ) ( ))
ˆ /
t tV P V PT
d T
DM

=
−
 
 
T  = number of observations 
V = loss function 
P1 = naïve forecast 
P2 = expert forecast 
 = joint spread of the two loss functions   
 
The null hypothesis tested in this way is that the naïve forecast (P1) and the expert forecast 
(P2) have the same accuracy. Neither one of the two alternatives thus provides a clearly better 
result. The numerator is the mean deviation between the loss functions V of the two forecast 
approaches to be compared. Normally a squared loss function is assumed; in other words, the 
squared errors of the two forecast approaches are compared (P1 and P2). The denominator is 
the joint spread of the two loss functions. This is estimated on the basis of the long-term au-
tocovariances of the loss functions. In the case of large samples, this test value is asymptoti-
cally normally distributed. 
ˆ /d T
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3.2 Sign Accuracy Test 
The sign accuracy test (Merton, 1981; Henriksson and Merton, 1981) is another widespread 
tool for evaluating forecasts. In this procedure, the extent of a forecasted change is not the 
issue. It only examines whether the general direction of the forecasts (rising or falling) is cor-
rect. The forecasts are then entered into a 2x2 matrix (Table 2).  
Table 2: 2x2 Contingency Table 
 Actual Event: 
Interest Rates Rise 
Actual Event: 
Interest Rates Fall 
∑ 
Forecast: Interest Rates Rise N11 N12 N1 
Forecast: Interest Rates Fall N21 N22 N2 
∑ N1 N2 N 
On the one hand, a differentiation is made between whether an interest rate increase or an 
interest rate fall was forecast; on the other hand, a differentiation is also made between 
whether an interest rate rise or an interest rate fall has actually occurred. The principal diag-
onal in the 2x2 matrix (N11 and N22) indicates the forecasts which are correct regarding the 
trend direction. The secondary diagonal (N12 and N21) indicates the forecasts which are incor-
rect regarding the trend direction. A chi squared test is now applied to examine whether the 
distribution frequency of the four fields is significantly different from a random walk forecast 
(cf. Diebold and Lopez, 1996; Joutz and Stekler, 2000). If this is the case, a comparison between 
the number of observations in the principal diagonals and the secondary diagonals must be 
carried out to establish whether the forecasts are significantly better or significantly worse 
than a random walk forecast. 
3.3 Unbiasedness Test 
The unbiasedness test using the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969) 
can check whether the forecast errors are systematic. According to the theory of rational ex-
pectations, this should not be the case. The Mincer-Zarnowitz regression takes the following 
form: 
 
 
 = event which has actually occurred (dependent variable) 
  = constant  
  = forecast of the actual event at the moment in time t 
  = coefficient of the respective forecasts 
 = error term at the moment in time t 
t t tA P u = + +
tA
tP

tu
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Based on this equation, forecasts are considered unbiased if α is not significantly different to 
0, and β is not significantly different to 1. In addition, the error term ut may not be autocorre-
lated. 
Forecasts are considered unbiased when, with a low probability of error, the joint hypothesis 
of α = 0 and β = 1 does not have to be rejected. This is checked by using the Wald test. A 
further condition is the absence of autocorrelations in the value of the error term ut, which is 
examined with the Durbin-Watson test. If, according to these criteria, a forecast time series is 
based on rational expectations, Granger and Newbold (1973) argue that this by no means sig-
nifies that the forecasts are perfect. They merely do not exhibit systematic errors. 
3.4 Topically-Orientated Trend Adjustment  
In order to answer the question of whether forecasters have oriented themselves towards 
current levels when drawing up interest rate forecasts, the TOTA coefficient is used as a sta-
tistical benchmark (Andres and Spiwoks, 1999). Topically-orientated trend adjustment (TOTA) 
is present when forecasts reflect the present more strongly than the future. In the most unfa-
vorable case, the future-oriented character of such forecasts may be lost entirely.  
The TOTA coefficient is the quotient of two coefficients of determination (R2A and R2B). The 
R2A measures the correlation between the forecasts at the time of their validity and the actual 
events. The R2B measures the correlation between the forecasts at the time of their appear-
ance and the actual events. The TOTA coefficient takes the following form: 
2 2
2 2
forecasts (validity date); actual events
forecasts (issue date); actual events
A
B
R R
R R
TOTAcoefficient = =  
If the TOTA coefficient has a value of < 1, topically-orientated trend adjustment is given, and 
forecasts reflect the present more strongly than the future.  
The TOTA coefficient and the unbiasedness test are closely related. If a forecast time series is 
characterized by the phenomenon of topically-orientated trend adjustment, the forecast error 
ut is normally not randomly distributed (cf. Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein, 2010). Forecast time 
series which have a TOTA coefficient of < 1 are therefore normally biased. 
4 Results 
510 of the 532 forecasts analyzed have a TOTA coefficient of < 1 (see Tables 3-19). 95.9% of 
all the forecast time series analyzed are therefore characterized by the phenomenon of topi-
cally-orientated trend adjustments. If interest rates rise, expectations regarding future inter-
est rates will therefore normally be revised upwards. If interest rates fall, expectations regard-
ing future interest rates will therefore usually be revised downwards. In this way, the forecast 
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time series ultimately reflect current interest rates more strongly than future ones. Expressed 
more pointedly, it could be said that the experts are forecasting the present rather than the 
future. This is consistent with the results of earlier studies. In an analysis of 1,182 forecast 
time series of the G7 countries and five other European countries, a total of 98.5% of all fore-
cast time series studied exhibited a topically-orientated trend adjustment (see Spiwoks, 
Gubaydullina and Hein, 2015). 
These sobering findings are also reflected in the unbiasedness test. 529 of the 532 forecasts 
analyzed exhibit bias (see Tables 3-19). In 99.4% of all forecast time series studied, either α 
differs significantly from 0, or β differs significantly from 1, or the error term ut proves to be 
autocorrelated.  
Even unbiased forecasts can exhibit dramatic forecasting errors. The term unbiased merely 
states that forecasting errors are not of a systematic nature. A systematic forecasting error is, 
for example, a continuous over – or underestimation of the subject of the forecast (α≠0). A 
different kind of systematic forecasting error is present when small actual events are con-
stantly overestimated (or underestimated), and major actual events are constantly underesti-
mated (or overestimated) (β≠1). Systematic forecasting errors are also present when the error 
term ut reveals a pattern. This is usually the case when topically-orientated trend adjustment 
is present (cf. Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein 2010). However, other systematic forecasting errors 
can also lead to the error term ut proving to be autocorrelated. Biased forecast time series are 
thus a reflection of systematic errors in drawing up the forecasts. This is true for 99.4% of all 
the forecasts we considered. 
An expert's forecast can be viewed as largely worthless if it cannot bear comparison with the 
respective naïve forecast. A naïve forecast requires no specialist knowledge and is available 
free of charge to everyone at any time. One should, however, expect that forecasts made by 
highly-paid financial market experts are more exact than naïve forecasts. In many of the fore-
cast subjects and forecast horizons examined here, the experts’ forecasts – compared to the 
mean squared forecast error – are indeed more precise than naïve forecasts.6 A total of 175 
out of 532 forecast time series (32.9%) exhibit lower mean squared forecast errors than the 
respective naïve forecasts. However, the Diebold-Mariano test shows that only 19 out of 532 
forecast time series (3.6%) contain significantly better forecasting results than naïve forecasts. 
The experts who forecast the prime lending rate in Hong Kong are particularly successful. 14 
out of 30 forecast time series (46.7%) predict the interest rate trend significantly better than 
                                                          
6 In the forecasts of the prime lending rate in Hong Kong, it can be seen that 26 out of 30 forecast time series 
(86.7%) were superior to the naïve forecast. In the case of the forecasts of the 3-month rate in Hong Kong, 24 
out of 38 forecast time series (63.2%) were superior to a naïve forecast, while in the forecasts of the 3-month 
rate in India, at least the forecasts with a 13 month forecast horizon were highly successful: 9 out of 12 forecast 
time series (75%) were more precise than the corresponding naïve forecast. Among the forecasts of 10-year 
interest rates in Indonesia, the forecasts with a horizon of 13 months were once again very successful. 9 out of 
12 forecast time series (75%) are more exact than a naïve forecast. Forecasts of the base lending rate in Malaysia 
were more successful than a naïve forecast in 18 out of 30 cases (60%), which is also the case for forecasts of 3-
month interest rates in Malaysia in 19 out of 36 cases (52.8%). The forecasts of the 3-month rate in New Zealand 
were more precise than a naïve forecast in 25 out of 36 cases (69.4%). Among the forecasts of the 3-month rate 
in Thailand with a forecast horizon of 13 months, 9 out of 13 forecast time series (69.2%) were superior to the 
naïve forecast. 
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a naïve forecast (Table 6). Apart from this there are only five individual cases in which the time 
series of expert forecasts are significantly more precise than the time series of the respective 
naïve forecasts. 
The sign accuracy test merely reveals whether forecasts were in the right direction (rising or 
falling). For the sign accuracy test, however, it is completely irrelevant whether forecasts pre-
dict the extent of future trends. The findings here are surprisingly favorable. In 248 out of 513 
forecast time series (48.3%), the future trend (rising or falling interest rates) has been grasped 
significantly better than by a random walk forecast (see Tables 3-19). This is also a remarkable 
success in comparison to the findings of many previous studies. For example, Spiwoks, Bedke 
and Hein (2008) established a success rate of only 19.9% among US interest rate forecasts. 
In the case of Australian 3-month interest rates with a forecast horizon of four months, 13 out 
of 21 forecast time series (61.9%) were significantly better in predicting the future trend di-
rection (rising or falling) than a random walk forecast (Table 4). The forecasts for the base 
lending rate in China are very conspicuous: 29 out of 30 forecast time series (96.7%) predict 
the future interest rate trend significantly better than a random walk forecast (Table 5). This 
result is even surpassed by forecasts for the prime lending rate in Hong Kong. All 30 forecast 
time series (100%) reflect the future interest rate trend significantly more precisely than a 
random walk forecast (Table 6). The forecasts for three-month interest rates in Hong Kong, 
with a 13 month forecast horizon, are also very successful. 14 out of 19 forecast time series 
(73.7%) predict the interest rate trend significantly better than a random walk forecast (Table 
7). Forecasts for the three-month rate in India are equally successful. In 17 out of 24 forecast 
time series (70.8%), the future trend (rising or falling interest rates) is reflected significantly 
better than by a random walk forecast (Table 9). The base lending rate in Malaysia is also 
forecasted successfully: 23 out of 28 forecast time series (82.1%) predict the future interest 
rate trend significantly better than a random walk forecast (Table 11). The forecasts for the 
three-month rate in New Zealand similarly predict the future interest rate trend significantly 
better (rising or falling) in 25 out of 36 cases (69.4%) than a random walk forecast (Table 14). 
Among the forecasts for three-month interest rates in Thailand, it is particularly those with a 
forecast horizon of four months that are successful. 10 out of 13 forecast time series (76.9%) 
predict the future trend significantly more precisely than a random walk forecast (Table 19). 
In the case of 19 out of 532 forecast time series, the sign accuracy test could not be carried 
out, because frequencies of < 1 occur in one or several fields of the 2x2 contingency table. In 
these cases, however, the chi squared distribution is no longer a suitable test statistic (see, for 
example, Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein, 2009). 
Overall, it can be stated that forecasting three-month interest rates is considerably easier than 
ten-year interest rates. Only 15.3% of the forecast time series on 10-year rates (Australia, In-
dia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Taiwan) predict the future trend (rising or falling interest rates) 
significantly more precisely than a random walk forecast, whereas in the case of three-month 
interest rates (Australia, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand) the 
figure is 57.1%. This coincides with the findings which have been obtained in other parts of 
the world. For example, in the case of US interest rate forecasts, Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein 
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(2008) showed that only 8.8% of all forecast time series on 10-year interest rates were signif-
icantly more successful than a random walk forecast, while in the case of three-month interest 
rates the figure was 30.9%. 
The interest rates for short maturities are influenced considerably more by the actions of cen-
tral banks than the interest rates for long maturities. In addition, central banks frequently 
provide an outlook on their future base rate policies. It can be that careful observation of 
central bank policy benefits forecasts of three-month interest rates, but not those for ten-year 
interest rates (cf. Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein 2008, p. 376). That would explain the variations in 
the success of forecasts. 
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Table 3: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Australia (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
ANZ  440 0.813 - 0.004 o 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.406 - 0.034 o 0.388 0.000 0.000 
BIS Shrapnel 442 0.837 - 0.000 o 0.821 0.000 0.000 0.559 - 0.000 - 0.048 0.000 0.000 
BT Financial Group 450 0.808 - 0.025 o 0.803 0.000 0.000 0.431 - 0.024 o 0.108 0.000 0.000 
Centre of Policy St. 205 0.461 - 0.011 o 0.994 0.000 0.000 0.022 - 0.049 o 0.743 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 245 0.796 - 0.002 o 0.686 0.000 0.000 0.296 - 0.079 o 0.334 0.000 0.000 
Commonwealth B. 444 0.785 - 0.000 - 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.401 - 0.015 o 0.642 0.000 0.000 
Deloitte Acc. Econ. 428 0.806 - 0.017 o 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.424 o 0.111 - 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 124 0.349 o 0.148 o 0.856 0.000 0.000 0.256 - 0.075 o 0.107 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 228 0.743 - 0.009 o 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.415 o 0.183 o 0.564 0.000 0.000 
HSBC 286 0.814 - 0.096 o 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.623 - 0.031 o 0.178 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 403 0.760 - 0.000 - 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.361 - 0.000 o 0.198 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie  386 0.752 - 0.035 - 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.363 - 0.001 - 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 300 0.847 - 0.018 o 0.889 0.000 0.000 0.570 o 0.242 o 0.266 0.000 0.000 
Moody’s Analytics 206 0.755 - 0.006 o 0.952 0.000 0.000 0.341 o 0.106 o 0.924 0.000 0.000 
Nation. Australia B. 411 0.825 - 0.011 o 0.713 0.000 0.000 0.499 - 0.018 o 0.943 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 328 0.587 - 0.023 o 0.675 0.000 0.000 0.137 - 0.024 - 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Royal B. of Canada 272 0.771 o 0.249 o 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.298 o 0.107 o 0.576 0.000 0.000 
Suncorp 212 0.436 - 0.000 o 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.038 o 0.155 + 0.057 0.000 0.000 
UBS 449 0.791 - 0.005 o 0.973 0.000 0.000 0.382 - 0.023 - 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 450 0.798 - 0.000 + 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.455 - 0.042 o 0.316 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.806 - 0.004 o 0.887 0.000 0.000 0.430 - 0.031 o 0.323 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; Sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 4: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Australia (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
ANZ 468 0.904 o 0.471 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.377 o 0.180 + 0.035 0.000 0.000 
BIS Shrapnel 465 0.897 o 0.159 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.490 o 0.215 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
BT Financial Group 468 0.886 o 0.432 + 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.427 o 0.847 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Centre of Policy St. 219 0.780 o 0.393 o 0.107 0.001 0.000 0.015 - 0.096 o 0.663 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 276 0.854 o 0.889 o 0.156 0.002 0.000 0.239 o 0.235 o 0.379 0.000 0.000 
Commonwealth B. 470 0.912 o 0.759 o 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.378 o 0.190 o 0.372 0.000 0.000 
Deloitte Acc. Econ. 450 0.874 o 0.592 o 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.430 o 0.407 o 0.063 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 124 0.560 o 0.867 o 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.044 o 0.089 o 0.839 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 227 0.913 o 0.162 + 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.457 o 0.351 + 0.000 0.409 0.000 
HSBC 272 0.953 o 0.502 o 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.713 o 0.172 + 0.028 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 410 0.877 o 0.450 + 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.387 o 0.902 o 0.387 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie  411 0.900 o 0.537 + 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.368 o 0.388 o 0.482 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 325 0.914 o 0.633 + 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.523 o 0.723 o 0.892 0.000 0.000 
Moody’s Analytics 188 0.906 o 0.457 + 0.002 0.028 0.000 0.364 o 0.779 o 0.660 0.000 0.000 
Nation. Australia B. 432 0.896 o 0.366 + 0.046 0.843 0.000 0.452 o 0.970 o 0.066 0.001 0.000 
Nomura 352 0.817 o 0.627 o 0.887 0.000 0.000 0.140 o 0.573 o 0.087 0.000 0.000 
Royal B. of Canada 272 0.865 o 0.121 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.383 o 0.612 o 0.366 0.036 0.000 
Suncorp 212 0.619 - 0.083 o 0.922 0.796 0.000 0.044 o 0.668 o 0.646 0.000 0.000 
UBS 472 0.874 o 0.707 + 0.031 0.006 0.000 0.363 o 0.576 o 0.401 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 470 0.930 o 0.506 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.503 o 0.234 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.897 o 0.308 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.427 o 0.737 o 0.206 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 5: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for China (1-Year Base Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Bank of China 258 0.671 o 0.317 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 o 0.623 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Barclays Capital 101 0.841 o 0.733 o 0.317 0.000 0.000 0.030 o 0.386 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BNP Paribas 108 0.888 o 0.830 + 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.441 o 0.343 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 100 0.599 o 0.229 + 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.007 o 0.179 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Daiwa Capital 115 0.897 o 0.766 + 0.000 0.000 0.952 0.675 o 0.359 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 158 0.702 o 0.240 + 0.036 0.002 0.000 0.000 o 0.445 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hang Seng Bank 107 0.918 o 0.532 + 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.547 o 0.885 + 0.590 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 212 0.665 o 0.332 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 o 0.530 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IHS Economics 278 0.735 o 0.408 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 o 0.441 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ING 216 0.574 o 0.298 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.036 o 0.889 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 96 0.580 o 0.271 + 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 o 0.324 + 0.002 0.000 0.098 
Morgan Stanley 93 0.808 o 0.632 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.013 o 0.895 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 158 1.017 o 0.860 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 1.432 o 0.751 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Oxford Economics 232 0.695 - 0.089 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.153 o 0.618 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 300 0.718 o 0.564 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 o 0.738 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 6: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Hong Kong (Prime Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Bank of China  334 0.967 + 0.025 + 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.574 + 0.058 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bank of East Asia  483 0.986 + 0.024 + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.738 o 0.257 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
C. Pacific-Yamaichi  168 0.985 o 0.264 + 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.287 o 0.131 + 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Credit Suisse  168 0.957 o 0.211 + 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.479 o 0.203 + 0.020 0.000 0.000 
Daiwa Research I. 273 0.956 + 0.044 + 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.488 + 0.076 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank  264 0.967 + 0.031 + 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.633 o 0.418 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FAZ Institute 132 0.939 o 0.208 + 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.449 o 0.161 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 156 0.972 o 0.703 + 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.785 o 0.697 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hang Seng Bank 363 0.994 + 0.021 + 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.778 + 0.047 + 0.000 0.006 0.000 
HSBC Economics 341 0.999 o 0.682 + 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.787 o 0.197 + 0.000 0.349 0.000 
IHS Economics 288 0.957 + 0.075 + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.527 o 0.201 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 139 0.378 o 0.946 + 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.153 + 0.009 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank  209 0.970 + 0.036 + 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.441 o 0.668 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 132 0.930 + 0.098 + 0.000 0.863 0.001 0.253 o 0.408 + 0.045 0.455 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.975 + 0.023 + 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.720 + 0.043 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 7: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Hong Kong (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Bank of China 336 0.923 + 0.088 + 0.003 0.080 0.000 0.760 o 0.152 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bank of East Asia 484 0.906 o 0.121 + 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.804 o 0.163 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 339 0.967 o 0.125 + 0.000 0.848 0.000 0.768 o 0.390 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
C. Pacific-Yamaichi 168 0.981 o 0.628 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.374 o 0.317 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Credit Suisse 185 0.887 o 0.231 o 0.091 0.292 0.000 0.573 o 0.577 o 0.284 0.000 0.000 
Daiwa Research 275 0.818 + 0.096 o 0.191 0.064 0.000 0.481 o 0.418 o 0.301 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 297 0.921 o 0.900 o 0.067 0.012 0.000 0.744 o 0.736 + 0.014 0.000 0.000 
FAZ Institute 132 0.921 o 0.456 o 0.392 0.061 0.000 0.374 o 0.931 + 0.030 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 375 0.862 o 0.214 + 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.795 o 0.223 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Hang Seng Bank 363 0.913 o 0.143 + 0.023 0.595 0.000 0.832 + 0.041 + 0.000 0.011 0.000 
HSBC 342 0.962 o 0.318 o 0.244 0.082 0.000 0.827 o 0.182 + 0.000 0.002 0.000 
ING 405 0.920 o 0.202 + 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.794 o 0.368 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Morgan Stanley 100 1.013 o 0.411 o 0.401 0.240 0.761 0.818 o 0.744 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 196 0.947 o 0.251 o 0.474 0.000 0.000 0.868 o 0.336 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 139 0.126 o 0.291 o 0.098 0.123 0.001 0.002 o 0.301 o 0.077 0.044 0.000 
Societe Generale 117 0.834 o 0.464 o 0.184 0.024 0.094 0.676 o 0.327 o 0.149 0.004 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 212 0.782 o 0.415 o 0.521 0.000 0.002 0.392 o 0.897 + 0.013 0.000 0.000 
UBS 131 0.808 o 0.638 o 0.674 0.001 0.001 0.026 o 0.767 o 0.510 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.909 o 0.154 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.778 o 0.140 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 8: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for India (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Citigroup 190 0.182 o 0.110 O 0.273 0.007 0.000 0.025 o 0.725 + 0.001 0.004 0.000 
Confed of Indian I. 144 0.949 - 0.037 o 0.073 0.000 0.032 0.684 o 0.563 o 0.093 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 101 0.932 - 0.011 + 0.020 0.090 0.000 0.907 o 0.329 + 0.030 0.008 0.000 
Dresdner Bank 84 0.747 o 0.919 + 0.011 0.021 0.790 0.653 o 0.287 + 0.037 0.183 0.829 
FERI 156 0.389 - 0.058 o 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.003 o 0.245 o 0.123 0.000 0.000 
Hindustan Lever 176 0.897 - 0.063 o 0.601 0.000 0.000 0.718 o 0.112 o 0.500 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Securities 272 0.849 o 0.126 o 0.080 0.015 0.000 0.812 o 0.299 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HIS Economics  186 0.607 o 0.170 + 0.028 0.076 0.000 0.317 o 0.140 - 0.046 0.000 0.000 
NCAER 214 0.881 - 0.005 o 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.712 - 0.003 o 0.688 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 224 0.951 o 0.171 o 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.951 o 0.537 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tata Services 327 0.922 - 0.073 + 0.001 0.033 0.000 0.813 o 0.163 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 138 0.905 o 0.178 o 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.730 o 0.518 + 0.013 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.934 o 0.167 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.843 o 0.944 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 9: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for India (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Citigroup 221 0.862 o 0.316 o 0.558 0.000 0.000 0.104 o 0.669 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Confed of Indian I. 166 0.908 o 0.621 + 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.656 o 0.624 + 0.028 0.000 0.002 
Deutsche Bank 151 0.905 o 0.304 + 0.011 0.109 0.000 0.443 o 0.413 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dresdner Bank 232 0.808 NA NA + 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.373 o 0.296 + 0.000 0.018 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 98 0.113 o 0.389 + 0.026 0.002 0.000 0.000 o 0.553 o 0.835 0.000 0.000 
Hindustan Lever 168 0.864 NA NA + 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.752 - 0.001 + 0.000 0.000 0.002 
HSBC Securities 234 0.502 o 0.172 o 0.585 0.000 0.000 0.167 o 0.513 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan  108 0.484 o 0.315 o 0.793 0.000 0.707 0.452 o 0.249 + 0.001 0.004 0.594 
NCAER 212 0.809 o 0.335 + 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.336 o 0.927 o 0.090 0.000 0.000 
Tata Services 325 0.854 o 0.487 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.180 o 0.870 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 136 0.666 o 0.158 o 0.200 0.001 0.000 0.049 o 0.186 o 0.133 0.122 0.002 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.799 o 0.393 + 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.223 o 0.502 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available. 
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Table 10: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for India (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Bahana Securities 194 0.916 o 0.990 o 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.569 o 0.553 - 0.033 0.000 0.000 
Bank Danamon  98 0.809 NA NA o 0.301 0.000 0.023 0.464 o 0.367 + 0.043 0.000 0.000 
Castle Asia  108 0.787 - 0.034 o 0.433 0.360 0.000 0.440 o 0.513 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup  228 0.912 o 0.505 o 0.273 0.000 0.615 0.443 o 0.707 o 0.722 0.000 0.000 
Danareksa S.  375 1.001 NA NA o 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.844 o 0.273 o 0.317 0.156 0.000 
GK Goh   110 1.107 o 0.347 o 0.053 0.276 0.000 0.969 o 0.864 o 0.542 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 272 0.916 o 0.270 o 0.983 0.000 0.000 0.590 o 0.281 o 0.601 0.000 0.000 
ING  199 0.937 o 0.353 o 0.191 0.008 0.000 0.747 o 0.519 o 0.983 0.000 0.000 
Nomura  134 0.867 o 0.338 o 0.866 0.000 0.095 0.419 o 0.308 - 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Societe Generale 124 0.822 - 0.002 NA NA 0.450 0.000 0.653 o 0.222 NA NA 0.031 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 174 0.861 o 0.111 o 0.676 0.144 0.000 0.358 o 0.660 o 0.971 0.018 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.926 o 0.265 o 0.884 0.000 0.000 0.590 o 0.501 o 0.547 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available. 
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Table 11: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Malaysia (Base Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
AMSecurities 212 0.890 o 0.226 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.493 o 0.318 o 0.309 0.000 0.000 
CIBD-CIMB 157 1.002 + 0.096 + 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.612 o 0.272 + 0.017 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 94 0.848 o 0.305 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.105 o 0.821 + 0.013 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 92 0.996 o 0.261 NA NA 0.022 0.000 1.016 o 0.222 + 0.000 0.000 0.010 
Goldman Sachs 118 0.792 - 0.049 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.388 o 0.301 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Securities  149 0.551 - 0.056 o 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.005 o 0.441 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon 150 0.918 o 0.218 + 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.746 o 0.158 + 0.001 0.270 0.000 
Kanega Research 109 0.954 o 0.131 + 0.009 0.014 0.000 0.142 o 0.155 + 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 261 0.951 o 0.249 + 0.001 0.495 0.000 0.918 o 0.231 + 0.001 0.368 0.000 
Maybank 145 0.791 o 0.390 NA NA 0.082 0.000 0.037 - 0.086 o 0.201 0.000 0.000 
MIER 276 0.862 o 0.277 + 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.636 o 0.475 o 0.697 0.204 0.000 
RHB Research 400 1.021 o 0.287 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.676 o 0.169 + 0.000 0.045 0.000 
Societe Generale 104 0.911 o 0.216 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.102 o 0.800 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 165 1.051 o 0.240 + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.654 o 0.555 o 0.059 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 480 0.939 o 0.130 + 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.606 o 0.160 + 0.000 0.180 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available. 
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Table 12: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Malaysia (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
AMSecurities 211 0.896 o 0.261 o 0.051 0.706 0.000 0.364 o 0.400 o 0.161 0.000 0.000 
Baring- ING 427 0.882 o 0.499 + 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.603 o 0.920 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BofA-Merrill Lynch 111 1.050 o 0.643 o 0.068 0.052 0.000 0.924 o 0.650 o 0.536 0.000 0.000 
CIBD-CIMB 156 0.962 o 0.622 o 0.350 0.028 0.000 0.588 o 0.184 o 0.148 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 383 0.923 o 0.100 + 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.534 o 0.474 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 127 0.996 o 0.546 o 0.071 0.006 0.000 0.884 o 0.153 + 0.000 0.000 0.014 
Goldman Sachs 464 0.877 - 0.081 o 0.663 0.000 0.000 0.573 NA NA + 0.017 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 195 0.819 - 0.051 o 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.138 o 0.479 + 0.004 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon 150 0.917 o 0.180 + 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.689 o 0.248 + 0.002 0.064 0.000 
Kanega Research 118 0.819 o 0.113 + 0.005 0.098 0.000 0.077 o 0.179 + 0.000 0.047 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 120 0.841 o 0.575 + 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.497 o 0.276 o 0.940 0.000 0.000 
Maybank 141 0.876 o 0.110 o 0.699 0.008 0.000 0.200 o 0.144 o 0.248 0.000 0.000 
MIER 282 0.915 o 0.243 + 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.604 o 0.424 o 0.482 0.000 0.000 
RHB Research 404 0.935 o 0.245 + 0.000 0.527 0.000 0.501 o 0.263 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Societe Generale 118 1.019 o 0.938 + 0.000 0.436 0.001 1.540 o 0.810 o 0.095 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 238 0.963 o 0.237 + 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.581 o 0.445 o 0.238 0.025 0.000 
UOB Kay Hian 220 0.908 o 0.274 o 0.189 0.654 0.000 0.352 o 0.294 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.927 o 0.199 + 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.588 o 0.291 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available. 
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Table 13: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for New Zealand (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
ANZ Bank 488 0.832 - 0.010 o 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.575 - 0.053 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
ASB Bank 274 0.798 - 0.011 o 0.849 0.000 0.000 0.393 - 0.072 o 0.630 0.000 0.000 
Bank of NZ 480 0.779 - 0.038 o 0.806 0.000 0.000 0.426 - 0.047 o 0.423 0.000 0.000 
BERL 340 0.483 - 0.024 o 0.951 0.000 0.000 0.231 - 0.086 o 0.355 0.043 0.000 
Credit Suisse FB 114 0.297 o 0.263 o 0.602 0.002 0.000 0.239 o 0.983 o 0.638 0.213 0.000 
Deutsche Bank NZ 468 0.831 - 0.006 + 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.481 - 0.001 - 0.004 0.000 0.000 
First NZ Capital 348 0.830 - 0.000 o 0.988 0.000 0.000 0.565 o 0.145 o 0.198 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs NZ 144 0.516 - 0.059 o 0.955 0.043 0.000 0.093 o 0.308 - 0.015 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 216 0.867 - 0.003 o 0.550 0.000 0.000 0.490 - 0.053 o 0.129 0.000 0.000 
Infometrics 498 0.762 - 0.002 o 0.469 0.000 0.000 0.426 - 0.021 o 0.549 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 331 0.754 - 0.000 o 0.444 0.019 0.000 0.361 - 0.035 o 0.833 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie 172 0.776 - 0.003 o 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.341 - 0.050 o 0.472 0.000 0.000 
National Bank NZ 212 0.465 o 0.663 o 0.107 0.529 0.000 0.000 o 0.180 o 0.455 0.000 0.000 
NZIER 440 0.764 - 0.000 o 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.572 - 0.060 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Ord Minnett S. 128 0.234 - 0.005 o 0.567 0.008 0.000 0.367 o 0.783 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 476 0.779 - 0.001 - 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.393 - 0.084 - 0.040 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 482 0.799 - 0.003 o 0.663 0.000 0.000 0.497 - 0.092 o 0.359 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.793 - 0.005 o 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.504 o 0.118 o 0.075 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 14: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for New Zealand (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
ANZ Bank 488 0.939 o 0.287 + 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.694 o 0.383 o 0.446 0.000 0.000 
ASB Bank 274 0.998 o 0.243 + 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.684 o 0.654 o 0.434 0.000 0.000 
Bank of NZ 480 0.937 o 0.152 + 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.758 o 0.341 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
BERL 340 0.770 o 0.275 o 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.403 o 0.213 o 0.128 0.038 0.000 
Credit Suisse FB 114 0.742 o 0.215 + 0.012 0.490 0.000 0.042 o 0.236 + 0.000 0.043 0.000 
Deutsche Bank NZ 468 0.947 + 0.076 + 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.630 o 0.497 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
First NZ Capital 348 0.960 o 0.161 + 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.637 o 0.394 o 0.299 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs NZ 146 0.825 o 0.265 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 o 0.464 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 198 0.972 o 0.294 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.805 o 0.419 + 0.038 0.000 0.000 
Infometrics 498 0.925 o 0.411 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.472 o 0.969 o 0.363 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 327 0.959 o 0.328 o 0.071 0.115 0.000 0.435 o 0.861 o 0.743 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie 176 1.002 o 0.320 + 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.806 o 0.324 o 0.379 0.000 0.000 
National Bank NZ 212 0.807 o 0.130 + 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.270 o 0.361 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NZIER 440 0.891 o 0.997 o 0.067 0.015 0.000 0.493 o 0.860 o 0.258 0.000 0.000 
Ord Minnett S. 128 0.772 o 0.537 + 0.009 0.078 0.000 0.685 o 0.193 + 0.001 0.860 0.000 
UBS 478 0.927 o 0.412 + 0.001 0.496 0.000 0.558 o 0.571 + 0.028 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 482 0.946 o 0.137 + 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.542 o 0.611 + 0.039 0.006 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.929 o 0.150 + 0.000 0.562 0.000 0.603 o 0.291 + 0.009 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
 
 
- 160 - 
Table 15: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Singapore (Prime Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Citigroup  94 0.580 o 0.604 NA NA 0.004 0.000 0.308 o 0.163 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit Suisse 95 0.847 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.355 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.002 
Deutsche Bank  164 0.996 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.920 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs  151 0.792 - 0.003 o 0.696 0.000 0.000 0.871 o 0.196 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
HSBC  322 1.090 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 2.542 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon  164 1.144 o 0.457 o 0.119 0.000 0.000 2.295 o 0.956 - 0.030 0.000 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 122 0.784 o 0.280 o 0.055 0.000 0.000 1.378 o 0.951 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Morgan Stanley 95 0.818 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.704 - 0.010 o 0.338 0.000 0.000 
Nomura  183 0.973 - 0.000 o 0.505 0.000 0.000 1.054 - 0.008 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
OCBC Bank  194 0.970 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.868 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 144 0.749 o 0.430 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.398 o 0.903 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 168 0.978 - 0.061 o 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.863 o 0.395 o 0.064 0.000 0.000 
U. Overseas Bank 190 0.937 - 0.013 o 0.058 0.000 0.000 1.050 o 0.542 + 0.004 0.000 0.000 
UOB Kay Hian  143 9.037 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 2.053 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 392 0.946 - 0.000 o 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.749 - 0.002 - 0.039 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available.  
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Table 16: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Singapore (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Citigroup  382 0.847 o 0.196 + 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.431 o 0.189 o 0.229 0.353 0.000 
Credit Suisse 154 0.922 o 0.246 o 0.058 0.270 0.000 0.424 o 0.531 o 0.264 0.000 0.000 
DBS Bank 208 0.892 o 0.554 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.379 o 0.349 - 0.032 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank  240 0.916 o 0.999 + 0.003 0.017 0.047 0.761 o 0.844 + 0.049 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs  454 0.818 o 0.111 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.522 o 0.557 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
HSBC  335 0.926 o 0.553 o 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.501 o 0.948 - 0.002 0.000 0.000 
IHS 212 0.891 o 0.119 o 0.990 0.451 0.000 0.311 - 0.098 o 0.622 0.000 0.000 
ING 279 0.697 o 0.319 + 0.028 0.024 0.000 0.097 o 0.442 + 0.011 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon 166 0.541 o 0.494 + 0.041 0.149 0.163 0.064 o 0.495 o 0.914 0.626 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 236 0.572 - 0.057 o 0.375 0.059 0.000 0.188 o 0.426 + 0.023 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 127 0.767 o 0.313 o 0.855 0.470 0.027 0.371 o 0.229 o 0.874 0.000 0.001 
Nomura  252 0.663 o 0.571 o 0.385 0.202 0.000 0.426 o 0.319 + 0.031 0.000 0.000 
OCBC Bank  323 0.831 o 0.554 o 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.527 o 0.750 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 128 0.315 - 0.052 o 0.796 0.001 0.444 0.001 o 0.391 o 0.492 0.000 0.028 
S. Chartered Bank 243 0.658 o 0.484 + 0.016 0.049 0.002 0.098 o 0.823 o 0.066 0.000 0.000 
UBS 122 0.625 o 0.951 o 0.435 0.146 0.002 0.355 o 0.492 o 0.411 0.000 0.000 
U. Overseas Bank 206 0.751 o 0.412 + 0.026 0.176 0.000 0.615 o 0.240 + 0.000 0.031 0.000 
UOB Kay Hian  143 0.837 o 0.434 o 0.184 0.051 0.000 0.342 o 0.719 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.770 o 0.511 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.436 o 0.403 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 17: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for South Korea (3-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Credit Suisse 112 0.295 - 0.032 o 0.790 0.009 0.000 0.403 - 0.021 o 0.340 0.000 0.000 
Daewoo Securities 208 0.849 - 0.090 o 0.874 0.000 0.000 0.586 o 0.465 o 0.172 0.000 0.000 
Daishin Economics 133 0.634 - 0.098 o 0.466 0.000 0.000 0.164 - 0.000 - 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Dresdner Bank  179 0.724 - 0.002 o 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.643 - 0.006 o 0.473 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 94 0.838 - 0.009 o 0.848 0.002 0.000 0.634 o 0.463 o 0.108 0.000 0.000 
Hyundai Securities 228 0.714 - 0.005 o 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.216 - 0.056 o 0.166 0.000 0.000 
ING Baring 94 0.322 o 0.149 - 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.382 - 0.000 - 0.040 0.001 0.000 
LG Group 211 0.856 - 0.056 o 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.338 - 0.001 - 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Samsung ER 196 0.923 - 0.000 o 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.830 - 0.021 - 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Sakura 143 0.581 - 0.013 o 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.020 - 0.031 o 0.107 0.372 0.000 
Shinhan Securities 144 0.640 - 0.002 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.138 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Societe Generale 92 0.841 - 0.000 o 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.573 o 0.725 o 0.123 0.000 0.002 
UBS 101 0.912 - 0.018 o 0.073 0.001 0.000 0.820 - 0.038 o 0.781 0.000 0.005 
Consensus Forec. 278 0.834 - 0.047 o 0.795 0.000 0.000 0.485 - 0.008 - 0.014 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available. 
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Table 18: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Taiwan (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Citigroup  176 0.325 o 0.116 o 0.791 0.000 0.043 0.000 - 0.036 o 0.645 0.000 0.294 
HSBC  192 0.629 - 0.004 o 0.681 0.000 0.000 0.127 - 0.094 o 0.163 0.000 0.000 
IHS  234 0.645 - 0.023 - 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.222 - 0.018 o 0.222 0.000 0.000 
ING  224 0.675 o 0.119 o 0.752 0.000 0.005 0.208 o 0.120 o 0.941 0.000 0.000 
Nomura  167 0.635 - 0.004 o 0.444 0.001 0.000 0.001 - 0.032 o 0.391 0.000 0.000 
Polaris Research 134 0.721 - 0.000 o 0.601 0.000 0.000 0.339 - 0.003 o 0.314 0.000 0.000 
Taiwan Institute R. 126 0.719 o 0.227 + 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.222 o 0.102 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 236 0.672 - 0.045 o 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.201 - 0.065 o 0.234 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available. 
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Table 19: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Thailand (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
Institution # TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
TOTA Res P-
Value 
Res P-
Value 
P-
Value 
P-
Value 
Citigroup 298 0.823 o 0.366 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.468 o 0.570 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 82 0.972 o 0.762 + 0.006 0.064 0.000 0.797 o 0.320 o 0.908 0.298 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 377 0.762 o 0.231 o 0.297 0.063 0.000 0.522 o 0.368 o 0.366 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 346 0.865 o 0.349 + 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.361 o 0.332 o 0.060 0.000 0.000 
ING  400 0.820 o 0.328 + 0.006 0.481 0.000 0.344 o 0.297 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kasikornbank 390 0.761 o 0.148 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.391 o 0.401 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 155 0.865 o 0.270 o 0.659 0.000 0.002 0.538 o 0.524 - 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Morgan Stanley 85 0.963 o 0.379 o 0.804 0.194 0.027 0.131 o 0.509 o 0.095 0.030 0.095 
Nomura 146 0.791 o 0.487 + 0.000 0.000 0.421 0.579 o 0.912 + 0.006 0.000 0.007 
Phatra Thanakit S. 334 0.850 o 0.370 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.554 o 0.382 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Siam C. Bank 175 0.899 o 0.254 + 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.725 o 0.391 o 0.506 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 206 0.841 o 0.838 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.398 o 0.474 + 0.047 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.841 o 0.437 + 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.477 o 0.379 o 0.186 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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A further factor is that it is obviously more difficult to forecast market interest rates than those 
which are set or controlled by governments. The base lending rate in China, the prime lending 
rate in Hong Kong, the base lending rate and the three-month interest rate in Malaysia as well 
as the prime lending rate in Singapore are set directly by the respective administration or – at 
least partly – managed by it. The success rate for the relevant forecast time series is relatively 
high: 75% of the forecast time series for these interest rates predict the future interest rate 
trend (rising or falling) significantly better than a random walk forecast. 
5 Conclusion 
We analyzed interest rate forecasts for the Asia-Pacific region in the period from 1990-2016. 
To do so, we examined individual interest rate forecasts from Australia, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. As a 
basis we used forecasting data which had been published in the journal Asia Pacific Consensus 
Forecasts on a monthly basis. We did not limit ourselves to the analysis of consensus forecasts, 
however: We also evaluated all of the forecast time series issues by banks, investment com-
panies, consulting firms, associations and industrial companies. Overall we assessed 532 fore-
cast time series with a total of 85,264 individual interest rate forecasts. The variety of proce-
dures which we used to measure the quality of forecasts enabled us to create a comprehen-
sive evaluation of forecasting performance in the Asia-Pacific region. We carried out a com-
parison to naïve forecasts. We examined the forecast time series for evidence of topically-
orientated trend adjustments. In addition, we deployed the sign accuracy test and the unbi-
asedness test.  
The results are very sobering in part. 95.9% of all forecast time series are characterized by the 
phenomenon of topically-oriented trend adjustments. This means that the overwhelming ma-
jority of all forecast time series reflect the present rather than the future. In total, 99.4% of all 
forecast time series proved to be biased. Given that topically-orientated trend adjustments 
usually lead to the error term ut not being distributed randomly, the result of the unbiasedness 
test is not surprising.  
Only a small proportion of the forecast time series (3.6%) reflected the future interest rate 
trend significantly more precisely than a naïve forecast. The only forecast whose success went 
beyond rare individual cases was that for the prime lending rate in Hong Kong. 46.7% of these 
forecast time series predict the future interest rate trend significantly better than a random 
walk forecast. 
However, some of the results of the study are also surprisingly positive. The sign accuracy test 
reveals that in 248 out of 513 forecast time series (48.3%), the future trend (rising or falling 
interest rates) has been grasped significantly better than by a random walk forecast. In this 
context, at least part of the forecasts for Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore and Thailand proved to be particularly successful. 
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Overall it can be stated that – at least in some countries and for some forecast horizons – 
forecasts of future interest rate trends in the Asia-Pacific region are significantly more suc-
cessful than those made in other parts of the world. This has consequences for portfolio man-
agement: Active portfolio management strategies have no prospects of success in many finan-
cial markets because the necessary forecasting competence is simply not there. However, this 
is different, for example, in the case of the Indian bond market. 61.5% of the forecast time 
series on the interest rates of Indian state bonds with ten years remaining to maturity (fore-
cast horizon: 13 months) predict the future interest rate trend (rising or falling) significantly 
better than a random walk forecast. This should suffice in order to achieve systematic excess 
returns with active portfolio management strategies. 
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Appendix 
Table 20: Overview of Studies on the Accuracy of Survey-Based Interest Rate Forecasts 
Study Countries An-
alyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Friedman (1980) USA Fed Funds Rate, 3-Month and 
12-Month Bills, 6-Month Eu-
rodollars, Utility Bonds, Mu-
nicipal Bonds 
Goldsmith-Nagan Bond 
and Money Market Letter 
1969 - 1977 Unbiasedness Test, Effi-
ciency Test, Consistency 
Test 
Negative 
Throop (1981) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate Goldsmith-Nagan Bond 
and Money Market Letter 
1970 - 1979 MSE, RMSE Positive 
Belongia (1987)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate  Wall Street Journal 1981 - 1986  Direction of Change, 
MAE, RMSE   
Negative 
Dua (1988)  USA 3-Month and 12-Month 
Treasury Bill Rate, Fed Funds 
Rate  
Goldsmith-Nagan Bond 
and Money Market Letter 
/ Federal Reserve Bulletin 
/ Bond Buyer 
1972 - 1985  MAE, RMSE, Theil´s U Mixed 
Simon (1989) USA Fed Funds Rate Money Market Services 1984 - 1987 MAE, MSE Negative 
Hafer / Hein (1989)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate  Bond and Money Market 
Letter 
1969 - 1989  Bias Tests, Market Effi-
ciency Tests 
Negative 
Francis (1991) USA Various Bank Interest Rates 
in Pennsylvania 
Call Reports 1983 - 1986 Mann-Whitney Test Negative 
Zarnowitz / Braun 
(1992) 
USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate ASA-NBER Quarterly Sur-
vey 
1968 - 1990 ME, MAE, RMSE Mixed 
Hafer / Hein / MacDon-
ald (1992)  
USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate Bond and Money Market 
Letter / Wall Street Jour-
nal 
1977 - 1988  Unbiasedness Test, ME, 
MAE, RMSE, Theil´s U 
Negative 
Domian (1992)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate IBC / Donoghue’s Money 
Fund Report 
1982 - 1990  Granger Causality Negative 
Ilmanen (1996)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-year Government 
Bond Yield 
 Wall Street Journal 1981 - 1994  Yield Change Predic-
tions Compared to For-
wards and No-Change 
Negative 
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Study Countries An-
alyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Kolb / Stekler (1996)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-Year Government 
Bond Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1982 - 1990  Compared to No-
Change, Random Walk 
measured by Skillings-
Mack, Fisher’s Exact 
Negative 
Cho (1996) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-Year Government 
Bond Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1989 - 1994 Rank Consistency Test Mixed 
Gosnell / Kolb (1997)  GER, JPN, CH, 
GB, USA 
3-Month Euromarket Rate   Risk 1990 - 1992  Measured against  
No-Change Model and 
Forward Rate Forecast 
Mixed 
Baghestani / Jung / 
Zuchegno (2000) 
USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate ASA-NBER Quarterly 
Survey 
1983 - 1995 Unbiasedness Test Negative 
Albrecht (2000)  GER 3-Month Rate, 10-Year Gov-
ernment Bond Yield  
Finanzen 1991 - 1997  ME Negative 
Spiwoks (2003)  GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 1999  Theil’s U, TOTA Coeffi-
cient 
Negative 
Greer (2003)  USA 30-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1984 - 1998  Binomial Test, Direc-
tional Accuracy Test, In-
stitutional Affiliation 
Test 
Mixed 
Brooks / Gray (2004)  USA 30-Year and 10-Year Govern-
ment Bond Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1982 - 2002  
 
 
Simplified Sign Accuracy 
Test, Simplified Unbi-
asedness Test 
Negative 
Benke (2004)  GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Handelsblatt 1991 - 2003  Simplified Sign Accuracy 
Test 
Negative 
Mose (2005)  GER, USA 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2005  MAE Negative 
Baghestani (2005) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) 
2001 - 2003 ME, MAE, RMSE  Negative 
Scheier / Spiwoks 
(2006)  
GB 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2004  Theil’s U2, TOTA Coeffi-
cient 
Mixed 
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Study Countries An-
alyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Benke (2006)  GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Handelsblatt 1992 - 2005  Simplified Sign Accuracy 
Test  
Negative 
Spiwoks / Hein (2007)  FRA, GER, ITA, 
JPN, GB, USA 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
ZEW-Finanzmarktreport 1995 - 2004  RMSE, MARE Negative 
Mitchell / Pearce (2007) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-Year Government 
Bond Yield 
Wall Street Journal 1982 - 2002 Unbiasedness Test Negative 
Tabak / Feitosa (2008) BRA Short Term Interest Rate Selic / Bloomberg and 
Central Bank of Brazil 
1982 - 2002 MSE, Diebold-Mariano Positive 
Goodhart / Lim (2008) NZ, GB 3-Month Official Cash NZ, Of-
ficial Bank Rate UK (Libor) 
RBNZ and BoE Interest 
Rate Forecasts 
NZ 2000 - 
2006 
UK 1992 - 
2004 
Unbiasedness Test Mixed 
Spiwoks / Bedke / Hein 
(2008)  
USA 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield and 3-Month Treasury 
Bill Rate 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2004  Unbiasedness Test, Sign 
Accuracy Test, Efficiency 
Test 
Mixed 
Spiwoks / Bedke / Hein 
(2009) 
CH 3-Month Interest Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1998 - 2007 Unbiasedness Test, Sign 
Accuracy Test, TOTA Co-
efficient, Efficiency Test 
Negative 
Chun (2009) USA Fed Funds Rate, Short, Me-
dium and Long Maturity Yield  
Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts 
1993 - 2011 Compared against Time-
series Models, Parame-
tric Yield Curve Models 
and Futures Prices 
Mixed 
Spiwoks / Bedke / Hein  
(2010) 
GER 3-Month Interest Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2006 Unbiasedness Test, 
TOTA Coefficient, Effi-
ciency Test, Sign Accu-
racy Test, Modified 
Diebold-Mariano Test, 
Theil’s U2 
Mixed 
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alyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Gubaydullina / Hein / 
Spiwoks (2011) 
CAN, CH, ESP, 
FRA, GER, ITA, 
JPN, NLD, 
NOR, SWE, 
GB, USA 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield and 3-Month Interest 
Rate 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2009  TOTA Coefficient Negative 
Jongen / Verschoor / 
Wolff (2011) 
23 countries 
inter alia AUS, 
HK, IDN, MYS, 
NZ, SGP, TWN 
3-Month Interest Rates   
 
Consensus Forecasts 1995 - 2009 Dickey-Fuller Unit Root 
Test, Expectations Hy-
pothesis Tests 
Mixed 
Schwarzbach / Kunze / 
Rudschuck / Windels 
(2012)  
GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Bloomberg, Reuters 1999 - 2011  Augmented Dickey 
Fuller Test (ADF Test), 
Johansen Approach, 
Granger Causality 
Negative 
Chortareas / Jit-
maneeroj / Wood 
(2012)  
GB 3-Month Interest Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2006  Unbiasedness Test, Or-
thogonality Test 
Negative 
Baghestani / Marchon  
(2012) 
BRA Central Bank of Brazil Selic 
Interest Rate Target 
Central Bank of Brazil 
Online Survey 
2003 - 2011 Unbiasedness Test Positive 
Butter / Jansen (2013) GER, GB, JPN, 
NLD, USA 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
Consensus Forecasts 2003 - 2008 Successful Forecasts as 
a Percentage of Total 
Forecasts 
Negative 
Kunze / Kramer / 
Rudschuk (2013) 
EUR 3-Month EURIBOR Bloomberg/Reuters Pro-
fessional Survey Fore-
casts 
1998 - 2011 Granger Causality Mixed 
Knüppel / Schulte-frank-
enfeld (2013) 
BRA, GB Interest Rates Central Bank COPOM, IBGE 1999 - 2011 RMSE Positive 
Kunze / Gruppe (2014) EUR 3-Month EURIBOR Consensus Forecasts 1998 - 2013 Quandt-Andrews Break-
point Test, Theil´s U 
Mixed 
Baghestani / Danila 
(2014)  
CZE 2-Week Repo Rate and 12-
Month Interbank Interest 
Rate (PRIBOR)  
Czech National Bank 
(CNB) 
2005 - 2012  Theil´s U, Diebold-
Mariano Test, Fisher´s 
Exact Test 
Mixed 
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Methods Used Result 
Beechay / Österholm 
(2014)  
SWE Government Bond Yield, For-
ward Rate and Interest-Rate 
Swaps  
 
Prospera, Swedish Finan-
cial Markets 
2002 - 2012  Unbiasedness Test, Effi-
ciency Test, Modified 
Diebold Mariano Test, 
RMSE 
Mixed 
Kunze / Gruppe / 
Wendler (2015) 
EUR 3-Month EURIBOR  Consensus Forecasts 1998 - 2013  Sign Accuracy Test, 
Turning Point Analysis, 
RMSE 
Mixed 
Spiwoks / Gubaydullina 
/ Hein (2015) 
CAN, CH, ESP, 
GER, FRA, GB, 
ITA, JPN, NLD, 
NOR, SWE, 
USA 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2009 TOTA Coefficient 
 
Negative 
Oliver / Pasaogullari 
(2015) 
USA Fed Funds Rate, 1-Year, 5-
Year and 10-Year Bond Yield   
Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts 
1990 - 2012 RMSE Mixed 
Baghestani / Arzaghi / 
Kaya (2015) 
AUS, CAN, CH, 
EUR, GB, JPN, 
USA 
3-Month Eurocurrency Rate 
and 10-Year Government 
Bond Yield 
Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts 
1999 - 2008 Unbiasedness Test, 
Theil’s U, ME, MAE, Sign 
Accuracy Test, Rational-
ity Test 
Mixed 
Pierdzioch (2015) USA Prime Interest Rate, Treasury 
Bill Rate and T-Bond Rate  
Livingston Survey 1981 - 2013 ROC (Relative Operating 
Characteristic) Curves 
Analysing Techniques 
Positive 
Miah / Khalifa / 
Hammoudeh (2016) 
30 Countries 
inter alia CHN, 
HK, IND, KOR, 
PHL, SGP, 
THAI, TWN 
Long-Term and Short-Term 
Interest Rates 
Fx4casts.com 2001 - 2012 Unbiasedness Test, Effi-
ciency Test, Unit Root 
Test 
Mixed 
Kunze / Wegener / Bizer 
/ Spiwoks (2017) 
GER, GB 3-Month Interbank Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
Consensus Forecasts 1993 - 2014 RMSE, Theil´s U, 
Diebold-Mariano Test 
Negative 
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